


'"••^'T.-ii.f.i'l.i,. '•-.. 

E«-»->Ji .■r-V.r.i.-^^..-. -. 

■*»;:..,w^.;..jpi,:;; 
















B'*'i^'jfy"*~-i»'*-.':-j:u'-'..i:..i:i»,'.r: r-**. .: : „.; 



,vsCj.,U4:<v'.- 
















ii:.: 



'••Ji ■•;;.'. 



i';,...i'?,r:;'„, .>-' ■ 
.:.;'•■;. i;«Si.(.!l,-./; 






i?,«f^>,:M<;i-«>';^;'-V..v.''::.f,:;i,3»;^jra.-r'.^ 






.tiVi . 










?«^tir„" 



lUtM:. 







Ube Univ^ersitp of Cbicaao 

FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 



THE SOCIAL MIND 



AND 



EDUCATION 



A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTIES OF THE GRAD- 
UATE SCHOOLS OF ARTS, LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE, 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 



DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 



BY 



GEORGE EDGAR VINCENT 



/^C 



CHICAGO 

Ube xanivetsiti? ot Cbica^o press 

London: LUZAC & CO., \6 Great Russell St., W. C. 






INTRODUCTION. 

The task which this essay undertakes is one of organi- 
zation, rather than of investigation, the putting together in 
relations of interdependence, or mutual reinforcement, of 
ideas which have been worked out in connection with sev- 
eral more or less isolated pursuits. 

In terms of a proposition to be presented in Chapter I., 
the attempt belongs to that synthetic movement which is 
one of the factors in the progress of both the social and 
the individual mind. An effort is made to bring con- 
ceptions from social philosophy to bear upon the problem 
of education, with the hope that there may result both clar- 
ification of ideas and greater definiteness of purpose. 

The thought of social philosophy which sees in the 
development of society the growth of a vast psychic or- 
ganism, to which individuals are intrinsically related, in 
which alone they find self-realization, is of the highest 
significance for the teacher, to whom it suggests both aim 
and method. ^ 

While this undertaking is, in general, synthetic, its 
scope is so vast that emphasis will be laid chiefly, if not 
exclusively, upon the cognitive function of society and 
of the individual. Such one-sidedness of treatment is 
adopted deliberately, and not from any failure to recognize 
the organic unity of the mind. A complete view of the 
subject would include all the intimately interdependent 
aspects of both social and individual consciousness. Again, 
the view is confined to social life, as the sphere of man's 
activity, and as affording the immediate material of his 



Introduction. 



science and philosophy. The widest treatment would 
comprehend a cosmic philosophy ; but for obvious reasons 
it is necessary to limit an inquiry already covering an 
immense field. This primary synthesis must itself be 
further combined in the broader conception of the uni- 
verse. 

The argument of this essay, in its main outlines, is as 
follows : 

In the process of social evolution men's ideas, judg- 
ments, and desires have been combined into products 
which, transmitted from generation to generation, react 
upon individuals, and are in turn modified by them. 
These ' ' capitalizations of experience ' ' and their unceasing 
reactions form what may be described as the social mind. ^ 

The social tradition, in the course of its development, 
has been enriched by the successive separation or analysis 
of the world of phenomena and the generalization and re- 
combination of them in explanations or theories. Gradu- 
ally out of empiricism and "common sense" have been 
evolved more and more methodic examination and purpose- 
ful explanation, i. <?. , science and philosophy. Although 
differing chiefly in range and exactness of explanation, 
science and philosophy are therefore in a broad sense com- 
plementary processes of the social mind, which seeks not 
only knowledge of details, but a conception of the whole. 
Philosophy, in one of its functions at least, is a " science of 
the sciences." 

The race, confronted from the beginning by a complex 
of physical, vital, mental, and social phenomena, has 
analyzed and combined these facts, has slowly formed 
nuclei of phenomena related by obvious causes, and, 
struggling always for unity, has filled up the gaps between 

1 For purposes of brief exposition here this concept is personified in a manner 
which might be misleading, but for the fuller explanation of the term to be given 
in Chapter I. 



Introduction. vii 



such groups by explanations, more or less anthropomor- 
phic. 

In the lapse of time these gaps have grown smaller and 
smaller, until with the marvelous growth of the nature 
groups, which in many cases have quite touched borders, 
the explanations have become more and more definitely 
and immediately causal. A group of social theories has 
always been present in the collective tradition, but in 
comparative isolation and vague consciousness. The 
modern tendency has brought this group into close rela- 
tion with the others, which are now seen to be subordinate 
to it. So that the science of society (in a broad sense, 
not Sociology as a special discipline) is being recognized 
as the scientia scientiartcm, a true philosophy. Modern 
social philosophy is the latest conscious synthesis of the 
social mind. 

The sciences, or groups of knowledge, which have been 
reflectively organized out of the experiences of the race, 
are all related to social life, which is their point of de- 
parture and the common centre to which they return. 
Social philosophy comprehends society by organizing into 
a unity these elements of analysis. 

The parallel between the development of the individual 
and that of the race, asserted by poets, scientists, and 
philosophers, has of late been subjected to criticism. It 
has been pointed out that there are "short-cuts" by 
which in individual evolution whole stages of the race's 
growth may be omitted. Educationally, the theory of 
parallel development is fruitful in suggestions, but it may 
easily be made the basis of artificial schemes, such as 
certain doctrinaire forms of the "Culture Epoch theory," 
which assume that the products of different stages of 
social development, rather than life itself, must appeal to 
the child at corresponding periods of his development. 



viii Introduction. 



The real parallel is in the process, the progress from 
analysis to synthesis, and in the gradual development of 
fully self-conscious effort out of vaguely conscious activity. 

Education sets before itself the task of relating the indi- 
vidual intrinsically to the social tradition so that he may 
become an organic part of society. It aims to effect 
"short-cuts" in the evolution of the individual mind, but 
it must not violate the general laws of that development. 
All current plans for the concentration, correlation, or 
coordination of studies deal with the early or unconscious 
period of growth, during which it is quite as important to 
direct and systematize the process of analysis, i. e. , to aid 
the pupil in taking apart the vague unity of his life ex- 
periences, as to maintain relations between these parts or 
studies. 

The problems of the earlier stages in education are 
being attacked vigorously, but the analogy of race de- 
velopment suggests also the necessity of a conscious syn- 
thesis in the higher education. The stress there is now 
laid upon analysis, upon the study of subjects, and separate 
disciplines, while the complementary process of combina- 
tion, *or integration, is, for the most part, left to chance, 
to the gradual and comparatively planless effort of the 
maturing individual to arrange his scattered knowledge 
into a coherent theory of the phenomena which his daily 
life presents. It should be, therefore, a definite aim of 
the higher education to direct the student in a purposeful 
integration of his various pursuits, a putting back of these 
abstractions into a concrete conception of life. 

No study, in itself, can be a core for such integration. 
Social life and the student in relation to it form the real 
centre. The various social sciences, conceived broadly, 
may be made to serve the purpose ; literature, regarded as 
a social product, may render important aid. But in so far 



Introduction. ix 



as these instruments are useful they are really approxima- 
tions to a social philosophy, which aims to recombine into 
a more significant organic unity all the kinds of knowl- 
edge which have been analyzed and abstracted out of the 
life of men. 

Obviously, such a preliminary philosophy will not form 
a stable equilibrium in the student's mind. His in- 
creasingly complex experiences, varying interests, and 
maturing observation will compel continued analysis and 
synthesis. But this consciously directed integration will 
effect a "short-cut" in his mental development, and will 
help to secure, with economy of effort, his incorporation 
with the social mind. It will all the more quickly fit 
him for his social activities and will the sooner enable him 
to contribute something to the progressive organization of 
the social tradition. 



THE SOCIAL MIND AND EDUCATION. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE SOCIAL MIND AND ITS DEVELOPMENT. 

The modern conception of the social or general mind is 
the result of a conscious effort to discriminate and explain 
the phenomena which have their origin in the influence of 
individual minds upon each other in society, and the 
action and reaction between individuals and the accumu- 
lated psychical resources which are trainsmitted from gen- 
eration to generation. The unconscious or empirical 
recognition of these phenomena has long found expression 
in such phrases as "public opinion," "popular will," "the 
spirit of the people," the "Zeitgeist," the " ame des 
peuples," and is vaguely implied in the adjective "unan- 
imous." 

It is to be expected that thus early in the attempt to 
mark off and organize the phenomena of social psychology 
there should be decided differences of opinion both as to 
their nature and as to the concepts by which they may 
be most satisfactorily expounded. Without attempting to 
discuss or reconcile these conflicting views, we shall try to 
describe the generally established facts of the social mind. 

At the outset we must guard against the dangers which 
lurk in the use of analogies. There can be no facts of 
collective consciousness outside of and apart from individ- 
ual consciousness. James has insisted upon this in his 
delightfully concrete way: "Take a dozen words," he 
says, "and take twelve men and tell to each one word. 



J 2 The Social Mind and Education. 

Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and 
let each think of his word as intently as he will ; nowhere 
will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence. 
The private minds do not agglomerate into a higher com- 
pound mind."' If, however, each of these men com- 
municate his word to the others, and by dint of mutual 
suggestion the sentence be united in the consciousness of 
each, the group may be regarded as of one mind, and the 
sentence, a result of cooperation, is a social product. If it 
be symbolized in written language, it takes on no new or 
really objective nature but is simply a potentiality, and has 
no actual existence as thought until it gets itself translated 
again into individual consciousness.^ 

From the earliest beginnings of society men have been 
cooperating by conflict, discussion, the exercise of author- 
ity, and the imitation of leaders, to produce social ideas, 
i. €., states of consciousness common to whole groups.^ 
These products, symbolized in speech or written language'* 
and embodied in ceremonials, customs, and laws, have 
been transmitted from age to age, undergoing constant 
modification and reorganization." 

Simple and obvious as the above statement seems there 
is a fallacy in its very simplicity. There is a mechanical 

1 James : Psychology, Vol. I., p. i6o. 

Fouillee, in attacking the mystical conceptions of the German Folk-psycholo- 
gists, is strenuous upon this point: " Ce qu'on appelle la conscience nationale 
est le resultat et la consonance des millions de pens^es individuelles." He denies 
emphatically that there is " fusion de toutes les consciences individuelles en une 
seule." — La science sociale contemporaine, pp. 192-193. 

2 F. H. Giddings : Principles of Sociology, p. 146. 

8"Un chaos d'id6es et d'intergts en lutte entre individus distincts et rapproches ; 
voila le premier groupe social ; et il s'agit avec cela de former le faisceau le plus 
fort et le plus volumineux de croyances qui se confirment ou ne se contredisent 
pas, de desirs qui s'entraident ou ne se contrarient pas." — G. Tarde : La logique 
sociale, p. 96. 

4 A. E. Fr. Schaffle: Bau und Leben des socialen Kbrpers, I. Auf., Bd. I., S. 94. 

6 W. H. Payne describes the experiences of the race as " capitalized and trans- 
mitted " from generation to generation. Educational Review, Vol. X., p. 137. 



The Social Mhid mid Its Development. 13 

or chemical analogy in the conception of ideas being com- 
bined into products, which is likely to mislead unless its 
use be carefully guarded. Every modification of social 
thought must be effected in the mind of some one man, 
must result from a unified state of individual conscious- 
ness/ Otherwise a social "mind-stuff" theory^ or an 
Herbartian metaphysic would be needed to explain the 
phenomenon. It is only when looked at in a general way 
and over considerable periods that this movement of the 
social mind seems to assume an independent and some- 
what super-psychical character. There is a distinct ad- 
vantage in taking this social and objective point of view, if 
only the really individual nature of the elaboration be kept 
in thought. The stream of social consciousness has no ■ 
other channels through which to flow than those of indi- 
vidual minds. It may be frozen into symbolic forms, but 
melts into mobility again only in the consciousness of man. 
Yet it would be a serious mistake to reduce the phe- 
nomena of the social mind to those of individual psy- 
chology merely. 

"The spirit of the people [declares Falckenberg] is not a 
phrase, an empty name, but a real force, not a sum of the individ- 
uals belonging to the people, but an encompassing and controlling 
power which brings forth in the whole body processes {e. g., 
language) which could not occur in individuals as such. It is 4 
only as a member of society that any one becomes truly man. 
The community is the subject of the higher life of spirit." ^ 

There is an idealism about such a paragraph which is 
suggestive but at the same time somewhat vague. Lewes 
speaks more definitely : "A solitary man would think and 
feel and will ; but he would no more fashion his feelings, 

1 Lewes has pointed this out in these words : " Nor can experience be likened 
to any complex of parts ; it is no mosaic of elements ; it is a living, developing, 
manifold unity." — Pi'oblems of Life and Mind ; The Study of Psychology, p. i8o. 

2 James : loc. cit., Vol. I., pp. 158-162. 

3 History of Modern Philosophy (tr. by Armstrong), p. 623. 



14 The Social Mind and Education. 

thoughts, and volitions into conceptions which are the 
formulae of knowledge than he would articulate them in 
words."* Even the forms of thought, elaborated through 
a long period of social development, are transferred^ to 
the individual. The contents of his mind are in large 
measure social products. /Through symbols of many- 
kinds the thoughts of others past and present reproduce 
themselves in his consciousness. Durkheim sees in the 
reaction of social products upon the individual a veritable 
compulsion, the domination of an independent entity over 
subjects powerless to resist.^ 

This is an extreme statement of the relation, yet it con- 
tains much truth, i-'l'he conceptions which have been 
formulated during the development of society become 
"necessities of thought" to the individual.^ The accu- 
mulated and organized observations and explanations of 
the race are communicated to him and either constitute 
his own view of reality or form a basis for further advance 
and modification.* 

1 Loc. cit., p. i6i. 

2 This does not imply a mechanical superposition ab extra, but a hastening and 
guiding of individual development through education. 

3 " Non seulement ces types de conduite ou de pensee sont exterieurs a I'indi- 
vidu, mais ils sont doues d'une puissance imperative et coercitive en vertu de 
laquelle ils s'imposent a lui, qu'il le veuille ou non." — E. Durkheim: Les regies 
de la mithode sociologique, p. 6. 

■4 Lewes, loc. cit., p. 169. 

In connection with this thought attention should be called to Tarde's ingenious 
theory of social categories. Just as certain forms of thought are necessary to 
classify, organize, and unify perceptions in individual consciousness, so society 
can be formed only by the aid of similar collective reconciling agencies or 
categories. " II y a done, en tout, pour I'esprit individuel, les categories sui- 
vantes, logiques et teleologiques : la Matiere-Force, I'Espace-Temps, le Plaisir et 
la Douleur : et pour I'esprit social; la Divinite, la Langue, le Bien et le Mai." — 
La logique sociale, p. 92. 

6 The formation and reaction of the general mind have been admirably de- 
scribed by Lewes : " Further, the experiences of each individual come and go. 
They correct, enlarge, destroy one another, leaving behind them a certain 
residual store which, condensed in intuitions and formulated in piinciples, direct 



The Social Mhid arid Its Development. 15 

'The social mind may be regarded either as in process of 
change or as in temporary equilibrium, as being formed or 
as a product. Such a discrimination is of course purely 
arbitrary. Yet it is a useful devise for examination and 
study. At any given moment the traditions of a society, 
economic, legal, religious, scientific, artistic, and political, 
may be thought of as social products forming in the 
aggregate the ' ' social memory. ' ' ' Yet these products 
vary greatly in definiteness and coherence. A part are 
organized and unified but a large proportion are either 
discrete and isolated or in actual antagonism. As to form, 
they are for the most part symbolized in written or printed 
language, in works of art, in technical appliances, yet, as 
has been shown, they really exist only in individual minds. 
Every scientific book is, on the one hand, the product of 
cooperation by many individuals, but, on the other, it 
represents in its final form the unified consciousness of 
one man which may be reproduced in the minds of many 
others for whom the symbols have a definite meaning. ^ 

Again, the classes of products are not common' to the 
whole society but are apportioned among many groups, or 

and modify all future experiences. The sum of these is designated as the 
individual mind. A similar process evolves the general mind — the residual 
store of experiences, common to- all. By means of language, the individual 
shares in the general fund which thus becomes for him an impersonal ob- 
jective influence. To each it appeals. We all assimilate some of its material 
and help to increase its store. Not only do we find ourselves confronting nature 
to whose order we must conform, but confronting society whose law we must 
obey." — Problems of Life and Mind, p. i6i. 

1 G. De Greef : Le transforviisnie social, p. g. 

" Limitation se trouve ainsi correspondre exactement a la mSmoire ; elle est en 
effet la memoire sociale, aussi essentielle a tous les actes, aussi n^cessaire a tous 
les instants de la vie de societe, que la memoire est constamment et essentiellement 
en fonction dans le cerveau." — Tarde : loc. cit., p. 123. Tarde greatly extends the 
term " imitation." Traditions that are widely accepted are " imitated." Means 
of communication are " facilites d'imitation." 

2 A compilation or "undigested" mass of many individual ideas is a purely 
mechanical social product without real unity, which is secured only by the fusion 
of the materials in one mind. 



1 6 The Social Mind and Education. 

at most these traditions are present in different minds in 
widely varying degrees of definiteness and clearness. The 
legal tradition enters the minds of the vast majority of 
citizens in a vague way at best. It is clearly conscious in 
the thought of a special class only, which, however, may 
be regarded as the social organ of that particular function 
of the collective mind. ''In a like manner all the tra- 
ditions of society are not merely symbolized but are in 
actual existence, forming in large measure the memories of 
individuals. Thus at any time they may be called into 
active consciousness to assimilate the new elements which 
are constantly received by the general mind.^ A dis- 
covery need not remain an isolated phenomenon until 
libraries have been ransacked to consult the social memory. 
The sifted experiences and conclusions of the race are 
active in the consciousness of many individuals who 
quickly combine in the unity of their own thoughts the 
new with the old and thus enrich the tradition and modify 
the collective memory. 

Insensibly our thought has been carried over from the 
static to the dynamic point of view. The very difificulty of 
isolating the forms of treatment is significant of the 
reality. As human consciousness is a ceaselessly changing 
stream^ so the social mind undergoes constant modifica- 
tion. Individual thoughts and feelings are, on the one 
hand, largely social products, yet, on the other, they offer 
new elements which are gathered up and integrated with 
the various traditions of the social mind. 

This process may be temporary, as in the case of mobs 

1 De Greef : loc. cit., p. 5. 

L. F. Ward : The Psychic Factors of Civilization, pp. 297-298. 

2 " Each novel impression has to be assimilated by the existing mass of 
residual impressions ; each new conclusion has to be affiliated on the old, dove- 
tailed into the rest." — Lewes: loc. cit., p. 166. 

3 James: loc. cit.. Vol. I., pp. 237-239. 



The Social Mind and Its Development. 17 

or crowds,' or it may take on a more orderly, definite, 
and permanent character. Since this essay is to deal 
chiefly with the cognitive function of both the individual 
and the social mind, attention will be directed to those 
phenomena which display more or less systematic proc- 
esses of organization/ 

The social mind, made possible by devices for the 
symbolizing and communicating of thought, attains coordi- 
nation and power in direct proportion to the organiza- 
tion of this mechanism. That society in which individuals 
are careful observers, accurate reporters, and in which the 
means exist for gathering up these observations, organizing 
them with the traditions of the past, and distributing the 
results widely, will, other things being equal, develop its 
collective knowledge to a high degree of efficiency. i/t\\\s 
is in general the process which is going on constantly in 
society. The absolutely essential importance of organized 
communication is obvious. Division of intellectual labor is 
as dependent upon communication as the specialization of 
industry upon a system of transportation. ^ 

A broad assertion like the above may mislead by its 
systematic form. Falckenberg has wisely observed : " . . 
If we may judge from the experience of the past, too much 
caution cannot be exercised in setting up formal laws for 
the development of thought."* Equal care should be 
observed in making general and simplified statements 
about complex phenomena. The social mind is not modi- 

1 Le Bon : Psychologie desfoules, pp. 12-16. 

2 It is very important to realize how greatly this restriction of the discussion 
narrows the field of inquiry. Social standards of taste and conduct, the phe- 
nomena of imitation and authority, the question of the collective will, etc., must 
be almost wholly neglected. 

3 The invention of printing was, in this view, the setting up of a communicating 
apparatus by means of which the area of social consciousness might be greatly 
increased and made the basis for the later emergence of social self-consciousness. 

4 Falckenberg : loc. cit.. p. 6. 



The Social Mind and Education. 



fied in so methodic, orderly, and mechanical a manner as 
this description would seem to imply. The process is one 
of gradual growth. Conflicting feelings and theories 
coexist and struggle for mastery. The integration is 
never complete. To quote once more from Lewes : "In 
the great total of collective experience, as in that of the 
individual, absurd perversions and wild fancies take their 
place beside exact correspondences of feeling and fact, 
and truths that are unshakable ; it is a shifting mass of 
truth and error forever becoming more and more sifted 
and organized into permanent structures of germinating 
fertility or of fossilized barrenness."' Yet beneath these 
surface phenomena of conflict and confusion, it is possible 
to discover broad general tendencies of a more orderly 
nature. We have already seen that the social tradition is 
not transmitted in a single, compact, coherent body, but 
divides rather into a large number of minor traditions, 
each of which finds clear expression in the consciousness of 
a more or less restricted group of men. This is not to say 
that much of the tradition does not in a vague way enter 
the minds of large numbers in society, or to deny that in 
rare cases the whole stream of social consciousness, in a 
generalized form of course, may flow through single minds. 
This splitting up of the social memory suggests the ques- 
tion as to how far and in what sense society may attain 
self-consciousness. If the accumulations of experience are 
divided among social groups, must not consciousness and 
self-consciousness, which depend upon memory, be equally 
fragmentary ? 

A distinction must be made at the outset between in- 
dividual and social consciousness. Each member of 
society may be conscious of his own thoughts and feelings, 
but it is only when these thoughts and feelings are common 

1 Loc. cit., p. i66. 



The Social Mind and Its Development. 19 

to a whole group that social consciousness appears. Social 
consciousness is directly dependent upon the communi- 
cating- structure and upon the intrinsic nature of the 
thought to be communicated, z. e., a fact will penetrate 
the social consciousness with a promptness proportioned to 
the facilities for transmission and to a degree dependent 
upon the generality of the interest to which It appeals.' 
Again, society may be described as self-conscious when, 
in addition to a community of thought and feeling, each 
individual realizes the significance of his own ideas and 
acts in relation to the aggregate of activities, and shapes 
his conduct in conformity with such knowledge or adopts 
general principles of procedure determined by collective de- 
liberation.^ Social self-consciousness thus develops out of 

1 De Greef has worked out an elaborate analogy between the facts of indi- 
vidual and collective consciousness. He attempts to show a parallel between the 
progressive organization of the physical nervous system and the social organs of 
psychical communication and regulation. — Introduction a la sociologie (2me 
Partie), Chap. XIII. 

2 Giddings thus characterizes social self-consciousness : " In a true social self- 
consciousness, which must be described rather than defined, the distinctive 
peculiarity is, that each individual makes his neighbor's feeling or judgment an 
object of thought, at the same instant that he makes his own feeling or thought 
such an object ; that he judges the two to be identical, and then he acts with a full 
consciousness that his fellows have come to like conclusions, and will act in like 
ways." — Principles of Sociology , p. 137. This statement alone, perhaps from the 
nature of the phenomenon described, is somewhat disappointing in its vagueness. 
In order to genuine social self-consciousness there should be a knowledge in each 
individual mind of the aggregate or totality of individual activities in their 
relations, that which Giddings later describes as " asocial perception." Through- 
out this discussion the term self-consciousness is used in general to connote 
definiteness of purpose, e.g., society acts in a self-conscious way when individuals 
conduct themselves in harmony with some common plan of procedure which has 
a fixed end in view. Cf. L. F. Ward : Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II., pp. 249, 250, 
and Fouillee: loc. cil., pp. 235-246. 

Tarde has admirably described the formation of social consciousness from the 
products of individual consciousness: "Tout, dans la creation d'une oeuvre 
sociale quelconque, simple ou composfie, n'est qu'acte de conscience, et, le plus 
souvent m^me, de reflexion et d'effort; mais, 3. I'origine, une invention [idea, 
theory, piece of literature as well as a machine] s'engendre lentement par la 
collaboration accidentelle ou naturelle de beaucoup de consciences en mouvement, 
cherchant chacune de son cote, apportant chacune son petit brin de paille ou 
d'herbe au nid commun ; puis un moment arrive souvent ou ce travail tout entier 



The Social Mind and Ediication. 



social consciousness. Obviously, definite social self- 
consciousness is possible only in advanced societies in 
which the means exist for making accurate observations, 
organizing them carefully, and distributing them widely, 
and in which on the basis of such knowledge there 
are institutions for deliberation, decision, and execution. 
Social self-consciousness is a characteristic of social ma- 
turity, and the correlative of social purpose.' 

Once more it is necessary to guard a general statement. 
The phenomena of social self-consciousness are clearly 
marked in connection with the activities of governments, 
but they are not so easily distinguished in the innumer- 
able less formal and orderly procedures of the social mind. 
But even in governments it is obvious that except in rare 
cases and in a most general way, social self-consciousness 
is really confined to comparatively small groups which 
examine the data available, see the relations involved, 
reach decisions, and carry out policies. Democracies 
difier from autocracies in the area of self-consciousness, 
which in' the former case might ideally extend to every 
mature mind, in the latter be confined to a small cabinet. ^ 

Thus the social tradition does not grow as a result of the 

commence et se termine dans un meme esprit, d'ou un invention parfait en 
naissant, telle que le telephone, comme I'a remarque Reuleaux a propos des 
machines, jaillit un jour ex abmpto. Ce moment n'arrive pas toujours, mais 
toujours on y tend. Autrement dit, tout s'opSre primitivement ^a.r multi-conscience 
€t s'opere en suit ou tend a s'operer par uni-conscience" — La logique sociale, 

p. 201. 

Tarde further illustrates his point by asserting that the varying usage of different 
authors produces a " pluri-conscious " spelling, but when an academy fixes the 
usage it becomes " uni-conscious." Ibid., p. 202. The social function of ^/ozVtf 
(fame, notoriety, novelty, celebrity) is, in Tarde's view, to enable inventions to 
penetrate the social consciousness. Ibid., p. 121. 

1 L. F. Ward : " Sociology and Biology," Am. Jour, of Sociology , Nov., 1895. 

2 It is in connection with the state that the idea of the self-conscious individu- 
ality of society has been chiefly insisted upon. The following is typical of a 
certain class of thinkers : " C'est le 'moi public' ou Etat qui est le cerveau du 
corps politique, comme le cerveau est I'Etat du corps physique." — ^Jean Izoulet : 
La cite moderne , p. 353. 



The Social Mind and Its Development. 21 

self-conscious activity of society as a whole. While from 
time to time new observations and discoveries may pene- 
trate the social consciousness, they are put in their rela- 
tions and organized into the social memory by the 
purposeful efforts of small groups to which, in the de- 
velopment of collective thought, certain portions of the 
social tradition have been intrusted.' These groups 
represent the self-consciousness of society in a less definite 
and precise but essentially the same way as do legislatures 
and cabinets.^ 

J To confine attention to those groups which are directly 
concerned in the organization of social knowledge, it is 
obvious that they are self-conscious in the sense that each 
individual is in communication with every other and knows 
that his own theories, experiments, and researches are 
related to the activities of the rest. He adopts a plan 
of work adjusted in the main to the pursuits of his 

1 The recent discovery of Professer Rontgen is a case in point. By means of 
the press the main facts quickly entered the social mind, z. ^., the same general 
state of consciousness was common to almost all individuals of intefligence. The 
discovery is the object of a social self-consciousness confined to a comparatively 
small group of- specialists who aim to relate the new fact definitely to other 
observed phenomena and systematically to carry on further investigations. 

2 Schaffle has worked out an elaborate social psychology in which he discusses 
the general consciousness {allgemeine Bewusstsein) and social self-consciousness 
{Selbstbewiisstsein). He employs the theory of the threshold of consciousness in 
an ingenious way. " Nicht jede Idee tritt ins allgemeine Bewusstsein, d. h. ins 
Bewusstsein der centralen Collectivorgane oder gar in das Bewusstsein aller 
Individuen. Nur ein sehr kleiner Theil all^r geistigen Ereignisse des socialen 
Lebens wird den Centralorganen bewusst." — Bauund Leben des socialen K'drpers, 
I. Auf., Bd. I., S. 403. By the economy of this arrangement the central organs of 
government are spared the distraction of considering many details which do not 
get above the threshold {Schwelle). As to social self-consciousness SchaflBe 
makes an important discrimination: "Ein ' vollkommenes Selbstbewusstsein,' 
welches alle neben und nach einander vorkommenden geistigen Ereignisse des 
socialen Korpers vollkommen einheitlich, dem Inhalt und der Zeitfolge nach, in 
sich zusammensasste, ist auch in socialen Korper nicht wahrzunehmen." — Ibid., 
S. 408. The psychical labor, is divided among groups so that social self- 
consciousness is distributed rather than concentrated. Only in governmental 
activities is there an approach to genuine collective self-consciousness, but even 
there only a small portion of the social life is concerned. 



22 The Social Mind and Education. 

fellow-students and aims at a more or less definite co- 
operation with them to attain a certain end. At the same 
time the contents of the social memory, so far as they 
relate to his special task, are in his consciousness and are 
undergoing constant revision and modification as new 
truth comes to light.' 

In marked contrast with this procedure are the processes 
of the savage mind. The primitive group in its organi- 
zation for war may display an incipient self-consciousness, 
but in the rationalizing of daily experiences there is com- 
plete unconsciousness. The social tradition is homo- 
geneous or shows only the beginnings of differentiation. 
Each experience is explained and adjusted not to others of 
a similar nature but to the needs of the moment^ — for 
even the primitive mind demands subjective unity. There 
may be social consciousness in a savage tribe, but social 
self-consciousness emerges only as the group begins to 
specialize its tradition and organize its psychical labor, 
setting up the communicating apparatus which these proc- 
esses involve. 

In a broad sense it may be said that social knowledge 
advances from a homogeneous and empirical to a highly 

1 The importance of bibliographies is emphasized in this view. Just in so far as 
a scientist isolates himself from his fellow-workers and fails to keep himself 
informed as to their achievements, he withdraws himself from the self-conscious 
social mind, thereby either impairing his own work or wasting his time and 
energy in useless duplications. 

The attempt of German anatomists to devise a systematic nomenclature is an 
admirable illustration of self-conscious cooperation. It is proposed to substitute 
about 5,000 terms rationally constructed and related, for the old terminology of 
more than 20,000 names vaguely conceived and variously employed in different 
works. This is a step from unconsciousness to self-consciousness, from hap- 
hazard growth to purposeful construction. 

2 " Les soci6tes primitives n'ont pas de conception physique ou sociale du 
monde ; elles vivent au jour le jour, obeissant principalement aux conditions les 
plus generales de leurs milieux, a leur besoins et leur instincts guerriers gcono- 
miques et genesiques, lesquels sont, de tous leurs besoins, les plus simples, les 
moins Aleves et les plus irrSsistibles." — De Greef: U evolution des croyances et 
des doctrines politiques, p. 27. 



The Social Mind and Its Development. 23 

differentiated and rationalized tradition, and that the pro- 
cedure, characterized in its early stages by social un- 
I consciousness, tends constantly to become increasingly 
purposeful. ' 

Yet this description is partial and needs a comple- 
mentary statement. If this were the whole truth the term 
social memory or tradition would be inapplicable. There 
would be merely social memories and traditions. But as 
has been hinted, the stream of social consciousness does 
not flow always in clearly defined and separate channels, it 
is constantly dividing and combining in the minds of men. 
To change the figure, the social tradition has grown out of 
the life experiences of the race. Each new appearance 
had to be explained and fitted with the old and familiar so 
that things might hang together and satisfy the otherwise 
distracted mind.^ Thus, from the very beginning, social 
tradition, a product of a unified life, had a certain unity in 
itself. Many of its elements grouped themselves into 
nuclei of facts in relations of obvious causality, but there 
were wide gaps which had to be filled with anim'istic and 
volitional agencies. Yet in some fashion the daily life was 
pieced together and the tradition which grew out of it 
gained coherence. 

1 Durkheim has described the gradual progress of the collective mind from the 
concrete to the abstract which is closely related to the advance from social 
unconsciousness to self-consciousness. In a small society where all individuals 
have the same environment the common consciousness has a concrete character, 
but in larger groups, extending over a broader and more varied area, the col- 
lective conceptions become abstract. — De la division dn travail social, p. 318. 
Durkheim also points out that the sciences developed from the arts, from the 
problems of daily life which were first practically solved and afterward rationally 
explained. — Les rigles de la m'ethode sociologique, p. 23. 

2 " Pour sentir combien ce besoin est profond et impgrieux, il suffit de penser un 
instant aux efFets physiologiques de 1' etonnement , et de considerer que la sensa- 
tion la plus terrible que nous puissons eprouver est celle qui se produit toutes les 
fois qu'un phfinom&ne nous semble s'accomplir contradictoirement aux lois 
naturelles qui nous sont famili^res." — AugusteComte : Cows de philosophie posi- 
tive, Tome I., p. 52. 



24 The Social Mind and Education. 

The same objective and subjective factors have been at 
work throughout tne whole process of social evolution. 
Social life with all its increasing complexity has never lost 
its unity, and the human mind, bewildering as has been the 
increase of knowledge, has never ceased its efforts to ' ' see 
things together." 

Social knowledge, therefore, has grown not only by 
division but by combination. As Spencer has so clearly 
pointed out : ' ' There has all along been higher specializa- 
tion, that there might be a larger generalization ; and a 
deeper analysis that there might be a better synthesis. 
Each larger generalization has lifted sundry specializations 
still higher, and each better synthesis has prepared the 
way for still deeper analysis."' Emerging social self- 
consciousness has been directed not only to the division of 
the social tradition and the elaboration of its parts but 
also to the recombination of them into a higher unity. 
r\ Up to this point, general statement has been employed, 
for the sake of presenting the facts as clearly as possible 
and to avoid the confusion which might be involved in 
the premature use of special terms. It now remains to 
inquire how this view of the > social mind may be stated in 
terms of the famihar intellectual tasks of men. 

Common or empirical knowledge forms a part of the 
social tradition and enters social consciousness, but is not a 
product of social self-consciousness. ' ' We break the solid 
plenitude of fact," says James, "into separate essences, 
conceive generally what only exists particularly, and by 
our classifications, leave nothing in its natural neighbor- 
hood, but separate the contiguous and join what the 
poles divorce."^ Such classification and rationalizing, 
purposeful efforts to reduce the world of phenomena to 

1 Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, Vol. II., p. 29. 

2 Psychology, Vol. II., p. 634. 



The Social Mind and Its Development, 25 

order and system produce sciences. Common knowledge 
is "untested and unanalyzed consciousness," while science 
is knowledge ' ' in its completest and purest form. ' ' ' The 
self-conscious element of the social memory, therefore, 
contains the sciences. From this point of view the prog- 
ress of the sciences is the extension of the area of self- 
consciousness in the social tradition. Common knowledge, 
originally chaotic and haphazard, is gradually ordered, 
organized, and brought under the reign of law.^ 

The methodical organization and enrichment of the 
social tradition have been achieved by division of labor 
which has become increasingly minute. "Nous sommes 
loin du temps," says Durkheim, "ou la philosophie etait 
la science unique ; elle est fragment^e en un multitude de 
disciplines sp^ciales dont chacune a son objet, sa methode, 
son esprit."^ He quotes also a passage from De Can- 
doUe,* who calls attention to the fact that in the epoch of 
Leibnitz and Newton the savant had two or three designa- 
tions, such as mathematician, astronomer, and physician. 
By the end of the eighteenth century several titles were 
still necessary to indicate the achievements, in more than 
one of the sciences and departments of letters, of men like 
Wolfi, Haller, and Charles Bonnet. In the nineteenth 
century this difficulty of description no longer remains, 
or at least is very rare. Candolle predicts that the 
dual profession of investigator and teacher will soon be 

1 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 
1878. 

2 "La succession des etats de conscience primitivement, desordonnee et 
fortuite, s'organise peu i. peu par I'activite de I'esprit. Elle ne devient intelli- 
gible pour lui que parce qu'il y met un ordre ; et par I'idee d'ordre on arrive 
ainsi a 1' idee de /ot." Quoted from a review of Andre Lalande's Lectures sur 
la philosophie des sciences, by Charles Andler in La revue philosophique. Tome 
XIX., p. 329. 

3 De la division du travail social, p. 2. 

4 Histoire des sciences et des savants, 2me Edition, p. 263. 



26 The Social Mind and Education. 

definitely differentiated. Comte commented emphatically 
upon the increasing specialization of his day, and sounded 
a note of warning which is still reechoing in popular 
phrases. ' 

In terms of the social mind such specialization has been 
shown to be a dividing up of the social self-consciousness 
and the formation of groups to each of which a certain 
class of phenomena is intrusted. Each science, therefore, 
"est le fruit d'une collaboration seculaire entre des genera- 
tions de savants. ' ' ^ The advance of each science displays 
the processes of analysis and synthesis, the examination of 
details, and the recombination into a whole, a movement 
of which Froebel wrote : "I find in pure thought the type 
and law of all development. ' ' ^ 

The same movement which within the social mind sub- 
divides the collective tradition into sciences and arts, 
characterizes also the development of these special ele- 
ments. "Division, analysis," declares Flint, "is a neces- 
sary and inevitable condition of progress both in life and 
science. Every stage of progress must be consequent on 
a stage of division, spontaneous or reflective, industrial or 
scientific."* 

But division and analysis are only half the process. 
Combination, synthesis, render a complementary service. 
Just as each science is organized into coherence, so all the 
elements of the social tradition are constantly tending 
toward integration in philosophy. 

The history of philosophy has been described by Falck- 
enberg as "the philosophy of humanity, that great in- 

1 Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 23. 

2 Tarde : La logique sociale, p. 214. 

8 Quoted by Miss Blow in Symbolic Education from a letter of Froebel to 
Krause. 

4 Robert Flint : loc. cit. 



The Social Mi7id and Its Development. 27 

dividual which . . . approaches by a necessary and 
certain growth of knowledge the one all-embracing truth 
which is rich and varied beyond our conception.'" As 
we have seen, humanity from the beginning has sought 
to unify its experiences, to explain all phenomena. This 
constant effort resulted at first in socially unconscious ex- 
planations which postulated the active agency of super- 
natural beings, and gradually with the increase of empirical 
or common-knowledge attributed all that happened to the 
power of a single God. This is the well-known theological 
stage of Comte's PJiilosophie Positive.^ It is impossible 
to mark off into definite stages the progress of collective 
thought. Only the tendency can be characterized. Fiske 
has described the movement implied in Comte's theory 
as progress from the more to the less anthropomorphic, ^ 
and Spencer has shown that in essential nature there is 
no difference between the theological, metaphysical, and 
positive stages, that all alike involve "the postulating 
of some external existence, and the postulating of this 
ultimate existence involves a state of consciousness (in 
positive philosophizing) indistinguishable from the other 
two."' 

The movement may also be described as progress from 
social unconsciousness to social self-consciousness, from 

1 Loc. cit., p. 2. 

2 " En d'autres termes, I'esprit humain, par sa nature, emploie successivement 
dans chacune de ses recherches trois methodes de philosopher, dont le car- 
actere est essentiellement different et meme radicalement oppose : d'abord la 
methode theologique, en suite la m^thode metaphysique, et enfin la methode 
positive." — Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 3. 

8 " There are not three successive or superposed processes. There is one con- 
tinuous process which (if I may be allowed to invent a rather formidable word in 
imitation of Coleridge) is best described as a continuous process of deanthropo- 
morphization or the stripping off of the anthropomorphic attributes with which 
primeval philosophy clothed the unknown power which is manifested in phe- 
nomena." — Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy , Vol. I., pp. 175-176. 

* Essays : " Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte," Vol. II., 
p. 127. 



28 The Social Mind and Education. 

spontaneous, unreflective explanations to ordered, system- 
atic, and purposeful investigation and conclusion. Be- 
tween these extremes there are many grades of partial 
self-consciousness that correspond in general to Comte's 
metaphysical stage which he himself conceived and de- 
scribed as a transition from the first to the third rather 
than as a clearly differentiated period.' 

The familiar "law of the three stages," therefore, maybe 
restated more exactly in terms of social self-consciousness. 
Each science passes gradually from unconscious empiri- 
cism to socially self-conscious or reflective organization 
and interpretation, just as philosophy in its attempt to 
interrelate and unify the sciences advances from more or 
less instinctive explanations to definitely planned and 
systematic efforts to construct a rational conception of the 
whole. Again, the order in which the sciences become 
the objects of the reflective social mind clearly depends 
upon more factors than Comte has indicated.^ The vary- 
ing simplicity and consequent progressive dependence of 
the phenomena themselves constitute only one of the 
causes which determine their relative rates of advance into 
social self-consciousness. Phenomena become the objects 
of reflective explanation not merely in the order of their 

1 " La premiere est le point de depart nScessaire de I'intelligence humaine ; la 
troisifeme, son etat fixe et definitif ; la seconde est uniquement destinee a servir de 
transition." — Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 3. 

2 Comte's principle of decreasing generality and cumulative dependence in 
the classification of the sciences was also made to serve as an explanation of the 
order in which the sciences have advanced through the " three stages." The 
well-known heirarchy is mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology 
(including transcendental biology — an abortive psychology), and social physics, 
or sociology. It should be said in justice to Comte that he himself recognized 
and admitted that the development and sequence was by no means rigidly linear. 
" On voit, en efifet, que, quelque parfaite qu'on p(it la supposer, cette classification 
ne saurait jamais etre rigoureusement conforme a I'enchainement historique des 
sciences. Quoi qu'on fasse, on ne peut 6viter entierement de presenter comma 
ant6rieure telle science qui aura cependant besoin, sous quelques rapports par- 
ticuliers plus ou moins important, d' emprunter des notions a une autre science 
classee dans un rang post^rieur. — Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 68. 



The Social Mind and Its Development. 29 

simplicity, but in proportion as they are («) conspicuous 
or obtrusive, forcing themselves on the attention of men, 
((5) frequent, demanding theories by their very iteration, 
(<:) concrete, seeking solution in definite tangible forms 
rather than in abstract relations, and (^) accessible or 
controllable within the natural or artificial range of human 
examination and analysis. ' 

Manifestly when all these influences are taken into the 
account the linear nature of Comte's law, based upon only 
one, must be greatly modified. The traditions of the 
social mind advance together in relations of mutual inter- 
dependence, the simplest aiding the more complex, while 
the latter often react in a most important way upon the 
former. In recognizing this organic growth of the social 
memory, it is unnecessary to go with Spencer to the 
extreme of wholly denying the existence of any order of 
progress based on the natural dependence of phenomena 
themselves. Even when Comte's rigid statement has 
been duly modified to include the other factors that have 
just been indicated, there remains the fact of -objective 
dependence which cannot be ignored. "So far from 
having succeeded in overthrowing that scheme [Comte's 
hierarchy of the sciences]," says Flint, "he [Spencer] has 
only succeeded in modifying it. There is a logical de- 
pendence of the sciences. And why ? Just because there 
is a natural dependence of phenomena. . . . There 
being such a hierarchy of phenomena, it is scarcely con- 
ceivable that there should be no corresponding hierarchy 
of sciences."^ 

A clear distinction should be made at this point between 
the historical order, in which certain bodies of knowledge 

1 Fiske : loc. cit., Vol. I., pp. 208-211. 

2 " The Classification of the Sciences," Presbyterian Review, July, 1886, p. 
523- 



30 The Social Mind and Education. 

have emerged into social self-consciousness, and the sys- 
tematic, reflective arrangement of these sciences in a 
scheme or classification designed to display their relations. 
Spencer^ in demonstrating the inadequacy of Comte's 
historical argument seems to ignore this discrimination. 
It is quite conceivable that the chronological sequence 
might have been in many details other than it was, but 
the exigencies of logic compel men in a self-conscious 
effort to systematize the social tradition to recognize "a 
rational dependence of phenomena" — a necessity to 
which Spencer himself has yielded in the sequence of 
the various parts of his Synthetic Philosophy.'^ But this 
distinction, which deserves passing notice here, will be 
emphasized from the pedagogical point of view in a subse- 
quent chapter. 

-^ It remains to show more definitely that philosophy 
corresponds to the synthetic movement of the social mind 
— a tendency toward integration which, no less than 
differentiation, is a condition of progress. The early 
philosopher had as his field a comparatively homogeneous 
social tradition ; he regarded all wisdom as his proper 
pursuit.^ Aristotle made a rational effort to specialize 
the social mind by the preliminary divisions of his classi- 
fication.* A classification of human knowledge is in its 
nature an act of social self-consciousness. ' ' In classing 
the sciences," says Bacon, "we comprehend not only 
things already invented and known but also those omitted 

1 Essays : Vol. II., " The Classification of the Sciences." Cf. also Fiske : loc. cit., 
Vol. I., pp. 199-212. 

2 L. F. Ward: " Sociology in Its Relation to the Social Sciences," ^wz^rzca« 
Journal of Sociology, "ivXy, 1895. 

3 Flint : The History of the Philosophy of History (France), p. 32. 

4 Aristotle divided philosophy or knowledge into (a) theoretical, including 
physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; {b) productive, the arts; and (c) practi- 
cal or moral, comprising ethics and politics, under the latter of vi'hich he also 
placed rhetoric and economics. — Vide p. 41. 



The Social Mind and Its Development. 31 

and wanted."' Here was a definitely conceived purpose 
to review the achievements of mankind and to plan an 
intellectual campaign for systematic conquest. 

Classification is a necessary preliminary for philosophical 
synthesis, it is a definite display of the analyzed elements 
which are to be organized into a unified conception.^ 
Flint mentions eighty-two philosophers, from Plato and 
Aristotle to those of the present, who have worked out 
classifications of the sciences and arts as a part of their 
intellectual contributions. The list includes, with few ex- 
ceptions, the most illustrious names in the history of 
thought. ^ 

Thus far the term philosophy has been used as though 
it tiad a definite and universal meaning. Yet this is far 
from being the case. Perhaps no term in general use is so 
vaguely and variously conceived. We cannot consider in 
detail the many theories which have been advanced in the 
past, but must confine attention to certain modern views. 
Philosophy may be regarded as having a hierarchy of 
functions, each of which is an advance upon the preced- 
ing and rests upon it. In this view philosophy may be 
regarded as : 

I. Syyithetic, which Flint describes as "simply science 
that has attained to 4he knowledge of the unity, self- 
consistency, and harmony of the teachings of the separate 
sciences."* Hodgson in attempting to discriminate be- 
tween science and philosophy presents among other 
theories virtually the same view, which he characterizes as 

1 Instauratio Magna (tr. by Dewey), p. lo. 

2 "All classification is a striving after unity. To classify it is necessary to 
generalize." — L. F. Ward : Dynamic Sociology , Vol. I., p. 3. 

3 Flint : " The Classification of the Sciences," Presbyterian Review, July, 1885, 
and July, 1886. 

4 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review , November, 
1878, p. 698. 



32 The Social Mind and Education. 

' ' Comtean Positivism. ' ' ' From a French source comes a 
statement of a similar tenor : ' ' Cette conception [onto- 
logical] de la philosophic tend aujourd'hui a disparaitre 
et 6tre remplac^e par une autre beaucoup plus facile a 
d^fendre, suivant laquelle la philosophic n'a pas d'objet 
special, est un simple unification du savoir, un ensemble 
du generalizations plus comprehensive que celles des 
sciences speciales, mais portant sur les m^mes objets."^ 
Spencer in his examination of the nature of philosophy 
regards it as a fusion of all the contributions of the 
sciences into a whole, ^ and defines the; progressive integra- 
tion of knowledge in these terms :^" Knowledge of the 
lowest kind is un-unified knowledge ; science is partially- 
unified knowledge ; philosophy is completely -unified knowl- 
edge. '"* M. Berthelot claims recognition for "an ideal 
science of the whole" which hereafter shall do purposefully 
what the systems of the past did with a sort of ' ' uncon- 
scious dissimulation."* Royce asserts that the con- 
spicuous tendency of modern thought is toward unity, the 
reconciliation of contradictions, "the unification of the 
world which anarchical passion and analytic reflection 
have conspired to rend asunder. ' ' ® Not to multiply quo- 
tations which are cited less as authorities than to indicate 
the trend of thought in minds which look at the question 
from different points of view, it is clear that philosophy 
may be regarded in one of its functions at least as an 
organization and integration of the social tradition, a re- 
flective unification of the special sciences. 

1 S. H. Hodgson : " Philosophy and Science," Mind, January, 1876. 

2 B. Bourdon : Review of R. de la Grasserie's " De la classification, objective et 
subjective, des arts, de la littSrature et des sciences," Revue philosophique, Vol. 
XIX., p. 106. 

3 First Principles, p. 132. 

4 Ibid., p. 134. 

« M. Berthelot : Science and Philosophy , reviewed in Mind, July, 1886. 
6 Josiah Royce : The Spirit of Modern Philosophy , p. 297. 



The Social Mind and Its Development. 33 

But there are other functions of philosophy which de- 
pend upon this first. They may be hardly more than 
indicated here, since they do not come within the limited 
scope of this essay. Philosophy may further be regarded as 

2. Critical, examining the conditions of all knowledge ; 
in the words of Bain, "tracking the facts of conscious- 
ness to their innermost deeps, planting all the special 
sciences upon common ground, giving every objective 
phenomenon its highest validity by showing its indissoluble 
relation to that fact of facts, self-consciousness."' Again 
philosophy may be conceived as 

3. Metaphysical, viewing all knowledge in its relation 
to primary and efficient and ultimate and final causes. In 
this view philosophy becomes, according to Hodgson, 
"the discovery of absolute existence," while the sciences 
become scientific only ' ' when they are deduced from the 
laws of the absolute existence, from which they receive 
their whole scientific character. This is the Hegelian 
view."^ Once more, in so far as philosophy may deal 
with problems of conduct it may be thought of as" 

4. Practical or moral, attempting to discover funda- 
mental principles for the guidance of humanity. 

However the scope of philosophy may be conceived, 
the dependence of its various functions upon the primary 
task of integrating the special sciences cannot be denied. 
Flint has stated the relation clearly : ' ' Philosophy as 
positive, i. e., a unification of the sciences, must precede 
philosophy as critical, metaphysical, and as practical. 
Critical philosophy, metaphysical philosophy, and prac- 
tical philosophy must further submit to be tested by posi- 
tive philosophy, by the collective results of the sciences. 

1 Communication on an allusion by Hodgson to Lewes in Mind, April, 1876. 
i Mind, January, 1876. This is not Hodgson's personal view, but one of four 
theories which he enumerates as having prominent advocates. 



1 

34 The Social Mind and Education. 

What has to be criticised are the conditions of all the 
sciences. What has to be viewed in relation to primary 
and efficient, and ultimate final causes are the results of all 
the sciences.'" 

It is with the primary function of philosophy, the inte- 
gration of the special sciences, that this discussion is 
concerned. Yet the fact should not be overlooked that 
the highest philosophic synthesis may go far beyond 
merely a systematic effort to relate and render coherent the 
various fragments of the objective world which the sciences 
present. The deeper insight into the nature of life is the 
crowning achievement of the self-conscious social mind. 
This is dependent, however, upon the preliminary syn- 
thesis. As Mackenzie remarks : " If it is the business of 
philosophy to get behind the work of the sciences and see 
their true meaning and relations, it is clear that it must 
presuppose a certain development of the sciences and 
cannot easily outstrip them. We must have got the con- 
ceptions and be able to use them with some freedom, 
before we set ourselves to the task of investigating their 
significance."^ Purposely confining attention, therefore, 
to this single function of philosophy, as it is now con- 
ceived, we remark once more that the social tradition 
displays two distinct movements, a constant and increas- 
ingly definite analysis into parts, and a complementary 
recombination of these parts into general conceptions of 
the whole. ^ To revert to a figure already employed, the 

1 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 
1878, p. 714. 

2 An Introduction to Social Philosophy , p. 38. 

3 There seems to be discoverable in scientific division of labor a tendency to 
specialization according to problems rather in artificially and arbitrarily ab- 
stracted subjects. Such terms as "physical-chemistry," " astro-physics," " chemi- 
cal physiology," " physiological psychology," etc., are full of significance. There 
are subordinate syntheses among groups of sciences. 

L. F. Ward has pointed out the relations of science and philosophy. The 



The Social Mind and Its Development. 35 

stream of social consciousness not only flows in more and 
more definite channels through the minds of men devoted 
to the various parts of the tradition, but now and again 
the separate currents converge in the consciousness of one 
individual and issue forth a fuller and deeper unity ^ only 
once more to undergo division and separation. 

Such in general is the rhythm of the social mind, yet 
beneath the seeming chaos of ideas and feelings it is hard 
to trace the movement in definite outlines. Only a broad 
glance over a wide sweep of history can reveal the process. 
Contrast Aristotle's vague classification of the sciences 
with the definite divisions of Comte,^ Shields,^ or Wundt,* 
and compare the incoherent explanations of medieval 
philosophers with the precisely stated, though tentative, 
generalizations of Von Baer, Meyer, Darwin, or Spencer. 

Philosophy, like the sciences — from which it differs in 
scope and definiteness rather than essential nature^ — 
passes from unconsciousness to social self-consciousness. 
"Whether we will it or no," says Royce, "we all of us do 
philosophize. The difference between the temperament 
which loves technical philosophy and the temperament 
which can make nothing of so-called metaphysics is 
rather one of degree than of kind."® The difference of 

former is concerned with ideal relations of coexistence or independent existence, 
the latter with real relations of sequence and dependence in a system. Dynamic 
Sociology, Vol. I., pp. 3 and 4. 

1 Tarde describes this process as philosophy which is Mwz-cowjczoMi-. ". . . la 
philosophie, c'est tout simplement I'etat uni-conscient de la science, succedant, 
progres immense a son etat morcele, emiette, multi-conscient. . . ." — Loc. cit., 
p. 204. 

2 Loc. cit., Tome I., 2me Legon. 

3 The Order of the Sciences. 

4"Uber die Entstehung der Wissenschaften." — Philosophische Studien (Bd. 
v.). Cf. also R. de la Grasserie's De la classification, objeQtive et subjective , des 
arts, de la litterature et des sciences. 

5 Each science has its philosophy which gives it unity. An inclusive philosophy 
of the sciences bears the same relation to the group of these special pursuits. 

6 The Spirit of Modern Philosophy , p. 2. 



36 The Social Mind and Education. 

degree registers itself in terms of self-consciousness. The 
social tradition, at first vaguely and unconsciously unified, 
becomes gradually the object of more and more purpose- 
ful, reflective attention' until the culminating triumph of 
collective self-consciousness is a philosophy which repre- 
sents a systematically planned effort to organize into unity 
the varied contents of the social memory.^ Philosophy, 
like the sciences, is a product of social maturity. 

The relation of the sciences and philosophy is one of 
interdependence. Philosophy, dealing with the materials 
which the sciences supply, must await their results and 
adjust itself to their discoveries. On the other hand, 
philosophy aids each special science by pointing out its 
relations to other pursuits,^ and as a coordinating agency 
helps to show how the various sciences may assist each 
other.* 

The development of each science does not display a 
definitely linear series of analysis and synthesis ; there is 
no conscious determination to avoid unifying hypotheses 
until all particulars have been isolated and examined. On 
the contrary, analysis and synthesis are concomitant.* 
A few data are combined into a guiding theory, which is 
then tested by continued experiment, or wider observation, 

1 In connection with this subject Spencer's description of the stages through 
which human opinion passes is significant. The steps of the progress are : 
"the unanimity of the ignorant; the disagreement of the inquiring, and the 
unanimity of the wise." — Education, p. 101. In other words, the advance is from 
unconscious passivity to conscious observation and to self-conscious agreement. 

2 It should be remembered that this process of unification cannot be completely 
based on positive scientific knowledge. Falckenberg insists that a new meta- 
physics is needed to supply the gaps in experience and observation and thus 
effect a unity. — History of Modern Philosophy (tr.), p. 625. 

3 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 
1878, p. 699. 

4 Ibid., p. 702. 

5 Spencer : Essays, Vol. IT., " The Genesis of Science," p. 24. 



The Social Mind and Its Development. 37 

modified to include newly discovered truths, or, if it fail 
to explain them, abandoned for a more adequate hypoth- 
esis. ' 

So it is with the progress of philosophy. The social 
tradition includes at the same time special sciences and 
unifying philosophies in action and reaction. Yet the 
dependence of philosophy upon the sciences is more 
obvious than the service of philosophy to the sciences. 
"It often happens in philosophy," says Fostor, "that a 
question is forgotten for a time while science prepares 
materials for asking it and answering it more definitely. ' ' ^ 
Spencer recognizes this relation of philosophy to science 
when he remarks that a single modern observation ' ' has 
to be digested by the organism of the sciences."^ The 
reason why the service which philosophy may render to 
the sciences has not been more clearly perceived is to 
be found in the fact that philosophy in the modern sense "* 
has only within comparatively recent times emerged into 
the social self-consciousness. Philosophy has often seemed 
so remotely related to science in the past that the term 
does not commend itself readily to scientific minds. ^ But 

1 Comte : loc. cit., Tome I., p. 7. 

2 H. M. Fostor : " Organic Evolution and Mental Elaboration," Mind, October, 
1895. 

3 Essays, Vol. II., p. 67. 

4 Mr. John Fiske's statement of the cosmic philosophy may be regarded as fairly 
tj'pical : " The cosmic philosophy is founded upon the recognition of an Absolute 
Power manifested in and through the world of phenomena ; and it consists in a 
synthesis of scientific truths into a universal science dealing with the order of the 
phenomenal manifestations of the Absolute Power." — Outlines of Cosmic Philoso- 
phy, Vol. I., p. 263. 

5 Prof. Josiah Royce has put these imaginary sentences into the mouths of the 
scientists: "See these idealists! They have long tried to call the world their 
dream and to construct it a priori. But they grow hungry in their wilderness, 
feeding the swine of strange masters and longing for the very husks of specula- 
tive guess-work and delusion. Now they come back like prodigals, hoping that 
experience, our master, will have facts and enough to spare for them. In truth 
had they remained at home their reflective cleverness might have been of much 
use to science. But they took the portion of intelligence that belonged to them. 



38 The Social Mind and Education. 

the definite effort to bring the sciences and philosophy 
into organic relations is only another evidence of a syn- 
thetic movement in the social mind. With the progress 
of this movement, the aid which a positive philosophy can 
render in the advancement of the special sciences will be 
more and more clearly recognized. 

Philosophy in its socially self-conscious phase represents 
the effort of a mature collective mind to preserve its unity. 
The social tradition, accumulated, sifted, and organized 
with increasing definiteness and purpose, has been divided 
into many sciences. All the materials of this growth have 
been derived from the phenomena of nature and human 
consciousness combined in the unity of social life. It 
follows, therefore, that the sciences themselves must make 
up a great whole, and that the system which they form 
must itself be an object of knowledge.' In other words, 
there must be a "science of the sciences" and this general 
science is philosophy.^ 

and went away, and here they come now, in all the rags of their poor systems." — 
The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 270. 

Ward declares that: "The leading distinction between modern and ancient 
philosophy is that the former proceeds from facts while the latter proceeds from 
assumptions. Every science is at the same time a philosophj'." — " The Data of 
Sociology," American Journal of Sociology , May, 1896. 

1 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 
1878, p. 697. 

2 " Philosophy claims to be the science of the whole ; but if we get the knowledge 
of the parts from the different sciences, what is there left for philosophy to tell us? 
To this it is sufficient to answer generally that the synthesis of the parts is some- 
thing more than detailed knowledge of the parts in separation which is gained 
by the man of science. It is with the ultimate synthesis that philosophy concerns 
itself, it has to show that the subject matter which we are all dealing with in 
detail really is a whole, consisting of articulated members." — A. Seth ; Encyclo- 
pcedia Britannica, " Philosophy," Vol. XVIII., p. 792. 



CHAPTER II. 

SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AS A SCIENTIA SCIENTIARUM. 

In Chapter I. we described the formal process by which 
social knowledge advances from vague unconsciousness in 
common empiricism to definite, reflective, and purposeful 
organization in sciences which are themselves integrated in 
philosophy. The next step will include both an examina- 
tion of the content of this process, i. e., the general 
classes of sciences which have been gradually formed in 
the course of social development, and an attempt to show 
that they are naturally and rationally related and combined 
in a philosophy of society which by virtue of such service 
becomes truly a ' ' science of the sciences. ' ' 

Whewell in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences ' 
presents two charts which are designed to show the 
progressive generalizations of astronomy and optics re- 
spectively from the earliest recorded observations of the 
Greeks to the sweepingly inclusive theory of universal 
gravitation and the undulatory hypothesis. In another 
work, the same author employs this figure : ' ' The table of 
the progress of any science would thus resemble the map 
of a river, in which the waters from separate sources unite 
and make rivulets, which again meet with rivulets from 
other fountains, and thus go on forming by their junction 
trunks of a higher and higher order. "^ The same thought 
extended to the sciences in their relations to each other 

1 p. Il8. 

2 History of the Inductive Sciences, p. 14. 

39 



40 The Social Mind and Education. 

would make philosophy a great stream gathering up the 
tributaries and rivulets of the various special pursuits. 
A chart which should exhibit in a synoptic view the 
chronological development of the various sciences in verti- 
cal columns, and indicate by horizontal lines the chief 
attempts of philosophy to bind these parts into unity, 
would be of great value if it could avoid, on the one hand, 
bewildering complexity of details, and, on the other, 
misleading uniformity and apparent definiteness. 

It has been shown that all science has its origin in 
the common experiences of social life.' The various 
phenomena of the environment, physical and psychical, 
have demanded attention and explanation. Empirical 
attempts to modify and utilize the materials and forces of 
nature have preceded rational and systematic inquiry into 
their nature and laws which has in turn resulted in more 
successful practical applications. " The dictum that ' ' every 
science has. its art" may be more properly reversed and 
modified into "every art has its sciences," for science has 
sprung from art and every concrete art requires the syn- 
thesis of two or more abstract sciences.^ From doing 
things men have advanced to rationalizing, reflecting 
upon the things they do, and in this process the concrete 
things themselves have been separated into ideal parts 
which have become objects of more or less isolated study. 
These abstracted, subjective products have been gradually 
arranged into so-called sciences. The attempt to form 
these various groups on some rational plan has been one of 
the problems of philosophy. There have been many 
solutions. Aristotle's classification assumed as its criterion 

1 Spencer : Essays, Vol. II., " The Genesis of Science," p. 71. 

2 A. Lalande : Philosophie des sciences, pp. i, 2. 

3 Flint : " Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 

1878. 



Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiaruni. 41 

the ends which the various pursuits may serve. Knowl- 
edge may be {a) theoretical, if it serve the end of pure 
thought in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics ; {b') 
productive, if it be applied to the tangible things of life in 
the arts, or (<:) practical, if it deal with problems of 
individual and social conduct in ethics and politics. Logic 
was regarded by Aristotle as the fundamental discipline 
preceding and conditioning all the other forms of knowl- 
edge. ' The Stoics adopted a tripartite division into (a) 
logic to guide the reason, (<5) physics to explain the 
world, and {c) ethics to rule the moral life. The vague 
generality of this scheme made it wide enough to include 
almost everything, although it seems to have ignored 
metaphysics, mathematics, psychology, and theology."^ 

It would not be worth our while to follow in detail the 
fanciful arrangements of knowledge on the basis of such 
intangible ideas as "four kinds of light "^ which reveal 
truth, or four "mirrors" of nature — doctrine, science, 
history, and morals," or Dante's poetical identification of 
the ten divisions of the sky with the ten sciences, by 
which the moon was made the symbol of grammar, Venus 
of rhetoric, and so on through the list. 

The educational curriculum of the Middle Ages, the 
seven so-called liberal arts included in the triviuni and the 
guadrivium," is of significance as showing the generally 
accepted ideas as to what organized bodies of knowledge 
ought systematically to be transmitted from generation to 
generation. These studies represent socially purposeful 
efforts. The rest of the tradition was unconsciously 
transmitted in the form of common sense, technical skill, 

1 Metaphysics (tr. by McMahon), p. 157. 

2 A. Lalande, pp. 42-44. 

3 St. Bonaventura (1221-1274). Flint : loc cit., p. 417. 

4 Vincent of Beauvais. Ibid., p. 417. 

6 Compayre : History of Pedagogy (tr. by Payne), p. 75. 



42 The Social Mind arid Education. 

legends, customs, and laws. The liberal arts were : 
grammar, dialectics or logic, and rhetoric, music, arith- 
metic, geometry, and astronomy, all, with the possible 
exception of the last, formal pursuits. The concrete 
studies were neglected, save perhaps in a few convents 
where the works of Aristotle were preserved and perused. * 
But this does not mean that there was no knowledge of 
nature, man, and society ; only that such knowledge ex- 
isted in an empirical, socially unconscious form. Re- 
flective and purposeful effort was expended upon the 
mental processes of men, upon the machinery of thought 
and expression. 

As a result of this situation there was great indistinct- 
ness of scientific ideas. Even the many clear notions of 
antiquity tended to lose their definiteness. ' ' When men 
merely repeat the terms of science," declares Whewell, 
"without attaching to them any clear conceptions ; when 
their apprehensions become vague and dim ; when they 
assent to scientific doctrines as a matter of tradition, rather 
than of conviction, on trust rather than on sight ; when 
science is considered as a collection of opinions, rather 
than a record of laws by which the universe is really 
governed — it must inevitably happen that men will lose 
their hold on the truths which the great discoverers who 
preceded them have brought to light. "^ 

In such circumstances little scientific progress was possi- 
ble — in fact, there was actual loss of ground — and attempts 
to classify knowledge into definite groups were doomed to 
failure. 

Roger Bacon was ' ' the first encyclopedic philosopher 
who emerged from the shadows of the Middle Ages."^ 

1 Compayre : loc. cit., p. 76. 

2 History of the Inductive Sciences, p. 2.-^8. 

8 De Greef : Uevolution des croyances et des doctrines politiques, p. 37. 



Social Philosophy as a Scie7itia Scientiarum. 43 

He urged the necessity of observation and enlarged men's 
conceptions by his advocacy of linguistic, optical, and 
experimental studies,' but the limited development of the 
sciences prevented him from offering a really useful classi- 
fication. 

Little progress was made until Francis Bacon so vigo- 
rously stimulated social consciousness by his famous ex- 
hibit of human learning/ The principle of classification is 
subjective, i. e., based upon the abstracted faculties of 
memory, imagination, and reason, out of which grow 
history, poesy, and philosophy respectively. This classi- 
fication is vulnerable at many points. It is based upon a 
false, artificial psychology ; it separates subjects which 
belong naturally together, as, for example, when it divides 
physiology into animal and human^; again it unites what 
ought to be separated in combining metaphysics with 
physics"; but the principles of historical judgment demand 
a contemporary standard. Considered from the point of 
view of his times. Bacon's classification is a remarkable 
contribution to the progress of thought. Moreover, it is 
valuable as an enumeration and discrimination of sciences, 
as an aid in their more definite formation. Bacon seemed 
consciously to recognize this service. "It is the office," 
he says, ' ' of all sciences to shorten the long turnings and 
windings of experience so as to remove the ancient com- 
plaint of the scantiness of life and the tediousness of art ; 
this is best performed by collecting and uniting the axioms 
of the sciences into more general ones, that shall suit the 
matter of all individuals. For the sciences are like pyra- 
mids, erected upon the single basis of history and ex- 

1 Flint: " The Classification of the Sciences," The Pf'esbyterian Review, }vi\y, 
1885, p. 417. 
i Instauratio Magna (tr. by Dewey), pp. 77 sq. 

3 Ibid., p. 156. 

4 Ibid., p. 144. 



44 The Social Mind and Education. 

perience.'" In a broad, preliminary way Bacon may be 
said to have divided science or general philosophy into the 
sciences of (i) God, (2) Nature, (3) Man. and (4) 
Society. There remained, however, within this classifica- 
tion much confusion, overlapping, and artificial synthesis, 
which with the growth of more definite conceptions have 
been in large measure corrected. 

Descartes proposed no complete classification of the 
sciences, but made a broad division into (i) metaphysics^ 
under which he included the principles of knowledge, the 
attributes of God, and the immortality of the soul, (2) 
physics, by which he meant the principles of material 
things — earth, air, water, plants, animals, and man. By 
means of such knowledge, he declared, the other sciences 
become intelligible. Descartes employs the favorite figure 
of the tree of knowledge, the root of which is metaphysics, 
the trunk physics, and the branches all the other sciences 
which grow out of the latter. This seems to be a rather 
definite recognition of the natural dependence of the more 
complex upon the simpler sciences.^ 

Hobbes offered a classification on the basis of two kinds 
of knowledge : (i) of facts — history; (2) of consequences — 
science. This scheme was worked out with great inge- 
nuity but did not contribute to the more definite formation 
of the science groups.^ , 

There would be little profit in examining in detail the 
various classifications of the sciences proposed by Locke, ^ 

1 Ibid., p. 139. 

2 " Ainsi toute le philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les racines sont la 
metaphysique, le tronc est la physique, et les branches qui sortent de ce tronc 
sont les autres sciences qui se rSduisent a trois principales, a savoir la mSdecine, 
la mecanique et la morale ; j'entends la plus haute et la plus parfaite morale, qui, 
prfisupposant une entiSre connaissance des autres sciences, est le dernier degr^ 
de la sagesse." — Les PiHncipes, Ed. Liard, pp. 19-21. 

3 Leviathan, Molesworth Ed. of Collected Works, Vol. III., pp. 71-73. 

4 "All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, 



Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiaruni. 45 

Leibnitz/ and Wolff/ all of which were subjective and 
speculative, resulting in cross-classification rather than in 
coordination. They were constructed in virtual independ- 
ence of experimental knowledge and consequently ignored 
the existence of a natural objective relationship between 
different groups of knowledge. 

The far-reaching influence of Kant could not fail to 
afiect the problem of classification. It is treated in the 
Kriiik der Reinen Vernunft, in the chapter on the "Archi- 
tectonik der Reinen Vernunft." Kant's conception of 
science as an organism which grows from within, as a 
system of conceptions unified by a central regulative idea/ 
is of more value to our present discussion than is his 
classification itself. This betrays the same ignorance, or 
at least neglect of experience, which vitiates so many 
philosophic attempts at the coordination of knowledge.* 

Hegel constructed a comprehensive ideal scheme which 
was consciously designed to unify all experience, objective 
and subjective. The philosophy of nature aimed to give 
a complete account of the external world, and the phi- 

first, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their 
manner of operation ; or, secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a 
rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of any end, especially happiness ; 
or, thirdly, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the 
other of these is attained and communicated ; I think science may be divided 
properly into these three sorts." — Human Understanding , Ed. by Frazer, Vol. II., 
p. 460. 

1 Nouveaux Essais, Ed. by Von Gerhardt, Vol. V., pp. 503-509. 

Leibnitz supports the ancient tripartite division into physics, ethics, and logic. 

2 Wolff's classification is implied in the phrase, " cognitio humana, historica, 
philosophica et mathematica." Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica, etc., pp. 1-3. 

3 " Das Ganze ist also gegliedert (articulatio) und nicht gehauft (coacervatio); 
es kann zwar innerlich (per intussusceptionem) wachsen, wie ein thierischer 
Korper, dessen wachstum kein Glied hinzusetzen, sondern ohne Veranderung- 
der Proportion ein jedes zu seinen Zwecken starker und tuchtiger macht."^' 
Sdmtnliche Werke, Ausg. Hartenstein, Bd. III., S. 548. 

4 As an illustration of Kant's method the following passage may be cited: 
" Wenn ich von allem Inhalte der Erkenntniss, objectiv betrachtet, abstrahire, so 
ist alles Erkenntniss subjectiv, entweder historisch oder national. — Loc. cit., p. 550. 



46 The Social Mind and Education. 

losophy of spirit sought to do the same for human con- 
sciousness, both in its subjective phenomena and its 
external manifestations in social institutions and their 
development. Without undertaking to discuss the ideal 
scheme as a whole, we emphasize the fact that this classifi- 
cation exhibits clearly sciences (i) of nature, (2) of man, 
and (3) of man and nature in interaction.' Hegel's 
apparent failure to realize that though nature were merely 
objectified idea, that idea could be truly comprehended 
only by scrutiny of nature herself, renders the minor 
details of his scheme of no scientific value. His contribu- 
tion is almost wholly a philosophic service. 

Dr. Neil Arnott's* classification of knowledge about 
nature is divided into two parts : (i) natural history — 
materials of the universe, and (2) science or philosophy, 
including (a) physics, (Ji) chemistry, (c) science of life, 
and (^) science of mind. Of this second group Arnott 
writes : ' ' They may be said to form a pyramid of sciences, 
of which physics is the base, while the others constitute 
succeeding layers in the order mentioned, the whole 
having certain mutual relations and dependencies well- 
figured by the parts of a pyramid. ' ' This idea approaches 
closely the principle of the classification suggested by 
Burdin, published by Saint Simon, but elaborated and 
incorporated into a general system of philosophy by 
Comte. * 

The general principles of Comte' s classification are : 

1 It is not asserted that Hegel made the statement in this form but that his 
division substantially included these sciences. The classification of Hegel is 
thus given in the introduction to his Encyclopiidie der philosophischen Wissen- 
chaften: " I. Die Logik, die Wissenschaft der Idee an und fiir sich ; II. Die 
Naturphilosophie als die Wissenschaft der Idee in ihrem Anderssehn ; III. Die 
Philosophie des Geistes als der Idee, die aus ihrem Anderssehn in sich zuriick- 
^€ax\.:'—Werke, Bd. VI., S. 26. 

2 Elements of Physics, cited by Flint. I have been unable to find the volume. 

3 Fouill§e : Le mouvement positiviste et la conception sociologique du ntond, p. 2. 



Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scieniiarum. 47 

first, a division of sciences into abstract and concrete, 
i. e., into sciences that deal with the laws which govern 
the elementary facts of nature, laws on which all phe- 
nomena actually realized must depend, and, on the other 
hand, sciences that concern themselves only with the 
particular combinations of phenomena which are found in 
existence.' This discrimination has been attacked by 
Spencer, who uses the terms in a different sense, but the 
criticism does not seem of vital importance, indeed is 
chiefly a verbal quibble.^ The next step consists in an 
arrangement of these abstract sciences in a scale or 
"hierarchy," of decreasing simplicity or generality and 
increasing complexity or speciality, so that each science 
will depend naturally on that which precedes it. Mathe- 
matics is made the basis, as being the most general of all 
in its range, then follow astronomy, physics, chemistry, 
biology (including "transcendental biology"), and social 
physics, or sociology. The same hierarchical plan is 
applied with varying success to the subdivisions of the 
different sciences. Comte himself admitted that "il faut 
commercer par reconnaitre que, quelque naturelle que 
puisse ^tre une telle classification, elle renfermera toujours 
n6cessairement quelque chose, sinon d'arbitraire du moins 
d'artificiel, de maniere a presenter un imperfection veri- 
table."^ It is not a part of our plan to review the discus- 
sions to which this classification has given rise. Thus 
much remains after the critics have done their worst : the 
sciences are grouped into three general classes : ( i ) formal 
(mathematics); (2) inorganic nature (astronomy, physics, 
chemistry); (3) organic nature (physiology or biology 
and social physics or sociology); but, what is of chief 

1 Loc. cit., Tome I., pp. 57 sq. 

2 Fiske : Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. I., pp. 193-220. J. S. Mill : The Positive Phi- 
losophy of Auguste Comte, p. 41, note. 

3 Loc. cit., Tome I., p. 10. 



48 The Social Mind and Education. 

importance, they are seen to be in such dependence that 
as the mind seeks to explain the highest phenomena, it 
finds itself of necessity forced back along the series step by 
step. Yet in this unbroken sequence there is a deception. 
No physiology, even transcendental, can bridge the chasm 
between vital and social phenomena.' Comte felt such 
contempt for psychology, was indeed so ignorant of it 
that he prematurely completed his scheme and gave to it a 
spurious appearance of finality. 

If we turn to the classification of Comte' s chief critic, 
Spencer, we naturally expect to find a wholly different 
arrangement. But when all discussion of terms and prin- 
ciples is done and we are confronted with a synoptic view 
of Spencer's scheme, it transpires that in spite of division 
into ' ' abstract, " " abstract-concrete, ' ' and ' ' concrete ' ' 
sciences, the hierarchical order persists, although greatly 
improved by the placing of astronomy after physics and 
chemistry, and by the interpolation of psychology between 
biology and sociology.^ At almost the same time that 
Spencer denies the validity of the hierarchy he admits the 
general, progressive dependence and in his system of Syn- 
thetic Philosophy treats the concrete sciences in this order. ^ 

Bain, Shields, Stanley, Flint, and others who have 
more recently proposed classifications of the sciences, have 
either consciously recognized or, what is quite as signifi- 
cant, unconsciously adopted in general the hierarchical 
arrangement. If other proof were needed that this idea of 
dependence has emerged into social self-consciousness, it 

1 Fouillee recognizes this gap and seeks to fill it by the synthesis of the idea of 
organism on the one side and that of the social contract on the other: "Nous 
croyons qu'il faut unir les deux idees d'organisme social et de contrat social dans 
une idee plus comprehensive, que nous appellerons 1' organisme contractuel. — 
Loc. cit., p. III. 

2 Spencer : Essays, Vol. II., " The Classification of the Sciences," pp. 84-95. 

8 Ward : " The Place of Sociology among the Sci&nc&s," America7i Journal of 
Sociology, July, 1895. 



Social Philosophy as a Sciejitia Scientiarum. 49 

might be found in the organization of educational curricula, 
and in the arrangement of scientific compilations.^ 

Yet there is a deceptive completeness and continuity 
about this hierarchy which requires careful examination. 
Is it made up of perfectly connected parts or does it fall 
into certain divisions, internally integrated, but externally 
less intimately joined ? We have seen that in all the 
classifications, with the exception of Comte's, there has 
been a more or less definite grouping into sciences of 
form, of nature, of man, and, in several cases, of society. 
In other words, phenomena are broadly divided into : 
physical, vital, psychical, and social. It is one thing to 
assert that there is an order of progressive dependence 
among these phenomena ; quite another to declare that 
the transition from one to the other forms a chain of 
unbroken and clearly perceived causal continuity. Life 
and consciousness may be accounted for in terms of 
chemistry, but scientific demonstration of the relation is 
still lacking.^ 

It is now in order to revert to a statement made in 
Chapter I.^ and to elaborate and illustrate the idea some- 
what more fully. The self-conscious social tradition is 
made up at any time of various groups of knowledge, 
i. <?. , phenomena related by generalizations into so-called 
sciences. Each one of these groups passes from common 
sense to rational and purposeful organization. Each 

1 Blum : La philosophie des sciences. Lalande : Sur la philosophie des sci- 
ences. 

2 " Le determinisme, c'est-a-dire le fait que dans le monde vivant, comme dans 
le monde mineral, les memes causes produisent toujours les mfimes effets, n'a 
rein a faire avec la theorie qui ne veut vols dans les itres vivants que le rtsultat 
de la libre action sur la matiere des forces ordinaires de la physique et de la 
chimie. . . . La vie est une force qui se superpose a toutes les autres, y 
compris I'affinite." — Ed. Perrier : Les colonies ani?nales, quoted by Eugene Blum 
in his Lectures de philosophie scientifique , p. 546. 

3 Pp. 22, 23. 



50 The Social Mind and Education. 

grows from an empirical nucleus, and by means of widen- 
ing generalizations extends its area. Gradually these 
elementary groups are further combined into larger bodies 
of unified conceptions, until at the present day it is pos- 
sible, as we have seen, to present in a comparatively 
small table a synoptic view of the main divisions of human 
knowledge, notwithstanding the marvelous accumulations 
of observation and experiment. Yet between these groups 
have always existed gaps which had to be filled by vari- 
ous anthropomorphic ideas. The progress of the self- 
conscious social tradition has been characterized not only 
by the growth and integration of the many groups of 
knowledge, but also by the gradual closing up of gaps, 
until it would seem that complete rational integration were 
about to be achieved. Yet, as has been indicated, breaks 
still remain in the ideal continuity. Only some relation 
of intimate dependence can be asserted. 

A complete treatment of this process would involve 
nothing short of tracing, as Whewell has done, the forma- 
tion of each of these great bodies of knowledge. For the 
present purpose it must suffice merely to indicate the 
broad features of the movement. 

Such vast generalizations as the nebular hypothesis, the 
theories of universal gravitation, the unity of matter, and 
the conservation of energy have given a coherence to 
inorganic phenomena ; the development theory has unified 
a wide range of organic sciences ; the phenomena of con- 
sciousness are undergoing more methodical scrutiny and 
organization, while social life and its products are only 
beginning to be the objects of systematic, reflective study. 
Embracing all, and provisionally relating them in un- 
interrupted sequence, is the great hypothesis of universal 
evolution. 

The scientists to whom each group of the social tra- 



Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum. 51 

dition is intrusted are not only engaged in elaborating and 
extending the area of their subject, but many are attempt- 
ing to relate it to other divisions of knowledge. Thus 
chemists and biologists seek to explain organic phenomena, 
psychologists and biologists are interested in the relations 
of brain and consciousness,' and sociologists seek more and 
more the aid of the psychologists. There is specializing in 
these border lands upon the problems of natural continuity. 

We have seen that Comte's theory of the chronologi- 
cally linear development of the sciences in the order of 
their increasing complexity must be, if not rejected, at 
least greatly modified. The sciences have advanced to- 
gether in relations of mutual dependence, yet the groups 
highest in the scale have been unable to make genuine 
progress far in advance of those below them. ' ' All the 
forces and laws of the universe, ' ' says Flint, ' ' so combine 
and cooperate in the constitution and life of man, that all 
the sciences which instruct us as to their nature neces- 
sarily help us to understand why the course of history has 
been what it actually has been."* By the course of 
history is meant the concrete manifestation of the laws of 
social evolution or progress. 

The fact that within the present century social phe- 
nomena have received so much attention, i. <?., have 
emerged into general consciousness and tended to become 

1 " This conference [American Psychological Association, Philadelphia, 1895] 
between those who look upon many of the same phenomena from two points of 
view, the biological and the psychological, seems to me significant and promising. 
I think it is one of several indications that in general the devotees of the different 
particular sciences are coming more clearly to recognize the community of truth 
and interest which makes them depend upon each other ; and that this recog- 
nition is producing more of the spirit of appreciation and of sympathy among 
them all. It is to be hoped that the day of the mere specialist is waning. It may 
reasonably be believed that the day is dawning when a broad culture, a genial 
attitude, and a firm grasp upon the verities of nature and of life will characterize 
the various departments of human knowledge." — G. T. Ladd, The Psychological 
Review, May, 1896. 

2 The History of the Philosophy of History (France), p. 37. 



52 The Social Mind and Education. 

the basis for socially self-conscious examination, delibera- 
tion, and collective action, should not lead us to suppose 
that men have only recently reflected upon social rela- 
tions. From the earliest beginnings of associated life 
human experience has been consolidated in common 
sense, in customs and laws which were for the most part 
products of social unconsciousness. The ideal Republic 
of Plato and the practical Politics of Aristotle mark the 
definite dawn of social self-consciousness in its truest sense, 
i. <?. , society's effort to understand and explain itself 
through individuals as organs of the social mind. ' But the 
undeveloped condition of the natural sciences and of psy- 
chology made any general synthesis of knowledge into 
a scientific conception of society quite impossible. Here 
was the definite formation of a nucleus for the social 
sciences, but many centuries of development were needed 
to extend the growth and bring the group as a whole into 
organic relations with the other contents of the social mind. 
With the advent of Christianity, philosophy and theology 
were united, or rather theology became the dominant form 
of philosophy.^ The natural sciences, as we have seen, 
were neglected, and social interpretation was attempted 
only in terms of divinity and ecclesiastical authority. 
Experience and common sense continued their unconscious 
consolidations and transmissions, but all reflective thought 
about social relations, such as St. Augustine's De Civitate 
Dei, was unified by theological conceptions. 

While from one point of view this period seems char- 
acterized by intellectual stagnation, from another it is seen 
to be most significant for the further development of 
the social mind. The Christian conception of the ideal 

iBosanquet: "The Relation of Sociology to Philosophy," Mmrf, January, 

1897. 
2 De Greef : IJ evolution des croyances et des doctrines politiques, p. 36. 



Social Philosophy as a Scie7itia Scientiarimi. 53 

spiritual unity of the race,' the communicating system 
which the church estabhshed in its hierarchical organiza- 
tion, the preservation and reproduction of manuscripts, all 
combined to stimulate social consciousness and ultimately 
to render possible a purposeful advance. 

St. Thomas Aquinas represented a movement which 
led eventually to the separation of theology from meta- 
physics in scholasticism,^ and so prepared the way for 
scientific method based upon observation and freed from 
a priori conceptions. In terms of the development of the 
social mind, the compact and apparently final synthesis of 
a theological philosophy began to yield to a further 
analysis which found expression in the inductive sciences. 

Comte asserted that while no definite beginning can be 
assigned to the positive mode of thought, it may practi- 
cally be regarded as originating with Galileo in Italy, 
Descartes in France, and Francis Bacon in England.^ 
None of these men specifically treated social phenomena, 
but by insisting on experiment and induction, by rejecting 
authority as such and appealing to reason, they laid the 
foundations of scientific method which De Greef describes 
as the highest procedure of both the individual and the 
collective consciousness.'* 

The progress of the social mind has since this beginning 
been the result less and less of blind empiricism, more and 
more consequent upon the elaboration of intellectual 

1 Flint : loc. cit., p. 62. 

2 De Greef: loc. cit., p. 38. 

3 Philosophie positive, Tome I., p. 15. 

4 " La mfithode est le precede le plus 616 ve de rintelligence individuelle ; elle 
est aussi superieure au simple raisonnement que celui-ci Test a Taction reflexe ou 
automatique. Ces dernieres sont egalement des modalites de I'intelligence 
collective ; a defaut de la methode positive, I'instinct, Taction reflexe et Tautoma- 
tisme ont heureusement, jusqu'ici, garanti la conservation et le progrSs des 
agregats sociaux avec plus d'efficacit6 que n'eut pu le faire la raison individuelle 
ou collective de leurs membres." — Introduction h la sociologie, lere Partie, p. III. 



54 The Social Mind and Education. 

devices for observation, comparison, and experiment, and 
the purposeful application of them to increasing areas of 
phenomena. 

The dependence of the more complex sciences upon the 
simpler has been illustrated in the changing conceptions by 
which men have attempted to interpret the facts of society 
both in its organization at a particular period and in its 
historical development. Bacon shows real insight into the 
nature of the mind when he declares that "those things 
which are in themselves new can yet be only understood 
from some analogy to what is old. ' ' ^ As men have con- 
sciously pushed their way among the bewildering phenom- 
ena of social life, they have of necessity taken with them, 
as instruments of inquiry and explanation, conceptions 
formulated in connection with simpler subjects. "It is 
chiefly," says Flint, "through the growth of physical 
science that the notion of law in human development 
has arisen, and chiefly through it also that the path which 
leads to the discovery of law has been opened up. Not 
till long after induction was familiar to physicists, not till 
long after Lord Bacon had traced its general theory, was 
it, or could it be, practiced to any considerable extent in 
historical research. ' ' ^ 

^ It has been pointed out that the social mind grows by 
analysis and synthesis, and that the two processes are at 
all times coexistent, although each act of analysis is in 
a general way the cause of a new synthetic conception 
expanded to include a larger content. The different groups 
of knowledge have been unified consciously or uncon- 
sciously by various theories which have successively 
proved inadequate to explain the phenomena and have 
yielded to more satisfying conceptions. Moreover these 

"^ Novum Organum (tr. by Dewey), p. 388. 

2 History of the Philosophy of History (France), p. 36. 



Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum. 55 

theories have been carried up from the sciences lower in 
the hierarchic scale to interpret the phenomena of greater 
complexity and by this process the scientific groups have 
little by little been drawn closer together. From the very 
first man's daily life has been the unity out of which 
the sciences have been abstracted, and to which they 
return with richer and deeper meaning. The effort of 
social self-consciousness has always been to put back these 
abstractions into their relations in the phenomena of 
society. All the sciences have thus been constantly 
converging in the focus of social life, at first to explain 
one by one the things that happen — the primary require- 
ment of the human mind — then gradually to show the wider 
relations of coexistence and sequence which obtain between 
these phenomena, ultimately to display a system within 
which all events assume methodic organization. 
V A philosophy of life has existed from the very origin 
of human association. This philosophy of life has under- 
gone continuous growth, adjusting itself constantly to in- 
creasing knowledge, widening to include larger, and more 
definite views of nature and man, becoming more and more 
a product of social self-consciousness. The philosophy of 
life has been dominated by several conceptions, yet at 
every stage it has undertaken to account for all phenom- 
ena. The theology of the medieval church furnished a 
philosophy of life and of society to which all that happened 
could be readily related. Certain scientific notions and 
empirical forms of knowledge furnished nuclei of phenom- 
ena clearly related by natural causation. All other appear- 
ances or events were explained as the results of divine 
interposition, always, however, with a view to human 
welfare or punishment. Everything that happened was 
easily connected with a philosophy of social life, for, in 
spite of the emphasis laid upon the individual's relation to 



56 The Social Mind and Education. 

God and a future life, society was at least a means to 
the chief end. 

From one point of view Comte was right 'when he said 
that the positive philosophy would show God over the 
frontier, but it was the medieval conception of God which 
was gradually to disappear from the social mind, as the 
area of causal continuity enlarged. 

The great advances of physical and astronomical science 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' effected 
marvelous integrations of knowledge and exalted mechani- 
cal conceptions which were carried up the scale of phenom- 
ena to explain and interpret the facts of life, conscious- 
ness, and society. Leibnitz conceived of organisms as 
machines. La Mettrie's volume on U homme machine rep- 
resented the extreme to which this interpretation could be 
carried.^ Herbart's mechanical psychology was a result of 
this mathematico-physical movement. History or the 
course of social development was ascribed wholly to 
mechanical laws, resulting in what De Greef describes 
as a Mechanique sociale.^ In this theory we have an appar- 
ently complete synthesis. All bodies of knowledge seem 
to be brought into close relations of causal continuity, and 
social philosophy in which all find their expression becomes 
a "science of the sciences." The physical basis of society, 
the thoughts and acts of men, all are combined in a system 
of mechanical dependence and mutual interaction. Every 
phenomenon can apparently be fitted into the scheme. All 
supernatural agencies may be dispensed with, and a La- 
place can say: "God! I have no need of that hypothesis."* 

But for how brief a time this synthesis served its pur- 

1 Royce : The Spirit of Modern Philosophy , pp. 38-40. 

2 De Greef: Le trans/ormisme social, p. 146. Cf. L'' homme machine (Ed. Ass6- 
zat). 

3 Loc. cit., p. 146. 

■*W. W. R. Ball : A Short Account of the History of Mathematics, p. 423. 



Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiaruvi. 57 

pose ! The social mind through the agency of Cuvier, 
Bichat, Von Baer, Lamarck, and others was consciously at 
work upon the phenomena of life. ' The knowledge which 
resulted could not be fitted into the mechanical theory of 
nature and man. It gradually gave way to the conception 
of growth as the biological sciences were developed and or- 
ganized under general vital principles. '' Comte, as we have 
seen, carried the biological notion almost directly over into 
social phenomena. It dominates all modern thought. 
"There are certainly few points," says Mackenzie, "on 
which thinking men in modern times are more thoroughly 
at one than in the recognition that everything that is deep- 
est in nature — and especially in human nature — must be 
regarded as a product not of manufacture but of growth. ' ' ^ 

It is unquestionably true that this organic idea had been 
vaguely and unconsciously entertained for many centuries, 
had gained in clearness during social progress, but it 
reached precise and systematic definition only with the 
formation of the sciences of life. It is necessary to dis- 
criminate constantly between empirical common -knowledge 
and "the reasoned knowledge which is science."^ 

While, as we have seen, it is quite impossible for groups 
of scientific conceptions to develop in actual isolation, yet 
the connections between the sciences are less obvious in 
the earlier stages of their development. Thus, thought 
about social phenomena, although influenced and rendered 
more precise by conceptions derived from physics and 
biology, had attained considerable proportions before these 
notions were systematically applied. Vico the Italian 
is usually credited with one of the first conscious attempts 
to formulate a law of social development, which he declared 

1 De Greef : U evolution des croyances et des doctrines polttiques , p. 66. 

^ Loc. cit., p. 127. 

3 Giddings : The Principles 0/ Sociology, p. 12. 



58 The Social Mind and Education. 

to be an endlessly cyclical movement through three stages, 
divine, heroic, human.' Vico's theory rested neither on a 
theological conception nor upon any metaphysical formula 
derived, for example, from a notion of natural, preestab- 
lished rights. His doctrine was based upon observation, 
highly generalized to be sure, but always subject to correc- 
tion by the same means. ^ Vico stands clearly for law and 
development in human affairs — although the connections 
of social with other phenomena are not definitely demon- 
strated. 

Montesquieu elaborated the idea of social law and em- 
phasized the continuity and dependence of phenomena by 
showing the influence of natural conditions on social organ- 
ization. ^ He was the first philosopher to call attention to 
the social significance of the economic forces which Ques- 
nay and the physiocrats were beginning consciously to 
study. * This differentiation of social phenomena themselves 
is worthy of remark. The work of purposeful analysis 
begun by Aristotle, and carried on in political thought at 
least by Machiavelli,® Hobbes,® Locke, ^ Spinoza, and many 
others, implied a further division of the social tradition and 
created a demand for a still more comprehensive synthesis. 

1 Flint : Vico, p. 213 sq. 

2 De Greef : V evolution des croyances et des doctrines politiques, p. 59. 

3 Montesquieu thus enumerates the factors to which laws must be adjusted : 
" They should be relative to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, 
to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of its natives, whether 
husbandmen, huntsmen, or shepherds ; they should have a relation to the degree 
of liberty which the constitution will bear ; to the religion of the inhabitants, to 
their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs." — V esprit 
les lois (tr. by Nugent), Vol. I., p. 7. 

4 The following sentence is characteristic of the physiocrats: " Le premier 
grain de ble, confie a la terre devient le germe assure des empires ; ils en resultent 
aussi necessairement que les €pis que ce grain de ble fait 6clore." — Dupont de 
Nemours: Physiocrates (Ed. Daire), p. 26. 

6 The Prince (Morley's Lib.), pp. 68-69, 152-158, 297-299. 

6 Leviathan (Molesworth Ed.), Vol III., Part II., Chaps. XVII. and XVIII. 

1 Political Treatise : Works (tr. by Elwe), p. 278 sq., pp. 301-308. 



Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum. 59 

Among the economists Turgot was conspicuous both for 
his special studies and for his wider generalization of social 
progress. According to Flint, Turgot' s great service was 
' ' that he definitely showed history to be no mere aggregate 
of names, dates, and deeds brought together and deter- 
mined either accidentally or externally, but an organic 
whole with an internal plan progressively realized by inter- 
nal forces. ' ' "■ Turgot recognized also that progress involves 
the coordination of all the elements of human welfare, 
economic, social, intellectual, and ethical, and fore- 
shadowed at least the idea that while social phenomena 
may be abstracted into special pursuits, they must be syn- 
thesized again to represent reality. Adam Smith was 
hardly less a moralist than an economist. He published 
his Theory of Moral Sentiments seventeen ■ years before his 
Wealth of Nations and recognized that ethical and eco- 
nomic problems are inseparably connected.^ Bentham 
sought to rationalize morality and relate it to economic and 
political ideas, a task which John Stuart Mill carried on 
upon a higher plane. ^ 

Thus we see social self-consciousness at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century engaged upon three converging 
problems : 

I. The sciences were being gradually arranged in an 
order of natural dependence. 

1 Flint : The History of the Philosophy of History (France), p. 283. 

Turgot's position is suggested in the following passage from his essay on 
" Geographie politique": " La geographic consid6ree par rapport aux diflferents 
gouvernements, aux difKrents caractSres des peuples, a leur genie, k leur valeur, 
3. leur Industrie ; separer ce qui appartient lel-dedans aux causes morales ; ex- 
aminer si les causes physiques y ont part, et comment." — CEuvres de Turgot (Ed. 
Daire), Tome II., p. 612. 

2 Dr. August Oncken in his volume Adam Smith und Immanuel Kant asserts in 
Buch I., entitled " Der ' Wealth of Nations ' kein selbstandiges Werk," that 
Smith really presented a complete system of practical or moral philosophy, in- 
cluding ethics, politics, and economics, the first contained in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments , the second and third in the Wealth of Nations, S. 11-16. 

3 Dissertations and Discussions , Vol. II., pp. 315-316, and Logic, p. 583. 



6o The Social Mind and Education. 

2. The phenomena of Hfe were being examined and 
generaUzed. 

3. Social phenomena were undergoing differentiation 
and the conceptions of interdependence and of growth 
according to law were being applied to them. 

Such were the materials of analysis ready for a new syn- 
thesis. Comte made the first attempt and succeeded in 
establishing in principle if not in detail his hierarchy, and 
in exhibiting the sciences in their relations as a whole, an 
organized body of knowledge. ' ' The presentation of 
scientific knowledge and method as a whole," comments 
Fiske, ' ' whether rightly or wrongly coordinated, cannot 
have failed greatly to widen the conceptions of most of his 
readers. And he has done especial service by familiarizing 
men with the idea of a social science based on the other 
sciences."* Comte' s philosophy of the sciences was prima- 
rily a social philosophy ; all groups of knowledge were 
subordinated to a conception of society as a whole. But, 
as we have seen, Comte failed to include anything like an 
adequate psychology in his scheme, which had, therefore, 
a false completeness. 

The work of the naturalists began to show results in the 
theories of Von Baer, Goethe, Treviranus, and Lamarck, 
which were already being applied to social phenomena 
when Darwin's Origin of Species offered a wide generaliza- 
tion of organic life. 

With these conceptions at his command, '^ Spencer under- 
took his great work of synthesis, and eventually announced 
his well-known formula of universal evolution. The chief 
product of this whole developing process is the social life 
of men. Society itself is an organism growing, differen- 

1 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy , Vol. I., p. 227. 

2 This is not to imply that Spencer had not worked out the general theory before 
Darwin's volumes were published. See introduction to the fourth edition of 
First Principles, 



Social Philosophy as a Scietitia Scientiarum. 6i 

tiating, adjusting itself to its environment. And society can 
be understood only as a product of all the forces with 
which the various sciences concern themselves. While it 
is true that Spencer's philosophy is in its broadest range a 
cosmic philosophy, yet in so far as it unifies organized 
knowledge of nature, mind, and human association it is a 
social philosophy and as such a science of the sciences. 

The biological concept, the idea of organism, the theory 
of adjustment to environment, and the transmission of 
acquired characters were quickly applied by social philoso- 
phers to the phenomena of associated life and were found 
far more satisfactory than mechanical analogies. Nor were 
psychical phenomena neglected. Lilienfeld' and SchafHe,^ 
who adopted the biological theory, gave prominence to the 
cerebral side of the analogy, and Spencer in his system of 
philosophy gave a most important place to psychology. 
Yet in spite of these definite efforts, the stress was almost 
unconsciously laid by Spencer in actual interpretation upon 
the physical and vital factors of social organization and 
progress. De Greef charges Spencer with making sociol- 
ogy only an extension of biology.^ The first biological 
synthesis was far richer and truer than the mechanical, but 
it is now yielding to another which shall include more con- 
sciously still another element of analysis — the psychical. 

This century has witnessed an advance in the knowledge 
of mind quite as remarkable as the earlier progress of bio- 
logical science. Herbart, Lotze, Fechner, Wundt, are 
associated with the beginning of a movement which is sys- 
tematically reexamining the facts of consciousness and 
attempting to relate them as closely as may be to the struc- 

1 Gedanken iiber die Socialwissenschaft der Ziikunft, Bd. I., S. 171-234, Bd. II., 
Kap. IV., Bd III., Kap. II., VIII., and X. 

2 Bau und Leben des socialen K'drpers, Bd. I., S. 392-430, 703-730, Bd. IV., S. 1-70. 
8 Introduction a la sociologie, lere Partie, pp. 16-25. 



62 The Social Mind and Education. 

ture and functions of the brain. As a result, these re- 
searches and preliminary generalizations seek a place in a 
synthesis of the sciences, and just now psychological con- 
cepts tend to dominate social philosophy. Tarde gives a 
somewhat extreme expression to this tendency when he 
says : 

" Ce n'est pas a un organisme que resemble un socidt^, et 
qu'elle tend a resembler de plus en plus ^ mesure qu'elle se civil- 
ise ; c'est bien plutdt £i cet organe singulier qui se nomme un cer- 
veau. ... La soci6t6 est en somme, ou devient chaque jour, 
uniquement un grand cerveau collective dont les petits cerveaux 
individuals sont les cellules. On voit combien, ^ ce point de vue, 
I'equivalent social du moi, que les sociologistes contemporaines, 
trop pr^occup^s de biologic, et pas assez peut-etre de psychologic, 
ont vainement cherch^, ce present aisement et du lui-meme."^ 

Yet on the same page Tarde speaks of the beings and 
things which support the social brain as "en quelque sorte 
les visceres et les membres," and remarks that in a society 
dominated by caste, the servile and plebeian groups ' 'peu- 
vent ^tre appel6es avec quelque verite I'estomac des patri- 
ciens." Thus the psychological social philosophy does not 
reject or ignore any of the sciences ; it includes them all 
and adds psychical factors to the synthesis. It is still a 
"science of the sciences." 

The contributions of Lilienfeld and Schafifle have been 
supplemented by Ward, De Greef, Durkheim, Tarde, Fou- 
ill^e,^ Giddings, Small, and others, all of whom recognize 
ideas and volitions as factors in social progress. Thus the 
provisional synthesis of the present includes not only the 
physical objective interpretation of society but the psychi- 
cal and subjective explanation as well. ^ It is the largest 
unity which has been as yet achieved. It affords a view of 

1 La logique sociale, p. 127. 

2 Psychologie des idees-forces and La science sociale contemporaine. 
8 Giddings : loc. cit., p. 10. 



Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum. 63 

society as the highest organization of physical and psychi- 
cal forces in relations of either causal continuity or intimate 
interdependence ; the whole system constantly growing or 
readjusting itself in adaptation to the requirements not only 
of nature but of the will of man. Such a philosophy of 
society cannot neglect any element of human knowledge, it 
demands as its materials the sciences of all phenomena, 
physical, vital, psychical, and social ; it may rightfully 
claim to be the science of the sciences. Mackenzie, from a 
somewhat different point of view, remarks : ' ' Hence the 
science which deals with social welfare may always be 
regarded as a master science in human studies, not indeed 
in the sense that, like logic, it regulates their principles, 
but in the sense that it determines their worth. It is worth 
while to know social philosophy, because until we know 
that, we do not know what else it is worth while to 
know.'" In other words, until the sciences have been 
organized into a conception of social life they have no real 
significance, they remain abstractions out of relation to 
reality.^ 

Once more it should be stated that it is not a question as 
to whether there can be or ought to be a social philosophy. 
There always has been and must be a philosophy of social 
life — a way of conceiving the nature and end of society. 
This philosophy has constantly readjusted itself to the 
growth of knowledge, admitting new truth, rejecting false 
theories, or combining and reconciling new with old. It 
has generalized men's knowledge about nature and about 
themselves. The difference has been in degree of definite- 
ness and consciousness, not in the kind of mental effort. 

1 Loc. cit., p. 6. 

2 In the development of this subject the term sociology has not been technically 
employed, because it is altogether probable that as a more definite discipline its 
application may be limited to a narrower field than that which a social philosophy 
must survey. 



64 The Social Mind and Education. 

But may we speak of a social philosophy as though there 
were one? Are there not many coexistent philosophies — 
naturalistic, idealistic, and the like? In its form social phi- 
losophy is one, i. e., it coordinates and generalizes men's 
reasoned knowledge of all the phenomena of associated 
life. In its content social philosophy varies with the kind of 
knowledge consciously emphasized. Thus if self-conscious 
effort be expended almost exclusively upon physical and 
vital phenomena and psychical phenomena be uncon- 
sciously neglected, the resulting philosophy will be none 
the less a generalization of all the recognized sciences — 
purposefully systematized groups of knowledge — but it will 
have a naturalistic, material content. Such was the physi- 
ocratic philosophy of the eighteenth century and the histor- 
ical theory of Buckle. On the other hand, when attention 
is concentrated upon subjective phenomena to the neglect of 
the objective world, social philosophy becomes idealistic, as 
in Hegel's Philosophy of History. 

But, as we have seen, the present self-conscious efiort of 
the social mind is first to examine and reflect upon all 
phenomena, objective and subjective, and second to com- 
bine the resulting generalizations into a philosophy which 
shall attempt ' ' to account for the origin, growth, structure, 
and activities of society by the operation of physical, vital, 
and psychical causes working together in a process of evo- 
lution.'" It is only when we regard the highest effort of 
self-consciousness as truly representative of the social mind 
that we can speak of one social philosophy. There are 
philosophies corresponding to varying degrees of purpose- 
ful reflection all the way down to the socially unconscious 
superstitions of the savages. 

"Un society," says De Greef, "n'est pas seulement un 
association de cerveaux, mais de corps dependants eux- 

1 Giddings : loc. cit., p. 8. 



Social Philosophy as a Scientia Scientiarum. 65 

m^mes de la nature ambiante; un societe ce n'est pas 
seulement une Academic, mais un partie de /' univers or- 
ganisie en sociitL ' ' * 

Such is the subject matter for social philosophy which 
aims to afford a view of associated life by generalizing into 
a coherent conception the sciences which have been differ- 
entiated from the experiences of men, to recombine into 
reality the subjective abstractions of the social mind, to 
serve, in other words, as a science of the sciences. 

1 Le transformisme social, p. 276. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL AND OF INDIVIDUAL 
THOUGHT. 

y' 
We have seen that the social tradition is made up 

at any given time of knowledge of details which in its 
systematized and reflective stage becomes science, and 
of theories of the whole which may be called philosophy. 
The primary task of a philosophy — whatever may be its 
further and ultimate problems — is to offer a theory of 
every-day human experience, a conception of the nature of 
social life. The growth of social knowledge consists, on 
the one hand, in the elaboration and extension of the 
sciences, on the other, in the widening and reorganizing of 
philosophy to include and harmonize new and broader 
generalizations.' The form of this process is in the main 
constant, but the content is ever changing, becoming not 
only richer but more definite and more purposefully coor- 
dinated. ^ 

■u Let us next inquire whether the process by which social 

knowledge has been developed has any meaning for the 

student of mental growth in the individual ; in other words, 

/ let us examine the time^iorwjredjthepry. that there is a 

1 " Le progres de la pensee consiste dans le progres simultane de I'observation 
devenue comparative et d' interpretations que se font de plus en plus larges." — 
M. Barnes : Revue philosophique, Tome XX., p. 374. 

2 De Greef states the idea in these words: " Les croyances, c'est-4-dire la 
pensee collective, ont pour point de dSpart et comme caractere commun d'etre des 
reflexes qui, plus ou moins compliques, centralises et coordonnes, en arrivent S 
s'elever jusqu'a Stre des doctrines et des theories scientifiques." — Le trans- 

formisine social, p. 5. 

66 



Development of Social and Individual Thought. 67 

parallel between the development of the race and that of 
the individual. 

As a preliminary to this discussion, it may be well 
to revert once more to the term "social mind," which has 
been so frequently employed hitherto. Its usefulness as a 
working idea has, it is hoped, grown steadily more appar- 
ent. It describes briefly phenomena which in the absence 
of such a phrase would demand detailed and prolix state- 
ment. It serves the purpose for which all terms are 
devised. Yet if its connotation be vague or metaphorical 
it will cloud rather than clarify the argument. The term {, 
' ' social mind ' ' has been used to describe reality, /. e. , the 
phenomena which result from the interaction of communi- 
cating individual minds. The German school of folk- 
psychologists, founded by Lazarus and Steinthal, have done 
much to lay the phrase ' ' social mind ' ' open to suspicion. 
In asserting that folk-psychology deals with the mind of 
the whole community which is different from all the differ- 
ent minds which belong to it, and which sways them all, ' 
they may be simply using a figure, but from the common- 
sense point of view this seems very much like postulating 
a ' ' social brain ' ' and asserting the existence of thought 
apart from individual consciousness. Bluntschli in describ- 
ing the state as a masculine personality has contributed 
certain elements to the mystical interpretation of social re- 
lations,^ while Espinas in his studies of animal societies 
reaches conclusions which Fouill6e regards as almost equally 
metaphysical.^ Even Le Bon, one of the modern school 
of sociologists, does not altogether escape the suspicion of 
being a mystic or at least of pressing analogies too far. ■* 

1 ZeitschriftfUr Volkerpsychologie, Bd. I., S. 5. 

2 The Theory of the State (Eng. tr.), p. 23. 

3 Fouillee : La science sociale contemporaine, pp. 211, 236-246. 

4 For example, Le Bon speaks of " une ime collective" and declares that a 
crowd forms " un seul ^tre." — Psychologie des/oides, p. 12. 



68 The Social Mind and Education. 

Against these forms of ontology there will always be 
vigorous protests. 

"All psychical processes [declares Professor Paul] come to 
their fulfillment in individual minds, and nowhere else. Neither 
the popular mind, nor elements of it, such as art, religion, etc., 
have any concrete existence, and therefore nothing can come to 
pass in them or between them. Away, then, with these abstrac- 
tions ! For ' away with all abstractions ' must be our last word if 
we wish to attempt in any place to define the factors of that which 
actually happens." ^ 

The term, then, is to be defended only when it is used to 
describe concrete reality. Professor Tufts has suggested 
the use of the word ' ' person ' ' in social interpretation, not 
as a mere figure but as a suggestive analogy. ' ' Personal- 
ity, regarded as the purposive, interrelated, and unified ac- 
tivity of various desires, may thus be of all grades, 
according to the degree to which impulses have passed 
into conscious desires, and desires in turn have become 
systematized into unity of steadfast purpose." Wundt is 
quoted as asserting that the social person is as real as the 
individual person.* 

It is in just this sense that we assert the reality of the 
"social mind," which on its cognitive side describes the or- 
ganization of men's ideas into systematic unity — through the 
sole instrumentality, however, of individual minds. ' ' Social 
consciousness," or "social self-consciousness," is used in 
the same way. v/'Consciousness is implied in knowledge and 
extends its area with the latter. Social consciousness is 
simply consciousness of the same thought or feeling on 
the part of communicating individuals, while social self- 
consciousness implies a further element of purposive co- 
operation between such individuals toward a more or less 

1 Principles of the History of Language (tr. by Strong), p. xxxiv. 

2 " Recent Sociological Tendencies in France," American Jotimal of Socialogy, 
January, 1896. 



Development of Social and Individual Thought. 69 

definite end. Vlt is this common purpose which, becoming 
clearer and more definite in the consciousness of indi- 
viduals, draws them together into a closer social unity.' 
The process may be described in terms of personality, 
collective mind, and the like, but these notions are em- 
ployed only as tools of thought, as clues in interpretation. 
They have no mystical meaning ; they describe actual 
phenomena which offer obstacles to systematic organiza- 
tion with other knowledge until they are symbolized in 
convenient terms. In every case where these phrases are 
used, some periphrasis in common language should be a 
possible substitute. If they will not stand this test they 
must be regarded as mere devices of logical jugglery. 

So much of restatement seems a necessary preparation 
for the next stage of the discussion. In comparing the 
social and the individual mind, it is of fundamental im- 
portance that we have a clear notion of what we mean — 
and what we do not mean — by the former. 

The idea that the individual passes in some sort through 
the same stages as the race, or that humanity, has experi- 
enced periods of development corresponding roughly to 
the different ages of the individual, is one of those concep- 
tions which may be traced back into the history of thought 
until it gradually fades away altogether. Or, from the 
other point of view, it is an idea which has developed from 
a vague and socially unconscious figure into a definitely 
elaborated scientific theory. 

The unconscious notion is implied in such phrases as the 
" childhood of the race," and it may be traced throughout 
literature under many different forms. One of the earliest 

1 "Ainsi, quelle que soit la societe que nous consid^rons, toute aspiration col- 
lective qui, en se realisant, aurait pour rfisultat de consolider le groupe, de le 
faire a la fois plus complexe, plus plastique, plus conscient de lui-meme sera une 
cause deprogres pour le groupe, et par suite deja une force sociale effective." — M. 
Bernes : Revue de metaphysique et de morale. Tome III., p. 172. 



yo The Social Mind and Education. 

clear statements of this doctrine is found in the Paida- 
gogos of Clement of Alexandria, in which he defends the 
teaching' of Greek on the ground that since God conducted 
the race from Judaism through Greek culture to Christian- 
ity, the individual should be led through the same stages of 
education. The philosophers of history naturally made 
more or less use of this theory. Herder saw in humanity 
a great individual which passes through its several ages 
from infancy in the orient, boyhood in Egypt, youth in 
Greece, manhood in Rome, to old age in the Christian 
world.' Hegel's similar division is familiar.^ Lessing as- 
serted that every individual must traverse the same course 
as that by which the race attains its perfection. 

Goethe, who was among the first to gain clearer ideas of 
development, said : ' ' The youth must always begin again 
at the beginning, and as an individual make his way 
through the epochs of the world's civilization," ^ while 
Kant raised the question whether individual education 
should follow the development of mankind in general 
through its different generations.* 

It would be idle to multiply illustrations of this general 
nature. They have been zealously ferreted out by the 
Herbartians of Germany, especially by those of the Ziller 
school. 

With Comte the theory gained in definiteness because of 
his method of checking inductive generalizations of history 
by deductive reasoning from the principles of human 
nature. Having established his ' ' three stages ' ' by the 
historical method he sought to verify his hypothesis by ap- 
pealing to the facts of individual development. He 

1 Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind. 

2 The Philosophy of History (tr. by Sibree), p. iii. 

s Quoted by Rein, Pickel, and Scheller: Das Erste Schuljahr, S. i6. 
* Pddagogik, Werke heraus. von Hartenstein, Vol. VIII., S. 462. 



Development of Social mid Individual Thought. 71 

declares that every mature person if he looks back upon 
his own history is aware that he was a theologian in his 
childhood, a metaphysician in his youth, and a natural phi- 
losopher in his manhood. ' Here is a definite assertion on 
historical and psychological grounds of the parallelism be- 
tween the development of race and of individual thought. 
vThe theory as presented by Comte, although possibly vul- 
nerable from both points of view, marked an advance in 
deliniteness and clearness. To educational philosophers 
the analogy is naturally suggestive. Rousseau recognized 
it in a very general way in the Emile,^ and more specifi- 
cally in one of his shorter, less famous essays. * Pestalozzi 
expressed the thought somewhat vaguely in his best known 
work, Wie Gertrud ihre Kinder lehrt. He makes much of 
a natural order of development in the child, to which 
the curriculum must be carefully adjusted.* The idea is at 
least hinted at in this statement of the problem : ' ' How to 
find a common origin of all methods and arts of instruc- 
tion, and with it a form by which the development of our 
race might be decided through the essence of our own very 
nature."" It is, however, in a comparatively unknown 
essay^ that Pestalozzi most clearly states the theory. 
Herbart, as the interpreter and philosophic systematizer of 
Pestalozzi' s vague educational ideas,' gave more precise 
form to the conception, stating specifically that ' ' by imita- 
ting the traces of moral culture in the human race, the 
educator shall see in the progress of his pupil a recapitula- 

1 Loc. cit., p. 6. 

2 Tr. by Payne, p. 164. 

i Discours sur Vorigine et lesfondements de Vin'egalite parmiles hommes. 
^ How Gertrude Teaches Her Children (tr. by Holland and Turner), pp. 23, 26, 
29, 32. 
ilbid.,p.?,i). 

6 Meine Nachforschungen uber den Gang der Natur in der Entwickelung des 
Menschengeschlechts , S. 7. 

7 W. Rein : " Pestalozzi and Herbart," Forum, May, 1896. 



72 The Social Mind and Education. 

tion of the great progress of mankind.'" In his ^sthet- 
ische Darstellung der Welt, Herbart asserts that the be- 
ginning point for the child's intellectual and sympathetic 
education does not lie in the present, because the pupil's 
sphere is too narrow and quickly traversed, the adult's too 
high and complicated. Since, however, the time succes- 
sions of history end in the present and our culture has its 
origin with the Greeks, the Homeric poems which repro- 
duce the life and thought of that early period furnish 
appropriate materials for the beginning of education.^ 
Ziller, one of Herbart' s disciples, is credited with formu- 
lating the theory of the Culture Epochs (^Die Kulturhistor- 
ischen Stufen') still more definitely, ^ and with an attempt 
to determine with some precision the different periods of 
race development and the corresponding stages of individ- 
ual growth.* The elaboration of this theory has resulted 
in many schemes, some of which, like Hartmann's,* lay 
chief stress on the psychological aspect of the question, 
others, like Beyer's,^ emphasize the social and economic 
side. To statements of Vogt which bear directly upon the 
present discussion, more space must be assigned. He as- 
serts a parallelism of form and process rather than of con- 
tent and products. ' Confining attention to the growth of 
intelligence, we note the following progressive development 
in the mode of individual thought : (i) the imaginative 
i^phantasiemassige') mode, (2) a realistic or matter-of-fact 

1 Padagogischen Schriften. 
2Tr. by Felkin, p. 73. 

3 De Garnio : Herbart and the Herbartians, p. 109. 

4 Rein : Outlines of Pedagogics (tr. by C. C. and I. J. Van Liew). 
6 Das Erste Schuljahr, S. 30. 

^ Jbid., S.44. 

'Vogt declares, " dass es individuelle Entwickelungsstufen des kindlichen 
Geistes giebt, und solche der Menscheit oder eines bestimmten Volkes, welche 
den ersten homolog sind, und dass beide, Individuum und Volk, sich teils betreffs 
ihrer Intelligence, teils in practischer Hinsicht entwickeln." — Ibid., S. 29. 



Development of Social and Individual Thozight. 73 

{thats'dchliche') mode, and finally (3) a reflective {reflectir- 
ende^ manner of thought. The thought connections of the 
individual advance, therefore, in accordance with the cate- 
gories of possibility (^Moglichkeif), reality ( Wirklichkeif), 
and necessity (^Nothwendigkeif) . In the case of a race or 
Volk the corresponding progress is from (i) a mythical 
(mythische') to (2) an historical and finally to (3) a philo- 
sophical mode of observation and thought, which success- 
ively find expression in the psychical products of a people. ' 
^ It is unnecessary to follow out the application of this 
analysis to a course of study. The point which deserves 
attention here is the concept of generally parallel modes of 
thought development in the race and in the individual — an 
idea to be discriminated carefully from that of definite 
epochs and periods, of stages and "cultural products."* 
The theory of Vogt translated into terms of the social mind 
is simply the assertion that the collective tradition is syn- 
thesized — first in a socially unconscious or semi-conscious 
manner, then more and more reflectively until it culminates 
in modern science and philosophy. 

V The general theory of parallelism has been greatly influ- 
enced by the development of biology during the present 
century. The researches of Wolf!, Von Baer, Dumas, 
Dollinger, and others in embryology threw light upon the 
phenomena of individual growth, while the wider observa- 
tions and generalizations of Treviranus, Lamarck, Darwin, 
and Wallace offered a general theory of race development. ^ 
By Darwin himself in part and notably by Ernst von Baer, 
Haeckel, Louis Agassiz, Spencer, and Huxley these results 

1 Das Erste Schuljahr, S. 29. 

2 It is interesting to relate Vogt's analysis to the " three stages" of Comte, 
theological, metaphysical, and positive or scientific. 

3T. H.Huxley: "Evolution," EncyclopcEdia Britannica, 9th Ed., Vol. VIII., 
pp. 744-746. 



/ 



74 The Social Mind and Education. 

were synthesized into what is popularly known as the ' ' re- 
capitulation theory,'" according to which the individual, in 
his development, passes rapidly through the various stages 
by which the species has reached its present morphologi- 
cal and physiological status, or, in technical terms, the 
ontogenetic and the philogenetic series are coincident.^ 

This biological conception is undergoing more or less 
damaging criticism at the present time, but it has done 
much to give support to the general idea which we are 
discussing. It should be noted that in its original form 
the recapitulation theory is asserted of vital phenomena 
only. The hypothesis has been carried up into the spheres 
of psychical and social phenomena. As we have seen, 
the causal connections between these groups are not defi- 
nitely determined, so that the greatest care must be exer- 
cised in reasoning from the physical into the mental or 
from the mental into the social realm. ^ Again the purely 
physiological theory must be modified by the statement 
that for an ideal ' ' recapitulation ' ' identity of environment 
would be demanded. Even if the Lamarckian conception 
of heredity be accepted, it provides only one factor in the 
evolution of the individual. The influence of surrounding 
conditions upon the organism is another element to which 
large if not predominant importance must be attributed. 
This modification of the hypothesis must not be over- 
looked in applying it by analogy to the phenomena of 
consciousness and association. Of those who have system- 
atically attempted to account for mental development in 

1 Haeckel : Gesammte Populare Vortrdge, S. 94. 

2 Le Conte : Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thought, pp. 9 and 10. 

3 Spencer : Essays, " The Genesis of Science," Vol. II., p. 73. 

Durkheim goes so far as to say : " En un mot, il y a entre la psychologie et la 
sociologie la meme solution de continuit6 qu'entre la biologic et les sciences 
physico-chimiques. Par consequent, toutes les fois, qu'un phenomene social est 
directement expliquS par un phenomene psychique on peut etre assur6 que 
I'explication est fausse." — Les rigles de la methode sociologique, p. 128. 



Developmeiit of Social and Individual Thought. 75 

terms of organic evolution Spencer and Romanes may be 
regarded as prominent types. 

The former in his First Principles and more specifically 
in other parts of his philosophy has asserted that 

"The phenomena subjectively known as changes in conscious- 
ness are objectively known as nervous excitations and discharges 
which science now interprets in modes of motion. Hence in 
following up organic evolution the advance of retained motion in 
integration, in heterogeneity, and in definiteness, may be expected 
to show itself alike in the visible nervo-muscular actions and in 
the correlative mental changes."' 

Spencer traces this evolution both in the individual and 
in society and definitely asserts a parallel between them : 

"The education of the child must accord both in mode and 
arrangement with the education of mankind as considered histori- 
cally ; or, in other words, the genesis of knowledge in the in- 
dividual must follow the same course as the genesis of knowledge 
in the race."^ 

The problem which Romanes set himself was to trace 
the development of consciousness from its first emergence 
up through the animal series to its highest organization in 
man. In his volume Mental Evolution iii Mcin., he 
attempts to show the transition both in the individual and 
in the race from " receptual communication"^ in animals 
to the ' ' distinctively human faculty " of " conceptual 
predication. ' ' ■* He affirms that a characteristically animal 
mode of thought attains its highest development in the 
first part of a child's second year, at which period the 
emergence of a human form of intelligence begins to 
take place. ^ It is further asserted that in the light of 
actual history, tradition, and antiquarian remains, the race 

1 First Principles , p. 391. 

2 Education, p. 122. 

3 Pp. 36-39. 
4i5jrf.,pp. 34, 76-78. 
6 Ibid., p. 237. 



76 The Social Mind and Edzication. 

seems to have advanced continuously in stages analogous 
to those of individual development. ' Romanes complains 
that the critics of his theory insist upon contrasting the 
adult psychology of civilized man with the lowest forms of 
animal intelligence, ignoring on the one hand the psycho- 
genesis of the child and on the other the mental traits of 
the savage, both of which are of the greatest significance. ^ 

The students of psychical phenomena, largely under the 
influence of biology, have been led to examine not only the 
facts of adult consciousness, but to trace the growth of 
mind from earliest infancy to old age. The aim of ' ' child 
study ' ' is primarily to determine the general laws of such 
development in the first years of life, the "plastic" period. 

Preyer, Hartmann, Sully, Baldwin, and many others 
have given much special study to this problem, which has 
in some form engaged the attention of most modern psy- 
chologists. Sully gives expression to the theory in this 
wise : 

" According to this way [the evolutionary] of looking at infancy 
the successive phases of its mental life are a brief risuine of the 
more important features in the slow upward progress of the 
species. The periods dominated successively by sense and appe- 
tite, by blind wondering and superstitious fancy, and by a calmer 
observation and a juster reasoning about things, these steps mark 
the pathway both of the child mind and of the race mind." ^ 

Hofding traces the stream of consciousness in the in- 
dividual from the foetus state to death. It is said to form a 
curve with terminals representing comparatively simple 
states, while in the middle and at the highest point ideas, 
feelings, and expressions of will specifically appear. ' ' What 
in this way applies to the development of the individual is 
valid also for that of the race. . . . It is a condition 

1 Romanes : loc. cit., p. 391. 

2 Ibid., p. 438. 

3 Studies of Childhood, p. 85. 



Development of Social and Individual Thought. 77 

of any independent development of the life of thought and 
feeling, that the elementary, practical requirements of life 
should be satisfied." Only as social organization advances 
sufficiently to secure leisure to a few or to many can 
reflective thought apply itself to science. As the indi- 
vidual advances from vegetative and instinctive reactions 
to differentiated consciousness, so society passes from a 
mere animal struggle for existence to a division of physical 
and psychical labor, the discrimination and elaboration of 
thought in science, of feeling in art, and of volition in 
purposeful collective action.' Again, in discussing the in- 
fluence of unconscious habit, Hofding declares that "In 
the individual, as in nations, sudden revolutions avail but 
little ; below the surface tendencies persist which it takes 
time to overcome. ' ' ^ 

This thought offers a natural transition to the sociologi- 
cal point of view, which in general regards society as a 
developing whole, to be interpreted, as we have seen, by 
concepts derived from biology and psychology — in terms, 
therefore, of structure, function, mind, consciousness, and 
personality. 

Here also there are various degrees of definiteness and 
precision in the application of the theory. A community 
of boys is regarded as affording materials for a new science 
of ' ' social embryology. ' ' ^ Children playing in a sand-pile 
develop methods of settling disputes which are declared to 
throw light upon the evolution of the idea of justice in the 
human race.* The ethnologist, taking a broad view of 
ages and races of men, seeking to discover the origins of 
nations and of civilizations, sees "in the growth of the 

1 Outlines of Psychology (tr. by Lowndes), p. 93. 
2y5zrf.,p. 75. 

sjohnson : " Rudimentary Society Among Boys," J. H. U. Studies, November, 
1884, p. 51. 
4 Hall : " The Story of a Sand-Pile," Scribner's Magazine, Vol. III., p. 690. 



78 The Social Mind and Education. 

child from helpless infancy to adolescence, and through the 
strong and trying development of manhood to the idiosyn- 
crasies of disease and senescence ... an epitome in 
miniature of the life of the race." Philologist and artist 
study the child with the hope of finding some clue to the 
origin and development of speech and artistic expression 
from the earliest beginnings of society. ' 

We have noted that earlier sociologists, such as Comte 
and Spencer, have recognized the theory of parallel devel- 
opment with greater definiteness. The later schools of 
psychological interpreters of social phenomena have made 
still more of the analogy between the individual and 
society. In general, however, emphasis has been laid less 
upon genetic parallelism than upon statical correspond- 
ences. 

Lilienfeld, however, states the proposition in terms of 
social development most clearly, asserting that the devel- 
opmental stages of the human embryo's evolution repre- 
sent the progressive social development of the race in its 
gradual rise during the course of the entire history of 
humanity.^ He further points out what has been insisted 
upon by Baldwin from the standpoint of physiological 
psychology, that in social as well as individual evolu- 
tion the lower forms are not fully reproduced but only 
hinted at, i. e. , there are ' ' short-cuts ' ' in the recapitula- 
tion.^ Lilienfeld also applies the idea to education, and 
deprecates an exclusively scientific form of instruction 
which would in his judgment prove one-sided both for the 
individual and for the race.* Schaffle traces an elaborate 
analogy between individual and social psychology,^ guard- 

1 Chamberlain : The Child and Childhood in Folk Thought, p. 3. 

2 Gedanken iXher die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft, I. Theil, S. 247, 251. 

3 Ibid., S. 249. 

4 3id., S. 267. 

6 Bau und Leben des socialen Korpers, I. Auf., Bd. I., S. 392-409. 



Development of Social and Individttal Thought. 79 

ing with comparative success against a fanciful use of 
terms.' In his treatment of the collective spirit ( Volks- 
geisf) and social self-consciousness (^Selbstbewusstsein des 
sociale7i Kbrpers'), which exist only in individual minds, 
he shows that the social spirit gives evidence of growth and 
development/ The common possessions of the race are 
declared to be the accumulations of countless individual con- 
tributions, gradually reacted upon, coordinated, and con- 
solidated into a coherent whole.' The analogy is recog- 
nized in a general way and emphasis is laid upon the com- 
parative brevity — and consequent rapidity — of individual 
evolution. SchafiBe also discusses the recapitulation theory 
of Haeckel,* but chiefly with the object of differentiating 
sociology from zoology.'' He outlines the main stages of 
social evolution but does not refer specifically to a parallel 
individual development. The whole work, however, is 
filled with allusions which leave no doubt as to the author's 
acceptance of the theory in its chief outlines. 

De Greef approaches the question from the social stand- 
point and endeavors to show that social intelligence is 
formed in a manner strictly analogous to the growth of 
individual consciousness. Following the suggestion of 
Comte, De Greef has applied the hierarchical idea to 
social phenomena, arranging them in a scale determined by 
increasingly conscious social action. The evolution of 
society is characterized, therefore, by progressively pur- 

1 In the second edition of his work, Schaffle has almost wholly abandoned the 
biological terminology. 

2 Loc. cit., S. 419. " Er schreitet in seinen Wachsthum nur langsam, doch unauf- 
horlich fort." 

3 This process " muss bei dem weltgeschichtlich ausgedehnten Lebenslauf des 
socialen Korpers langer dauern, als analog bei der kurz lebenden Einzelnperson. 
Und doch braucht selbst die leztere Zeit genug fiir ihre charactervolle, selbst- 
bewusste Durchbildung und fur wechselseitige Accommodation aller Theile 
ihres Nervensystems." — Ibid., p. 417. 

•4 Ibid., pp. 827-847. 

6 Introduction a la sociologie, 2me Partie, Chap. XIII. 



8o The Social Mind and Education. 

poseful regard for social phenomena, economic, genetic, 
artistic, those relating to belief, juridical and political, 
successively.' The activities lowest in the scale are rel- 
atively unconscious, reflex, and instinctive, just as in the 
case of the individual the physiological functions are per- 
formed either automatically or with the minimum of con- 
sciousness. Again, as a certain measure of organization in 
the lower social phenomena is essential to the further 
development of the higher, so the instinctive and reflex 
activities of the individual form the necessary basis for the 
psychical functions. ^ ' ' En resume, la conscience sociale, ' ' 
says De Greef, "se forme naturellement suivant les memes 
lois que la conscience individuelle ; elle passe du r^flexe ^ 
r instinct, a la memoire, au raisonnement et finalement a 
la m6thode ; ce developpement est organique. ' ' ^ The 
recognition of contract in social activities is regarded as an 
evidence of collective consciousness.* 

De Greef makes much of the gradual fading away of 
consciousness, social and individual, after a purposeful 
decision has been reached. Every conscious act by repe- 
tition becomes habit in the individual and custom in soci- 
ety. Thus conscious gains are preserved and consolidated 
in automatism.^ 

It should be noted that De Greef concerns himself not 
with stages of cultural attainment, either in the individual 
or in the race, but with the general principles of intellec- 
tual development in both. He directs attention to form 
rather than to content, to process rather than to products. 
Yet he regards the latter as organic growths displaying 

1 Loc. cit., 2me Partie, pp. 443 sq. 

2 Ibid., p. 437. 

3 Ibid., p. 453. 

4 " Le contrat est une forme intellectuale ou la conscience se manifest naturelle- 
ment a un degre plus 61eve que dans toute autre forme psychique." — Ibid., p. 453. 

6 Ibid, pp. 433, 441. 



Development of Social and Individual Thought. 8i 

the same phenomena of formation.' Other sociologists 
have not specifically adopted the genetic parallelism, 
although they constantly point out or assume analogies 
which are related to it. Durkheim lays stress upon the 
determining character of the social milieu which molds 
the individual after its own model. ^ Tarde sees in the 
formation of the social tradition a process analogous to the 
growth of individual memory ; in social standards and 
customs influences similar to the inherited tendencies in 
man.^ 

From the materials presented it is clear that in a general 
way at least the parallelism is widely recognized and has 
been incorporated in the social tradition. Yet this general 
conception may be rendered more precise in different 
ways. It may be treated as a biological problem, as a 
psychological theory, or as a sociological hypothesis. In 
all these aspects it must have meaning for teachers. 
Again the parallelism may be asserted for the products and 
types of race development and individual growth, as when 
it is afHrmed that the youth must be for a time a savage or 
a cow-boy, that he must be interested by literature which 
describes pastoral, agricultural, and industrial life success- 
ively.* Or the correspondence may be stated in terms of 
mental modes. It may be urged that at certain periods 
the child will show fear, or will reason as do primitive 
men in similar circumstances. The former theory was 
pushed to its limits by Ziller, who attempted to systema- 
tize the educational process on this basis with an exactness 

1 " Les croyances sont, 3. n'en pas douter, purement reflexes ou instinctives k 
leur origine, et il en est longtemps ainsi. . . . Precisement parce que le 
developpement des croyances est organique et non pas accidentel, leur develop- 
pement suit la voie naturelle qui va du reflexe k I'instinct, au raissonnement et 
enfin a la pure methode consciente." Ibid., p. 449. 

2 De la division du travail social, pp. 385-391. 

3 La logique sociale, p. 109. 

< Van Liew: " The Culture Epoch Theory," First Herbart Year Book. 



82 The Social Mind and Education. 

and rigidity which ignored or underestimated the varia- 
tions of organic growth and the modifying influences of 
heredity and a changing environment/ The later Her- 
bartians themselves have reacted from this formalism, and 
have made their plans much more flexible, although these 
are perhaps still open to the charge of putting too much 
faith in ' ' cultural products ' ' as the appropriate material 
for successive periods of instruction.'^ Without attempting 
a discussion of this point, we may pass to the other aspect 
of the parallel, i. e., mental modes in the race and the 
individual. 

Once more we must give heed chiefly to the intellectual 
or reasoning processes, not losing sight of the fact, how- 
ever, that in such a course we are abstracting an organic 
part of consciousness.^ It has been pointed out that the 
social mind has been organized out of the vague unity of 
homan life. Primitive men in whom reason first dawned 
were confronted by a confused whole, which they gradu- 
ally analyzed into its components. So the infant looks 
out, in James' picturesque phrase, upon ' ' thinghood as a 
whole." 

"The first sensation which an infant gets is for him the uni- 
verse. And the universe which he later comes to know is nothing 
but an amplification and an implication of that first simple germ 
which, by accretion on the one hand and intussusception on the 
other, has grown so big and complex and articulate that its first 
estate is unrememberable."* 

James Ward expresses a similar thought in his phrase 

1 Allgemeine Pddagogik, S. 214. 

2 Van Liew : loc. cit., p. 95. 

Cf. C. A. McMurray: " The Culture Epochs,'' Second Herbart Year Book, p. 96. 

3 It is quite conceivable that considerations based upon a purely intellectual 
analysis ought to be modified by regard for emotional and ethical development. 
Thus the advocates of cultural products as materials of instruction lay stress 
upon their aesthetic and moral value. Vide C. A. McMurray : loc. cit., pp. 103- 
106. 

4 Psychology, Vol. II., p. 8. Cf. also p. 344. 



Development of Social and Individual Thought. 83 

"presentation continuum." "We are led," he says, "to 
the conception of a totum objedivuni, or ' objective con- 
tinuum,' which is gradually differentiated, thereby becom- 
ing what we call distinct presentations, ' ' ' 

Yet it will not do to lay too great stress upon the 
earliest period, which has much in common with animal 
psychology. It must be remembered that to the child, as 
to the adult, ' ' the sense of the whole comes first. ' ' The 
process of analysis asserts itself immediately, however, and 
the child begins to examine details. 

But the social mind from the first demands unity also. 
The separated elements must be put together again. The 
germs of science and philosophy are present in primitive 
thought. So, too, the child mind is "endowed with a 
lively and inextinguishable impulse to connect and sim- 
pHfy."* But for this tendency his world would be appar- 
ently disconnected and hopelessly capricious. 

Once more it has been shown that the sciences have 
grown out of attempts to meet the daily needs of life, i. e., 
out of the arts. ' ' Man began to reflect, ' ' says Sully, ' ' on 
the connections of things in order to supply himself with 
food, to ward off cold and other evils. So with the child. 
Before the age of speech we may observe him thinking out 
rapidly as occasion arises some new practical expedient. ' ' ^ 

Again, we have seen that the explanations or philoso- 
phies which have successively influenced the social tra- 
dition have become less and less anthropomorphic. In 
primitive society the theories based upon personal volition 
are very prominent and result in myths, fetishism, and 
theological explanations. The predominance of fancy and 
imagination among primitive people is significant, for in 

1 Art. " Psychology," Encyclopczdia Britannica, Vol. XX., p. 45. 

2 Sully : loc. cit., p. 73. 

3 Ibid., p. 71. 



84 The Social Mind and Education. 

these sources the thought which results in sciences and 
philosophy has its origin. The attempts of a child to 
account for phenomena in terms of its own imaginative 
consciousness are familiar/ 

"Thus in the case of children, as in that of uncultured races, 
the supernatural realm is at first brought at most into only a 
very loose connection with the visible world. All the same there 
is seen in the measure of the individual child's intelligence the 
endeavor to coordinate."^ 

With the progress of society the search for causes and 
processes becomes more definite. In the history of human 
thought attempted solution of the more difficult problems 
of origins and final causes preceded in a general way the 
examination of processes and the determination of invari- 
able sequences. Metaphysics had its turn before science. 
It would be going beyond the facts to assert that the child 
first concerns himself with metaphysical problems and 
then turns to a primitively scientific mode of thought, but 
a study of children's questions throws some light on the 
matter. "When this more definite scientific direction is 
taken by a child's questioning we may observe that the 
ambitious 'why?' begins to play a second role, the first 
being now taken by the more modest ' how?' "^ 

In general, therefore, it may be said that the social and 
the individual mind grow by a process of analysis and 
synthesis, by examination of details and the connection of 
them in explanations which become less and less anthropo- 
morphic. 

Yet this is only a partial description. The social tradition 
has accumulated a vast amount of experiences and obser- 
vations which are not immediately available for organi- 

1 This is admirably illustrated by the remark of a little girl who on seeing for 
the first time a horseless carriage exclaimed: " Look, mama, fairy horses must 
be pulling that carriage." 

2 Sully : loc. cit., p. 92. 

3 Ibid., p. 88. 



Development of Social and Individual Thought. 85 

zation, which await some higher and broader generahzation 
and synthesis. These materials form a part of the social 
memory and are preserved for future use. In an analogous 
way the child mind during the ascendency of sense activity 
gathers a store of clear memory images as "a necessary 
preliminary to reflection and thought. ' ' ' 

With the systematization of abstract thought in the race 
the unity of social life begins to be more definitely analyzed 
and the social tradition becomes differentiated into specific 
parts, sciences, arts, literature. In the case of the individ- 
ual, education superimposes this rationalized scheme to 
such an extent that it is impossible to determine just what 
part is played by natural development. Yet we know 
from the laws of mental growth that so far as this analysis 
into subjects has a real and not merely verbal existence in 
the pupil's consciousness, it has been achieved by differ- 
entiating his life experiences and memory images, classify- 
ing them and giving them an abstract form. To this 
subject we shall return in a subsequent chapter. 

The gradual systematizing and development of the social 
tradition has been described as the result of collective 
action, at first unconscious, but ultimately with increas- 
ingly definite aim and methods, becoming self-conscious. 
These words are borrowed from individual psychology, so 
that to assert a parallel in terms would be simply to beg 
the question. If we turn our attention first to the individ- 
ual side we are confronted with widely varying theories as 
to the nature of consciousness and self-consciousness. The 
view is maintained that there can be no consciousness that 
is not self-consciousness. 

" Over and over again [says Baldwin] have systems been built 
upon the subject-object theory of consciousness ; namely, that 
personality, subjectivity, consciousness in any form necessarily 

1 Sully : loc. cit., p. 69. 



86 The Social Mind arid Education. 

implicated an antithesis, in consciousness, between ego and non- 
ego. But an example of what is thus denied may be seen upon 
the floor of any nursery where there is a child less than six months 
of age. "1 

Not only is there declared to be a distinction between 
consciousness and self-consciousness, but it is further as- 
serted that consciousness shades away into the unconscious 
and that many thought connections are made below the 
"threshold."^ Moreover, it is afifirmed that these three 
states are not merely isolated mental conditions, but are 
genetically related in a process of development from un- 
consciousness to the highest form of self-consciousness. 
' ' Das Ich ist ein Entwickelungsproduct, wie der ganze 
Mensch ein Entwickelungsproduct ist. ' ' ^ 

Chief attention has been given to the earlier develop- 
ments of consciousness and self-consciousness in the indi- 
vidual. The transition from animal to human thought is 
marked according to Romanes by the substitution of 
* ' conceptual " for " receptual ' ' thought, the recognition 
of abstract similarities rather than the mere association of 
habitually connected concrete things. James makes prac- 
tically the same distinction in the phrases ' ' association by 
similarity ' ' and ' ' contiguous association based on exper- 
ience. " True reasoning is the result of association by 
similarity, the abstraction from particulars of a common 
character by which they are united in generalized knowl- 
edge. Differences in reasoning power are simply differ- 
ences in degree, not in kind, of ability to associate by 
similarity. ' ' This answers the question why Darwin and 
Newton had to be waited for so long," says James. " The 
flash of similarity between the apple and the moon, be- 
tween the rivalry for food in nature and the rivalry for 

1 Mental Evolution in the Child and the Race, pp. 5-6. 

2 Hofding : loc. cit., Chap. III., especially pp. 72, 73, 75, 77, 85. 

3 Quoted by Romanes : Mental Evolution in Man, p. 207. 



Development of Social and Individual Thought. 87 

man's selection, was too recondite to have occurred to any 
but exceptional minds. "^ Intellectual growth, therefore, 
involves as one of its elements development of the power 
to detect similarities and to associate by means of them. 
But this process does not at the outset demand subjective 
recognition and direction by a self or personality. Ro- 
manes maintains that language and judgment may be 
developed in a child far beyond animal signs and receptual 
thought before he reaches the stage of differentiation 
between subject and object ; that there is consciousness 
but not self-consciousness.^ 

Another distinction between animal and child is in the 
nature of their speech. At first in both it is " receptual," 
or by " contiguous association. ' ' The animal never passes 
this point, but the child gradually abstracts the idea of sign 
as sign and applies it intentionally. ' ' This general purpose 
constitutes," in James' opinion, " the peculiarity of human 
speech, and explains its prodigious development." ^ 

The ability to associate by similarity and the exercise of 
intention are the germs from which have developed — in 
correlation with the other mental functions — the marvelous 
power of human reason purposefully applied to the prob- 
lems of life. It remains to show that the development of 
intentional thinking is accompanied by an expansion or 
extension of self-consciousness. The higher achievements 
of thought are made under the guidance of a growing per- 
sonality which gains constantly a clearer, more definite view 
of its own nature, its wider relations, and its own ends. Here 
again we must confine ourselves arbitrarily to the cognitive 
side of the growth, which, however, can be understood 
fuUy only in its organic relations with feeling and conation. 

1 Loc. cit., Vol. II., p. 360. 

2 Loc. cit., p. 194. 

3 Loc. cit.. Vol. II., p. 356. 



The Social Mind and Education. 



Mackenzie distinguishes five ways in which self may be 
conceived : 

1. The unimportant and arbitrary sense in which any- 
thing that can be regarded as an individual may be said 
to have a self. -E. g., a river empties itself into the sea.* 

2. Next, an object is said to have a self if it must be re- 
garded as a whole in order to be understood. An organ- 
ism must be so regarded. ^ 

3. The meaning of the term becomes still deeper when 
the unity of an organic being attains to consciousness, /. e. , 
the parts are reflected into a focus where their relations to 
the external world register themselves, and where a re- 
action upon the external world begins. The central ele- 
ment in this form of consciousness seems to be the simple 
feeling of pleasure and pain, i. e. , the consciousness of the 
harmony or disharmony of the content of experience with 
the unity in which it is contained.^ 

4. A still higher stage is reached when ' ' the organic 
being becomes actually conscious of itself as a unity, i. e. , 
the stage at which it reflects upon its own life, and recog- 
nizes itself as one throughout all its changes." In this 
stage happiness as an ideal which sees wider relations takes 
the place of pleasure which is concerned merely with 
immediate gratification. * 

5. Finally, man comes to realize not only that "his 
life is for him a whole, but also in the sense that his world 
is a whole. He is aware of his individual life not as a 
microcosm in a chaos, but as a microcosm in macrocosm, 
to the objective unity of which his individual life as well as 
everything else is referred. " ^ 

1 An Introduction to Social Philosophy , p. 161. 

2 Ibid., p. 162. 

3 Foid., p. 163. 

4 Ibid., p. 164. 
s Ibid., p. 165. 



Development of Social and Individual Thought. 89 

Corresponding to these stages of developing self-con- 
sciousness are certain problems which human thought 
must successively attack. Here we should note the tran- 
sition from those gropings and feelings after explanations 
which have been noted in children to the purposeful 
examination and reflection of adult life. The demand for 
pleasurable feeling requires a thinking out of the means by 
which it is secured, i. e., a preliminary understanding of 
the laws of the physical world. Further experience and 
the recognition of happiness as a more remote ideal are 
accompanied by the rationalizing of subjective as well as 
objective phenomena. The immediate pleasure of interest 
in intellectual activity prepares materials for further reflec- 
tion. Finally, the fuller recognition of self demands a 
conscious ef?ort to formulate more definitely an end which 
the self may purposefully seek. The ideal can be formed 
only out of the materials of past reflection which are 
organized into a conception of social life as a whole to 
which the individual self is intrinsically related. 

If we turn from the individual to the social mind, we 
observe that the latter is characterized not only by analy- 
sis and synthesis, by abstraction and generalization, but 
by increasing definiteness of purpose, the at least vague 
recognition of a common aim and a collective struggle to 
attain it. Ward asserts that social personality was the 
original stimulus to individual self-consciousness. "Col- 
lective action for common ends is the essence of society, 
and in taking counsel together for the good of the tribe 
each one learns also to take counsel with himself for his 
own good on the whole ; with the idea of the common 
weal arises the idea of happiness as distinct from momen- 
tary gratification.'" 

Professor Tufts has stated the parallel even more clearly : 

1 James Ward : loc. cit., Vol. XX., p. 84. 



90 The Social Mind and Education. 

' ' True it is that in individual and in society the early life 
is impulsive, unrelated, with little conscious unity of pur- 
pose, yet with language and religion and art, with indus- 
trial and intellectual cooperation, many a people has come 
to 'know what it wants,' and to act unitedly in order to 
get it.'" 

To sum up, it may be asserted that in their development 
social and individual thought agree since they begin with 
an indefinite whole or "presentation continuum," which 
is gradually differentiated and progressively integrated, at 
first instinctively but later with increasingly definite pur- 
pose in response to an even clearer perception of an ideal 
aim or end. 

1 AmeHcan Journal of Sociology , January, 1896, p. 454. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE SOCIAL MIND AND EDUCATION. 

The function of transmitting from one generation to 
the next the contents of the collective tradition has itself 
been characterized by increasing social self-consciousness. 
Beginning in the haphazard communication of empirical 
knowledge, dexterities, customs, and beliefs from parents 
to children, instruction has been more and more socialized 
and organized until in the great educational systems of 
modern nations societies purposefully seek to secure the 
orderly transmission and constant enrichment of the col- 
lective knowledge, feelings, and volitions, which, realized 
in individual consciousness, form the content of the social 
mind. In general, education may be regarded from the 
social point of view as a reflective effort to preserve the 
continuity and to secure the growth of the common 
tradition. Just as the successive states of consciousness in 
the individual form a coherent unity with which self or 
personality is associated, so society gains unity and 
5elf- consciousness from a well-organized and continuous 
collective tradition which therefore constitutes the essential 
vital principle of the social organism.* //Since the social 
mind can exist only in the minds of individuals, society 

1 FouillSe has emphasized this view in application to a nation and its educational 
system : " Le nation est un organisme doue d'une certaine conscience collective, 
quoique non concentrSe en un nioi ; nous considerons done comme une forme 
d'heredite et d'identite organique 3. travers les ages tout ce qui maintient chez un 
peuple une continuite de caractere, d'esprit, d'habitudes et d'aptitudes, en un 
mot, une conscience nationale et une volunt6 nationale. ... A nos yeux, le but 
dernier de I'education est d'assurer non seulement le developpement de la race, 
mais encore celui de la nationalite, de la Patrie." — V enseignement au point de vue 
national, p. vii. 

91 




92 The Social Mind and Edtccatio7i. 



seeks its own perpetuation and advancement by preparing 
the young gradually to appropriate the collective tradition 
in general, and by training a few minds to rieceive and 
elaborate its various highly specialized divisions. Thus, 
though individuals are constantly dying and others are 
taking their places, the social tradition not only persists 
but is progressively analyzed and synthesized, growing 
ever deeper and richer in truth, aesthetic and moral feeling, 
ideals, and aims, i^ Education seeks, therefore, to relate 
individual consciousness intrinsically to the social mind.' 
The social organism is in final analysis a psychic organism, i 
It is usual to contrast the social and individual aspects of 
education, often as though they were quite distinct and 
even antagonistic points of view. While society is chiefly 
concerned with socializing the pupil, the latter is supposed 
to gain most from a " development of his powers. " We 
have noted in a previous chapter the predominant influ- 
ence of the collective mind upon individual consciousness. 
The so-called "powers" or activities of the mind are 
simply abstractions from concrete states of consciousness. 
These latter have a social content. "There is no indi- 
vidual man," says Professor Tufts, "for ethics, for psy- 
chology, for logic, or for sociology, except by abstraction 
— that is if by individual man we mean a being not 
influenced by social forces — nor are there any feelings, 
thoughts, or volitions in any man which are independent 
of such forces."* In other words, the individual can 
exercise his powers only upon social materials, and in 
attempting to secure for himself discipline he appropriates 
in some measure the social tradition and may be the means 
of its transmission and further elaboration.^ The essen- 

1 Mackenzie : Introdiiction to Social Philosophy , p. i8o. 

2 American Journal of Sociology , January, 1896, p. 455. 

3 This is not to deny tliat there are disciplines which are of much more remote 
social value than others. 



The Social Mind and Education. 



tially social nature of education is being more and more 
fully recognized. The Culture Epoch theory, at which 
we just now glanced, is an illustration in point. Even Dr. 
William T. Harris, who is naturally and properly interested 
in the psychological side of education, has emphatically 
declared that a fundamental educational philosophy must 
be based not on physiology or even on psychology, but on 
sociology. ' If we regard the content of consciousness, the 
individual is almost an abstraction. It is the thought of 
humanity which he thinks.^ i^"It is only through the devel- 
opment of the whole race that any one man can develop."^ 
The harmonizing of the supposed antithesis between 
individual and social education has been admirably stated 
by Guyau in these words : ' ' Pedagogy might be defined 
as the art of adapting new generations to those conditions 
of life which are the most intensive and fruitful for the 
individual and the species. It has been asked if the 
object of education is individual or social ; it is simulta- 
neously individual and social ; it is, to speak accurately, 
the search for means to bring the most intensive individual 
existence into harmony with the most extensive social 
life.'"' The individual realizes his own possibilities by 

1 Educational Review , June, 1893. 

2 " How much more do we experience when we travel through ancient Egypt 
with Herodotus, when we stroll through the streets of Pompeii, when we carry 
ourselves back to the gloomy period of the crusades, or to the golden age of 
Italian art, now making the acquaintance of a physician of Moli&re, and now 
that of a Diderot or of a D'Alembert. What a great part of the life of others, of 
their character and their purpose, do we not absorb through poetry and music! 
. . . How great and comprehensive does self become in this conception ; and 
how insignificant the person ! Egoistical systems both of optimism and pessi- 
mism perish with their narrow standards of the import of intellectual life. We 
feel that the real pearls of life lie in the ever-changing contents of consciousness, 
and that the person is merely an indifferent symbolical thread on which they are 
strung."— Ernst Mack: Popular Scientific Lectures (tr. by McCormack), pp. 
234-235- 

3 Mackenzie: loc. cit., p. 180. 

4 Education and Heredity (tr. by W. J. Greenstreet), pp. xviii., xix. 



94 The Social Mind and Education. 

incorporating in himself the achievements of the race and 
he contributes to social progress by modifying and im- 
proving in never so slight a way the tradition intrusted to 
him. But even this service cannot be well rendered in 
isolation. Only by purposeful cooperation are the best 
and most permanent results secured. 

It has been shown that in a general way the social and 
the individual mind develop according to the same law — 
by analysis and synthesis, by the accumulation and organi- 
zation of experience, and by the formation of ideals from 
instinctive, unconscious activities to reflective, purposeful, 
self-conscious efforts. The value of this theory depends 
upon the interpretation of it. The dangers involved in 
the application of this principle have been pointed out by 
Professor Dewey, who, while admitting the truth of the 
parallel "in a general way," insists that the ontogenetic 
series must be the determining factor with the educator. 
The phylogenetic series may and does serve a useful 
purpose in suggesting methods and in some measure 
materials of instruction, but the moment one attempts to 
assign anything like definite, corresponding stages in the 
two series, and to reason from one to the other, the 
probability is that the resulting educational system will be 
largely artificial and doctrinaire. ' 

The fallacy of relying in any specific way upon the 
phylogenetic series may be made clearer by reference to a 
theory already mentioned, which has recently been defi- 
nitely stated by Baldwin, He asserts that by means of 
organically consolidated habit and accommodation, which 
may be perpetuated either through natural selection solely 
or through the transmission of acquired characters, certain 
organic ' ' short-cuts ' ' may be ef?ected so that the individ- 

1 Illinois State School Journal, December, 1895. Reprinted in Second Year Book 
of the Herbart Society. 



The Social Mind and Education. 95 

ual will omit in his own evolution certain elements or stages 
which were essential in the development of his ancestors/ 
This point is further illustrated by contrasting animals and 
men. In the case of the former, if higher centers of coordi- 
nation be removed, in a short time the function will be 
resumed by a lower center, but in men, the connections 
having been established directly and not via the subordi- 
nate segments, the injury or removal of the chief directing 
apparatus results in a permanent loss of functional power. ^ 

But there is still another though similar influence at work 
to modify the strict parallel. In adjustment to a changing 
environment, mental structure is being constantly accom- 
modated or adapted. " By accommodation, with the new 
adaptations which it works, old habits are broken up and 
new coordinations are made which are more complex or 
new organic growths secured which simplify a function. 
These gains are again clenched by heredity or selection 
and constitute further variations from phylogeny. ' ' ^ 

Baldwin also calls attention to the biological theory that 
the course of development of the embryo is dependent 
upon the amount of food, called "food yolk," which the 
^<g<g supplies. It is asserted that a plentiful supply hastens 
progress toward maturity, i. e. , abbreviates the recapitula- 
tion process.* This theory of organic growth is inter- 
preted in terms of mental life as follows : "Abundant 
food supply in the shape of lessons, rich suggestions in its 
social and educational life, urging forward in tasks of mind, 
etc., should give precocious mental development in the 
sense of early maturity of mind. The stages normally 
prescribed for natural growth may then be abbreviated. 

1 Mental Development in the Child and the Race (zd Ed.), p. 20. 

2 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 

3 Ibid., p. 23. 

4 Ibid., p. 29. 



96 The Social Mind and Education. 

The same effect is produced also by accidents of environ- 
ment. Newsboys and street gamins become sharp and 
mentally agile to a phenomenal degree from their methods 
of life, while boys reared in the artificial seclusion and 
solitude of a single son, educated by a tutor in his father's 
house, show the contrary character."^ 

We are justified in assuming, therefore, that to organic 
modifications correspond certain psychical variations by 
which the individual escapes some of the stages through 
which his ancestors passed or through which the thinking 
of the race was compelled to develop. In view of these 
facts, we reaffirm that any system which regards the 
phylogenetic series as a norm to which the psychogenesis 
of the individual must conform in any definite, precise 
manner, must be regarded as arbitrary. Yet, on the other 
hand, the development of the race and that of the indi- 
vidual so clearly correspond in a general way that the facts 
of the social mind may by analogy suggest a more careful 
examination of the ontogenetic processes, and a conse- 
quent modification of educational methods. From the 
cognitive point of view, instruction ideally aims to incor- 
porate in individual consciousness the social tradition as a 
generalized whole and some part of it in a specialized form. 
In this attempt, the educator fully recognizes the fact that 
consciousness is a growth, not a receptacle for information, 
that the subjective process is one of assimilation and organ- 
ization, not merely of accretion or aggregation. There- 
fore, he supervises and directs phenomena of development, 
not those of manufacture. The aim is to have the pupil 
reach the highest intellectual and moral standpoint of the 
race in the briefest time and with the greatest economy of 
effort. This standpoint, however, is not that of mere 
information, nor of abstract ' ' intellectual power, ' ' nor of 

liSzrf., pp. 32-33. 



The Social Mind and Edtication. 97 

useful automatic conduct, but it involves knowledge incor- 
porated in personality, an active organic growth possess- 
ing ability to assimilate new materials and advance to 
higher organization. 

It has been said that education seeks to secure results in 
the briefest time and with the greatest economy of effort. 
The recapitulation theory in any form requires rapidity of 
individual development. Manifestly, even if all the phylo- 
genetic stages are repeated, some of them must at best be 
merely suggested rather than actually reproduced. The 
difficulty of detecting the stages is obvious and any system 
dependent upon a discovery of them at all exact is evi- 
dently at a serious disadvantage. 

Economy of effort implies cooperation with natural forces 
instead of opposition to them. It recognizes, e. g., a 
development of consciousness and seeks in general to take 
advantage of its laws, not to attain an end apparently in 
violation of them. If, therefore, an educational theory be 
based upon detailed and complete recapitulation it can at 
best only urge the teacher to hasten on through some of 
the stages, but if it recognize the possibility of omitting 
stages altogether, it may advise purposeful ' ' short-cuts ' ' 
which neither waste time nor ignore principles of growth. 
From this point of view, the educational function may be 
described, though possibly not defined, as a purposeful 
social effort to effect "short-cuts" in the mental develop- 
ment of the individual as well as to hasten the whole 
process so that he may in the briefest time and in a 
thoroughly natural ' way attain the standpoint of the race, 

iThis term "natural" is one to conjure with in educational theory. In one 
sense mental development will be natural {i. e., in accordance with the fixed 
sequences and coexistences of psychological phenomena) in any event. Only the 
term supernatural can describe the opposite situation. But there are various 
degrees of resistance which mental processes offer to externally directed influ- 
ences. Economy of effort, elimination of friction, following lines of least resistance, 
are phrases which express the idea that one plan is more ' ' natural " than another. 



98 The Social Mind and Education. 

i. e., be intrinsically related to the social tradition. 

Dr. Paul has pointed out the service of language in 
enabling one individual to induce at once in the mind of 
another — who has the same sensuous or conceptual ma- 
terials — an association which the former has spent a long 
time in organizing. "It is owing to this economy of 
labor and time to which one individual has assisted 
another, that the latter is in his turn in a position to 
employ the result of this economy to set up a further 
connection for which the first individual had no time at his 
disposal.'" The educator methodically modifying the 
pupil's environment and, when language communication 
has been set up, through direct suggestion, aims systemati- 
cally to control the presentations of the child's mind and to 
guide the activity of self in conscious association. In 
other words, from both the mechanical and volitional sides 
of the mind's operations influences of abridgment and 
omission are brought to bear. 

The learning of language illustrates both the general 
parallel and the ' ' short-cut ' ' theories. It is true that the 
child unconsciously learns to speak. "And," says Paul, 
• ' the case is much the same with the period in the 
development of the human race which originally created 
language."* It is also a fact that the child employs de- 
nominations before verbs and later still applies modifying 
terms, moods, etc.^ The advance from vagueness to 
definiteness of thought is objectified in language. In a 
general way, therefore, the process of individual growth 
in speech corresponds to the historical development of a 
language considered as a phylogenetic series. Again, as 
Spencer has pointed out, consciousness or reflection in 

1 Principles of Languages (Strong's tr.), p. xl. 

2 Ibid., p. xlvi. 

3 Sully : Studies of Childhood, pp. 170-182. 



y 

The Social Mi7id and Education. 99 

language, i. e., the study of grammar, must follow its 
unconscious acquisition.' The confusion of the logical 
with the pedagogical order — so common in educational 
theory — has its classical illustration in Pestalozzi's plan — 
later abandoned by its author — of beginning with analyti- 
cally simple but meaningless syllables which were subse- 
quently to be combined into significant words. ^ 

It is one thing to recognize and utilize this general 
correspondence, but quite another to assert complete and 
detailed recapitulation. The latter theory might be re- 
garded as demanding instruction in archaic language forms 
— e. g. , the old plurals and verb-endings of early English. 
As a matter of fact, influences of inheritance and environ- 
ment introduce factors which quite change the situation. 
It is asserted on the organic side that by "a child in- 
heriting a direct tendency to respond to a visual stimulus 
with movements of the tongue and larynx would be saved 
the long course of development which has been necessary 
phylogenetically for the establishment of the direct connec- 
tion now very generally held to exist between the visual 
and motor speech centers, with a corresponding saving on 
the mental side.'" 

From the objective side, moreover, the materials for 
imitation and the stimulating and varied suggestions * of a 
rich social environment induce a marvelous development 
of speech. The child of four or five, reared in a cultivated 
home, quickly and unconsciously acquires a vocabulary 

1 " In short, as grammar was made after language, so ought it to be taught after 
language; an influence which all who recognize the relationship between the 
evolution of the race and of the individual will see to be unavoidable." — Educa- 
tion, p. 106. 

2 IVie Gertrudihre Kinder lehrt (tr. by Holland and Turner), pp. 90-95. 

3 Baldwin : Mental Development, p. 26. 

4 For an interesting discussion of the role of suggestion in education cf. 
Guyau : Education and Heredity (tr. by W. J. Greenstreet), pp. 12-45; Felix 
Thomas: La suggestion: sonrdle dans V Education; and Baldwin : loc. cit. ,io^-i6<). 



L n^ i: 



lOO The Social Mind and Education. 

and power of expression which is often a source of surprise 
even to parents. In so far as such acquisitions are chiefly 
the result of imitation, social approval of others, or mere 
subjective pleasure in rhythms of speech, they are to be 
deprecated as predominantly verbal, but when they are 
fairly well coordinated with mental images developed out 
of perceptions, they stand for genuine ' ' short-cuts ' ' in 
mental development and organic habits. So much by way 
•of illustrating the respective functions of the two theories 
"which merge into one. The recapitulation aspect empha- 
sizes what the older education did not recognize, at least 
with clear consciousness, viz., that instruction cannot 
simply effect one great "short-cut," but must direct a 
process of growth. On the other hand, the "short-cut" 
theory points out the danger of underestimating the possi- 
bilities of rapid, abbreviated development, and providing 
for ' ' stages ' ' which have disappeared from the onto- 
genetic series. Both views may be carried to extremes. 
Their synthesis represents education as recognizing the 
general parallel of individual and race development, but 
as also consciously seeking to take advantage of all ' ' short- 
cuts ' ' for the sake both of the unit and of society. 

In the light of this synthesis, the so-called inductive 
and deductive forms of reasoning assume new meaning. 
Professor Dewey has shown that the distinction between 
these two processes is one of direction rather than of 
essential nature. Both connect the universal with the 
particular. One starts with the particular and relates it to 
the universal, the other imposes the universal on the 
particular. In either case knowledge is the result.' But 
even though the results are similar the processes differ in 
their demands upon self-activity and in the time which 
they require. Inductive reasoning implies experience, 

1 Psychology, pp. 224-225. 



The Social Mind and Education. loi 

examination of details, association by similarity, and, 
finally, generalization. An induction is a result of growth. 
Deduction, on the other hand, starts from the general or 
universal and by association and dissociation subsumes or 
interprets the particular. Although the processes are 
analytically distinguished they really involve each other. 
The emphasis, however, is laid now on one, now on the 
other. 

In education induction is advocated by those who 
recognize the ontogenetic and phylogenetic parallelism. 
Just as the race reached its generalizations from a mass of 
empirical observations, so the child must gradually ad- 
vance through his own activity from particulars to uni- 
versals. The Emile^ insists upon this order of "nature," 
and Spencer' s Education ^ is largely influenced by the 
same idea. 

On the other hand, the "short-cut" theory in its ex- 
treme form relies upon deduction. It would save the time 
consumed in reaching generalizations. These, formulated 
by the race, should be transferred at once to the indi- 
vidual in order that society may advance in knowledge.^ 

Here we are confronted again by the old antithesis. 
Individual development demands gradual growth through 
induction ; social welfare requires the rapid communica- 
tion of the collective tradition through deduction. Once 

1 Payne's translation, pp. 134-139. 

2 Pp. 124-125. 

3 This does not mean that " short-cuts " are confined to deduction. By guid- 
ance and the conscious modification of the environment the processes of induction 
may be greatly abridged. 

Tarde's theory of the social syllogism is applicable here. In his view, the 
knowledge, judgments, and decisions of the race form major premises, i. e., 
general scientific principles, maxims, rules of conduct, etc. The major premises 
are imposed upon individuals who supply out of personal experiences the minor 
premises and hence reach conclusions. All conduct, therefore, is the resultant of 
generalized race experience and individual applications. Society seeks to extend 
these majors as quickly as possible to all individuals. — La logique sociale, pp. 53-61. 



I02 The Social Mind and Education. 

more we may reconcile these apparently antagonistic 
theories by asserting that together they are able to satisfy 
the requirements for both genetic development and for 
' ' short-cuts. " ' In the earlier period chief emphasis may 
be laid on induction, but with the growth of self-activity 
and consciousness, deductive ' ' short-cuts ' ' may be eco- 
nomically introduced.^ 

Assuming, then, that for the first few years of childhood 
the inductive process must in the nature of things pre- 
dominate, we may ask what problem first confronts the 
teacher. To introduce formal studies would be to impose 
deduction. As we have seen, it has required centuries of 
thinking by the race to elaborate these divisions of the 
social tradition. Here the phylogenetic series suggests 
that the vague unity of primitive man's environment corre- 
sponds to the undifferentiated presentation continuum of 
the infant. Both have to be analyzed and synthesized into 
more and more definite details and ever higher unities. 
The original unity is social life, even though it be merely 

1 Prof. W. N. Hailman has elaborated this idea in a paper on Organic Relations 
of Studies in Htmian Development, in which he distinguishes "developing 
instruction" and "didactic instruction," and discusses the function of each, 
The former he recommends for the earlier period, while he would put chief 
reliance on the second for the later stages of grammar and high school. — Reprint 
from Proceedings of the Jacksonville Conference on Superintendence, pp. 10-13. 

2 Lester F. Ward urges the deductive or "short-cut" theory in these words: 
" The idea that children in this enlightened age must go back to the ages of 
barbarism and grope along as their ancestors were compelled to do for crumbs of 
knowledge, that they must be allowed to get all kinds of errors into their minds 
along with a few truths because this was the method by which the primitive man 
first acquired ideas, . . . this entire scheme for converting education into a 
sort of social ontogenesis is false in principle, is not supported bj- any proper 
interpretation of the teachings of science, and is directly opposed to those 
furnished by every progressive step in the civilization of the race. 

" Nothing is calculated more forcibly to impress upon us the conviction that the 
mass of mankind must get their knowledge through instruction and not through 
experience, nor yet through personal observation and research, than to note how 
such great minds as those of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Bacon, and Newton 
groped about in darkness and doubt respecting the questions of planetary revolu- 
tion, tides, gravitation, light, etc., with which every schoolboy is now familiar." — 
Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II., pp. 628-629. 



The Social Mind and Education. 103 

the microcosm of the nursery or the family circle. This 
presentation continuum and the potential activity of 
the child are the factors out of which gradually by action 
and reaction are evolved a universe and a self-conscious 
personality.' The stimulus of sensations arouses the 
activity of self, which, little by little, acquires experi- 
ence and progressively interprets and reinterprets the 
objective world, gaining at the same time clearer knowl- 
edge of its own nature. Yet at the basis of all this mental 
activity lie sensations, actual physically mediated raw 
materials out of which the products of thought are elabo- 
rated.^ Sensations are wholly individual facts. They 
may be in a large measure controlled by artificial external 
arrangements, but they cannot be dispensed with. Each 
individual must therefore work over, interpret, and assimi- 
late his own sensations.^ Clearness can come only from 
differentiation. Education, or rather instruction, has for 
its primary task not the teaching of subjects but the forma- 
tion of subjects or studies in the pupil's consciousness. It 
must help him to take apart the vague unity of his life, to 
associate, dissociate, identify, and discriminate as he forms 
ideal groups and makes generalizations. It is only when 
this process has been carried to a certain point that the 
idea of studies and disciplines, evolved out of race ex- 
perience, can be assimilated by the self. Verbal memory 
may deceive the superficial observer in this regard, but 
the laws of thought cannot be violated. It is in recog- 
nition of this principle that the new primary education 
purposely avoids prematurely superimposing the logical 
differentiations of the social mind upon its pupils, but 
rather seeks to aid them in reaching by their own efforts 

1 Dewey : Psychology , pp. 4 and 5. 

2 Ibid., p. 81. 

» Prayer : Infant Mind (tr. by Brown), pp. 66-69. 



I04 The Social Miiid and Education. 

the idea of division and classification. With the further 
development of self-consciousness the conception of studies 
is readily assimilated and the whole self, vigorous from its 
earlier activities, reacts effectively and economically upon 
new materials, more than making up for the time appar- 
ently ' ' lost ' ' during the period of predominant sensation 
and spontaneous discovery. 

The function of interest in education is being more and 
more clearly perceived. Under its influence the organiza- 
tion and interpretation of sense-impressions goes on rapidly 
in the earlier years. Childish interest concerns itself not 
with abstract or formal pursuits which imply a relatively 
considerable development of self-consciousness, but rather 
with the immediate concrete facts of the environment, 
with daily life. In seeking to find expression for its own 
activity the child gradually associates and generalizes these 
phenomena, utilizing this knowledge for its own purposes. 
It speaks without consciousness of language, counts with 
no thought of mathematics ; walks, works, builds houses, 
dams rivulets in complete ignorance of mechanics and 
physics ; watches birds and gathers flowers with never a 
notion that these are kinds of knowledge labeled orni- 
thology and botany. For him life is a whole, a vague 
and indefinite unity, which he daily takes apart and puts 
together, gradually reading into it a deeper meaning as he 
perceives wider relations of likeness and sharper degrees of 
difference. It usually happens at about the period when 
this world unity is just beginning to display more or less 
clearly defined parts that the child is sent to school where 
subjects are thrust upon him and his universe divided up 
into study periods and text-books. Then life is taken 
apart indeed and happy is the pupil who can perceive 
some vague connection between the things he has loved 
out of doors and the subjects which he pursues in the 



The Social Mind and Education. 105 

schoolroom. ' This critical period during which the trans- 
ition from spontaneous discrimination to logical division 
takes place has been too much neglected. Object lessons 
and observation classes have by no means solved the prob- 
lem. Here it is that the theory of parallelism may render 
service by at least compelling the ' ' short-cut ' ' process to 
prove that conditions are ripe for the introduction of the 
latter. The gradual development of consciousness is also 
a factor to be considered. Only as the self becomes more 
definitely aware of its own activity in relation to the 
objective world of things and men, and gains fixity of 
purpose can it really grasp the more abstract and system- 
atic forms of thought. 

The very fact of growth, therefore, demands that this 
transition from vague unity to logical partition, from un- 
conscious interest to self-determining effort, should extend 
over a long period and be achieved gradually and natu- 
rally. Attempts to force the process may result in apparent 
success, but only at a real ultimate sacrifice. The facile 
use of words without ideas is the clatter of machinery in a 
factory in which raw materials are scanty and poor. There 
may be sounds of activity, but the product will be disap- 
pointing. So the premature forcing of formal instruction 
to the neglect of sense-impressions and their spontaneous 
elaboration is barren in its results. It violates the laws of 
ontogenesis in an effort unduly to hasten the pupil's de- 
velopment toward the maturity of the race. 

The task of differentiation then is the primary under- 
taking of instruction. The pupil begins, as we have already 

I "The young child /^^/j the oneness of nature and of life. 'The nursery is 
the place where study is most general and universal' (President Hyde). To the| 
six-year-old pupil the division of study into subjects has only just begun. 
Zoology, botany, meteorology, geology, agriculture, horticulture, astronomy, etc., 
all commence in the undifferentiated form of nature study." — Herman T. Lukens : 
"The Correlation of Studies," Educational Review, November, 1895. 



io6 The Social Mind and Education. 

insisted, with life as a whole, an indefinite unity out of 
which logical divisions are gradually to be discriminated, 
until differences are clearly apprehended. Then these are 
to be recombined ultimately into a deeper and richer con- 
ception or philosophy of the nature and end of society. In 
over- eagerness to impress the child with the varied ele- 
ments of knowledge education has sought in the past and 
is still attempting to superimpose an already specialized 
curriculum instead of helping the child gradually to differ- 
entiate the environment for himself. In the latter way the 
transition may be made naturally and easily as a result 
of the pupil's own activity. In describing the relation 
of analysis and synthesis Professor Dewey says : ' ' The 
analytic recognition of separate elements is a later process. 
Psychologically, the synthesis precedes analysis.'" The 
mistake has been made of trying prematurely to force 
a logical analysis and of neglecting synthesis altogether. 
The child not only suffers from this artificial process of 
division, but in his own instinctive efforts to preserve his 
personality performs alone and unaided the acts of syn- 
thesis with great waste of energy and distraction of mind. 
The danger arising from forced analysis and the mental 
isolation of elements or studies has not escaped the atten- 
tion of educators. Plans for concentration, coordination, 
and correlation have been advanced with the aim of cor- 
recting the evils involved in breaking up the unity of life 
and thought into separated fragments. ' ' Bring all things 
essentially related to each other to that connection in your 
mind which they have in nature, ' ' ^ wrote Pestalozzi. Yet 
this might be regarded as aiming at an ultimate or philo- 
sophical unity — the end rather than the beginning or mid- 
dle of the process. 

1 Psychology, p. 99. 

2 Wie Gertrud ihre Kinder lehrt, p. 78. 



The Social Mind and Education. 107 

Herbart insisted that the threads of thought ( Gedanken- 
fdden) should be spun into a single cord, instead of being 
isolated in the mind by an arbitrary and artificial educa- 
tional system which at the stroke of the bell introduces a 
new and unrelated subject. ' 

Ziller, like Herbart, laid stress upon the ethical value of 
unified thought/ Rein also points out that the person 
is a developing entity, that the ego does not originally 
possess unity but attains it in so far as the circle of 
thought is organized, not disconnected." The synthetic 
activity of the youthful mind cannot be relied upon to 
establish connections spontaneously between manifold and 
varied ideas. Instruction must specifically aim therefore 
to aid the pupil in attaining unity of consciousness, which 
is the primitive foundation of character.* The idea that 
synthesis must accompany analysis in the normal devel- 
opment of thought has been carefully worked out in 
different systems to which the names concentration, corre- 
lation, and coordination have been applied.^ We are 
concerned not so much with the details of these plans as 
to discover whether they have anything in common aside 
from the very general theory already indicated. 

Concentration, which may be regarded as the original 
Herbartian proposal, demands the subordination of various 
pursuits to one or more studies or "centers." Rein 
distinguishes two spheres of knowledge : (i) Life of Man, 
and (2) Life of Nature, or culture studies and science 

1 Psychologic , 2ten Teil. 

2 " Durch'Konzentration sorgt der Erziehungs-unterricht immer fiir das Dasein 
und die Erhaltung der Einheit des Bewussteins, d. h., der Personlichkeit, bei detn 
Zoglinge, und das ist eine wesentliche Voraussetzung fur Sittlichkeit und Glau- 
ben." — Allgemeine Pddagogik. 

3 Outlines of Pedagogics (tr. by C. C. and I. J. Van Liew), p. 103. 

4 Ibid., p. 104. 

6 Cf. article by H. T. Lukens on " The Correlation of Studies," Educational Re- 
view, November, 1895. 



io8 The Social Mind and Education. 

studies. They are to be related by means of geography 
primarily and the second group is to be subordinated to 
the first. Both are designed to educate the will of the 
pupil who "must acquire (i) an understanding of the 
limitations and aids that are based upon the ethical ideas, 
(2) an understanding of the limitations and aids that 
depend upon the relations of things in nature. " ' In other 
words, the pupil brings these two groups as aids in inter- 
preting life. Other Herbartians insist upon regarding 
certain studies as themselves "centers" of concentration 
to which the remainder of the subjects must be related. 
F. A. McMurray, a prominent representative of this view, 
holds that literature in the earlier years and history in the 
upper grades are the real centers to which the whole 
curriculum must be" adjusted. It is somewhat difficult to 
conceive of any study — an abstraction — as having an ap- 
parently objective existence in the sense that other subjects 
are related to it. This is to speak legitimately enough 
but nevertheless in figures. We recall the protest of Dr. 
Paul against the notion that parts of the ' ' social mind ' ' 
react upon each other. ^ All relating of ideas is effected 
in individual consciousness. Professor McMurray would 
surely admit that he uses the terms figuratively to describe 
processes which take place in the pupil's mind. More- 
over, some misapprehension may arise from the application 
of the term ' ' study ' ' to any arbitrary group which has 
been formed for purposes of classification or instruction. 
There is a vast difference between an analytic study like 
physics and a synthetic study such as literature. Litera- 
ture is in one view a social product, a reaction of an indi- 
vidual representing social forces against an environment 
of nature and man ; it is a reproduction or idealization of 

1 Outlines of Pedagogics (tr. by C. C. and I. J. Van Liew), p. 113. 

2 Supra, p. 68. 



The Social Mind and Education. 109 

life in some of its manifold aspects. History is a more 
reflective picture of society conceived as developing in 
time. To assert, therefore, that literature and history are 
centers of concentration is simply to declare indirectly that 
social life is the external unity to which the self-active 
personality is all the while adjusting itself. In other words, 
there must be constant return to the center, the presenta- 
tion continuum out of which studies have been differen- 
tiated. 

Another plan may be described as coordination. This 
regards studies as naturally forming themselves into 
groups or ' ' cores, ' ' no one of which is subordinate to the 
rest. All are of equal importance and cooperate to 
produce a symmetrical ' ' circle of thought. ' ' President 
DeGarmo stands for this scheme. He proposes three 
groups : (i) the humanistic, having an ethical content in 
literature and history, (2) the nature group, and (3) the 
economic, dealing with man and nature in interaction.' 
These three ' ' cores ' ' are described as lying parallel and 
somewhat independent. They may be coordinated by 
means of reading in the form of literature or, better still, 
by geography, which in its three forms, political, physical, 
and commercial, constitutes a bond of unity. The latter 
phase, indeed, gives the pupil ' ' not only ... an 
enlarged conception of his own place and function in the 
world, but he learns practically the great ethical lesson 
that every part of the world, and every man in every part, 
is trying to serve self through service to others."^ Clearly 
the attempt to combine knowledge of man, of nature, and 
of man in reaction with nature, is a recognition of the 
unity of social life, an effort to put back the elements of 
analysis into a more complete conception of reality. The 

1 Herbart and the Herbartians , p. 243. 

2 Tbid, p. 255. 



no The Social Mind and Education. 

real ' ' core ' ' then is life, the point of departure for all 
studies, the center to which all return with their constantly- 
increasing contributions. 

The Report of the Committee of Fifteen on ' ' The Corre- 
lation of Studies ' ' is disappointing in that it offers no very 
definite plan. Its proposal has been described as "inter- 
relation of studies. ' ' ' Yet on the whole it emphasizes the 
social aspect of education in a marked way. "In a 
word," reads the report, "the chief consideration to 
which all others are to be subordinated, in the opinion of 
your committee, is this requirement of the civilization into 
which the child is born, as determining not only what he 
shall study in school, but what habits and customs he 
shall be taught in the family before the school age arrives ; 
as well as that he shall acquire a skilled acquaintance with 
some one of a definite series of trades, professions, or 
vocations in the years that follow school ; and furthermore, 
that this question of the relation of the pupil to his civiliza- 
tion determines what political duties he shall assume and 
what religious faith or spiritual aspirations shall be 
adopted for the conduct of his life. ' ' ^ The report regards 
language as forming the center of instruction in the ele- 
mentary school, but urges that more stress be laid on the 
meaning of words and recommends the use of literary 
selections which ' ' portray situations of the soul or scenes 
of life or elaborated reflections."* That is, which help the 
child to interpret himself and his environment, by bringing 
all he learns to bear upon life. Geography is also regarded 
as extremely useful. Its study should begin with the pupil's 
immediate environment and thence work out into wider 
relations. The ' ' predominance of the human feature in a 

1 H. T. Lukens : "Correlation of Studies," Educational Review, November, 1895. 
! Report of the Committee of Fifteen on " The Correlation of Studies " (anno- 
tated by George P. Brown), p. 5. 
3 Ibid., p. 13. 



The Social Mi7id and Education. 



study ostensibly relating to physical nature ' ' is considered 
' ' necessary and entirely justifiable. ' ' ' This pursuit is 
further defended as affording opportunities to study differ- 
ences in climate and products, the unifying function of 
commercial intercourse, and as impressing the youthful 
mind with the law of economic and social interdependence. 

Still another scheme is that of Colonel Parker, who re- 
gards the child as the center on whom the various sciences, 
conceived in a somewhat Comtean hierarchy, converge.^ 
McMurray has made the point that to call the child the 
center is either meaningless or a truism. He would 
regard a study such as literature or history as the center. ' 
But we have already seen that this is an indirect approach 
to the view of social life as the real objective unity to 
which the self is related by its own activity. Colonel 
Parker's theory is therefore only another way of saying 
that all studies must be related and unified in the pupil's 
consciousness, i. e., must be transformed from elements of 
analysis into a synthesis which will present a more definite 
conception of life. 

In a recent article on the "Correlation of Science and 
History," Prof. W. S. Jackman has contended for a 
theory which is closely related to the present discussion. 
"The pupil's relations to his own community life," he 
declares, ' ' are the basis for history, as his relations to his 
immediate physical environment are the basis for science. 
No correlation of the two subjects is possible if in science 
the children are to live in the present and in history they 
are to dwell in the past. Immediate life for immediate 
purposes must be the motto for both.'"* In other words, 

1 Ibid., pp. 28-29. 

2 Talks on Pedagogics , Diagram and Chapter 1. 

3 F. A. McMurray : First Herbartian Year Book, p. 50. 

4 Educational Review , May, 1895. 



112 The Social Mind and Educatio7i. 

to reiterate our position, the present social environment, 
including man, nature, and these two factors in interaction, 
is the unity which the pupil must gradually differentiate 
into classes of phenomena. This environment becomes 
thus the point of departure for mental excursions in both 
time and space. The difficulty at first is in enabling the 
young mind to form these classes, to leave the immediate 
here and now. When once this has been accomplished, 
however, quite another problem presents itself, namely, 
how are these classes to be combined and interrelated? 
All attempts to meet this last difficulty resolve themselves, 
as we have seen, in spite of differences of detail, into an 
effort to restore the abstracted factors to their places in the 
community life of which the pupil is an organic part. 

Before leaving this subject it is important to discriminate 
between the unity of life as it appears to the young mind 
and the ultimate systematized and philosophical concep- 
tion of mature thought. Colonel Parker's plan of concen- 
tration has been criticised as requiring a philosopher as a 
teacher and a child philosopher as a pupil. Whether this 
be just or not in the circumstances, it calls attention to the 
danger of attempting to force prematurely a philosophical 
conception upon a young mind. As the self develops and 
becomes conscious of sustaining wider and wider relations 
to nature and men, the conception of the objective world 
grows from a vague blank whole, and finally should 
attain a highly differentiated yet closely integrated unity. 
Between these extremes are many causally related stages of 
development. It is impossible for the pupil to be con- 
scious of the final end, but the educator must see to it 
that each stage of growth is a step toward that end. The 
ideal teacher should be a philosopher and consciously, 
purposefully stimulate and guide the development of the 
pupil into a philosopher. 



The Social Mind and Education. 113 

This philosophical conception as an ideal in the higher 
education has been vaguely recognized but as yet no one 
has proposed a definite scheme for what may be described, 
not as the correlation but as the integration of studies. 
The service which modern social philosophy may render 
in unifying the higher education remains to be discussed in 
our final chapter. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE INTEGRATION OF STUDIES. 

"I AIM," says one of our prominent American scholars, 
' ' to keep one truth before the student, viz. : that he can- 
not leave out of the consideration those problems and 
convictions which belong to philosophy without overlook- 
ing that spiritual bond without which our science is a 
fragmentary thing and life can have neither wisely chosen 
ideals, nor a rational faith to support and strengthen it. " ' 
Dr. William T. Harris long ago insisted that philosophical 
studies should be a required part of the college curriculum, 
that they should be introduced early as an organizing, 
unifying influence and continued uninterruptedly to the 
end of the course.^ It is not difficult to trace his thought 
also in such allusions in the Report of the Committee of 
Fifteen as that to "a deeper correlation such as is found 
in all parts of human learning by the studies of the college 
and university." The Greeks have given us the ideal of 
philosophy as a whole which is interpreted for our genera- 
tion in these words :^ 

"There is no such thing as intellectual isolation. The worker 
in each domain should cultivate the power of viewing knowledge 
as a whole and of discovering the bond of unity between the 
several parts. From one department of learning, light is flashed 
back in unexpected ways upon another, and studies which have 
long seemed unrelated recognize one another on a sudden as 

1 Quoted from a private letter in an article by A. C. Armstrong, " Philosophy in 
American Colleges," Educational Review, January, 1897. 

2 Nineteenth Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the St. Louis Public 
Schools (1872-73), p. 80. 

3 Ed. annotated by George P. Brown, p. 57. 

114 



The Integration of Studies. 115 

sister sciences. . . . We must strive in the multiplicity of 
sciences to apprehend the common principles of knowledge, and 
to keep the parts in just subordination to the conception of the 
whole. "1 

For several years an interesting educational experiment 
has been in progress in the ' ' Edinburgh Summer School 
of Art and Science, ' ' of which Professor Patrick Geddes is 
the head. From the very first the attempt has been ' ' to 
work toward an educational synthesis — an organization of 
knowledge — and this not merely theoretically but practi- 
cally considered."^ This summer meeting is declared to 
express a growing effort to bring together specialists of 
various kinds who are in sympathy with each other and 
with a general aim toward order and synthesis of knowl- 
edge.^ "Ideas must be orchestrated and not exist as innu- 
merable solos "■* strikes the keynote of this ideal. 

From the New University of Brussels comes a similar 
theory: "Toute education," declares De Greef, "doit 
recevoir son courronnement moral, social, phi- 
losophique ; tout homme, en un mot, doit se former finale- 
ment un conception synthetique et rationelle du monde 
physique, moral et social, c'est-a-dire philosophic."^ 

Fouillee urges a reorganization of higher education in 
France as necessary to the preservation of the national 
genius. He deprecates the conflicts and antagonisms 
between the so-called humanities on the one hand and the 
natural sciences on the other,® and he strenuously de- 
mands the recognition of philosophical and social studies 
as the means by which harmony may be established among 

1 S. H. Butcher : Some Aspects of the Greek Genius, 2d Ed., p. 243. 

2 Prospectus of the Fifth Session of a Summer School of Art and Science 
{i89i),p. 5. 

3 The Interpreter, August 4, 1896. 

4 Ibid. , August 5. 

6 Uenseignement integral et la philosophie positive, p. 27. 
6 Uenseignemeni au point de vue national, p. x. 



ir6 The Social Mind afid Edtication. 

the various pursuits. These synthetic studies ought, he 
declares, ' ' vivifier ainsi 1' organisme tout entier. ' ' ' 

Citations need not be multiplied to prove that there is a 
more or less widespread conviction that in some fashion 
the higher education should exercise a unifying function 
and put its students in the way of looking at knowledge as 
a whole. Yet just how this shall be done is a very different 
matter. The moment men begin to put a content into 
this purely formal principle, the condition of educational 
aims and ideals seems at once to be chaotic. Literature, 
language, history, psychology, ethics, theology, the history 
of philosophy, political economy are variously urged as 
the pursuits best adapted to the purpose. While at first 
thought the very number of these solutions gives the 
impression of almost hopeless disagreement, further con- 
sideration discloses the fact that there is unconscious 
groping toward essentially the same ideal. The task of 
those who are interested in the higher education — in 
liberal studies — is to bring this common purpose into 
social consciousness, that is, to give it greater precision 
and to show how the various pursuits stand related to it. 

To discuss one division of the curriculum apart from the 
rest is more or less to make abstraction. We have, how- 
ever, traced the influences which are at work to maintain 
in natural unity in the pupil's consciousness the studies of 
the elementary school, and we have noted a similar effort 
in secondary education, so that in examining the college 
course we are not wholly neglecting its relation to the rest 
of the system. It is assumed that those who enter higher 
educational institutions will have been prepared in some 
measure to look at things in a consciously synthetic way. 

It will aid us in approaching the subject to recall the 
demands which society may be conceived as making upon 

1 Ibid., p. 365. 



The Integration of Studies. 117 

the individual through the process of education. These 
may be enumerated as : 

1. A demand that the individual exercise and develop 
his capacities to such an extent that he shall be able to 
' ' see straight and clear ; to compare and infer ; to make 
an accurate record ; to remember ; to express thought 
with precision,'" and to have the body under conscious 
control. 

2. That by means of language and other symbols the 
individual incorporate in his consciousness, so far as may 
be, the most general knowledge of his race, his nation, 
and his community. 

3. That the individual possess himself in the fullest 
way of some part of the social tradition, either rational and 
aesthetic knowledge or manual dexterity or technical skill. 

4. That the individual contribute something by way of 
rectifying or enriching the collective inheritance of knowl- 
edge, skill, taste, and ethical idealism. 

5. That the individual recombine and elevate in his 
own personality the deepest truths and best ideals of the 
race and nation in such a way that his conduct may be 
both wise and ethical, i. e., in harmony with the best 
interests of society and of his own nature. 

Such in general terms are the formal ends of education 
thought of as a social function, performed not by the 
school alone, but by the family, the church, the state, 
social intercourse, and industrial institutions in cooperation 
with the more specifically recognized educational sys- 
tem. ' 

In examining any one of these agencies it is proper to 
test its methods by the criteria outlined above, bearing in 

1 President Charles Eliot: "The Unity of Educational Reform," The Educa- 
tional Review, October, 1S94. 

2 W. T. Harris : Report 0/ the Commissioner of Education, 1892-93, Vol. II., p. 
1460. 



ii8 The Social Mind and Education. 

mind, however, that the work of one part is intimately, 
organically related to the services rendered by all the 
rest, and that at different stages in the process or with 
different institutions more stress is to be laid on some one 
requirement than upon the others. 

When it was just now intimated that the higher curric- 
ulum — the regular college course — still awaits a genu- 
inely purposeful organization, there was no intention to 
imply that theories of what the course of study should be 
have not been plentiful. On the contrary, in Tarde's 
phrase, the whole subject is in the multi-conscious or 
possibly the pluri-conscious stage. It remains to advance 
it to a uni-conscious state.' 

The many different conceptions of what the college 
curriculum should be vary with the emphasis which is 
laid upon the five phases of the educational function. 
Thus those who are impressed with the social and in- 
dividual importance of accurate observation and trust- 
worthy reasoning, of precise communication, of prompt 
and energetic action in adjustment to the demands of life, 
insist upon regarding college studies as disciplines by 
means of which these habits and dexterities, mental and 
physical, may be formed, or, in popular terms, by which 
these powers may be developed and strengthened. This 
ideal is pushed so far at times that it seems to imply the 
possibility of developing power as a sort of abstract 
energy to be stored up and available at will. It might 
almost be inferred that power to do one thing can be 
easily drafted off for the performance of a very different 
task. The limitations of this theory have been pointed 
out by Professor Hinsdale: ". . . it is only in a 
limited sense that we can be said to have a store of 
mobilized mental power. In a sense men have percep- 

1 Supra, p. 19, note. 



The Integration of Studies. 119 

tions, memories, and imaginations rather than perception, 
memory, and imagination."' 

Again there are those who see vividly the importance 
of transmitting collective knowledge. They are led to 
prize information, concrete facts, and general laws as 
forming the essential basis of education. Mr. Lester F. 
Ward represents the knowledge theory in its most robust 
development. His principle is that "Everything that has 
been made known by man should be made known to all 
men. Not that every object, fact, and law of nature can be 
separately acquired, but that general laws embracing 
them all should be made known, through the knowledge 
of which these details are generally, though not specially, 
known. "^ Since general laws become decreasingly trust- 
worthy and definite with the increasing complexity of 
phenomena, it follows that the information theory makes 
large demands upon the natural sciences for such forms of 
knowledge, and upon the historical sciences for facts. 
There is a tendency also toward encyclopedic knowledge. 
It is urged that the student must collect all kinds of infor- 
mation, in all the great departments, and thus round out 
and make symmetrical his accumulated store. This way 
of regarding the higher education arises chiefly from a 
popular misconception of the importance of learning as 
contrasted with knowledge which has been "assimilated 
and transformed ' ' into organized personality. 

Once more, to those who are impressed by the econo- 
mies and triumphs of a division of mental labor, it seems 
of prime importance to discover at the earliest moment 
special individual aptitudes and to begin at once a sys- 
tematic, continuous development of these peculiar abilities. 

IB. A. Hinsdale: "The Dogma of Formal Culture," Educational Review, 
September, 1894. 

3 Dynamic Sociology, Vol. II., p. 622. 



I20 The Social Mind and Education. 

Ideal social schemes very generally include devices for 
finding these various kinds of talent and for putting them 
at the disposal of the commonwealth. In another view, 
the social mind seeks its own perpetuation by drafting 
into service individuals peculiarly fitted to be intrusted 
with its many different elements. This ideal has struggled 
for a deserved recognition in the college curriculum and is 
now firmly established under the elective system which in 
some measure at least is to be found in all institutions of 
higher education. Valuable as this theory is to the indi- 
vidual and to society it leads easily to an extreme which 
seems to sacrifice the individual to society. In reality it 
both warps the former and impairs the vigor and capacity 
of the latter. The menace of ' ' premature specialization ' ' 
has been proclaimed so vigorously — at times even hys- 
terically — that no iteration is needed here. 

The task of pursuing truth for its own sake, of critically 
examining and reorganizing the collective tradition, of 
adding to it new elements, appeals naturally to the 
ambition of the scholar. The systematizing of research 
among historical and literary materials, in the geological 
field and in the laboratory, has advanced with remarkable 
rapidity and has found a home in the university. It is 
not strange that university ideals have reacted upon the 
college curriculum and that research methods are urged as 
a part of the training which the college should afford. It 
is asserted that the habit of dealing with phenomena at 
first hand, of seeking only the exact truth, of relying on 
personal observation rather than upon the authority of 
others, is not only of great importance intellectually but 
ethically exerts a stimulating influence upon the life of 
the student. 

Yet the ' ' laboratory method ' ' seems in some danger of 
becoming a fetish in itself, much as the "object lesson" 



The Integration of Studies. 121 

has in many cases come to be regarded as end rather than 
means. 

Finally, there is a large class who demand of the higher 
education that its chief concern be the development of 
men and women who shall not simply garner a wide store 
of knowledge or acquire a special skill but take up into 
their lives, organize into their characters the greatest 
thoughts, the highest ideals, the noblest impulses of 
humanity.' Education is declared to be more than in- 
struction, more than discipline, it is the incorporation in 
the individual of the loftiest aspirations of mankind,^ and 
' ' in striving to advance the race toward the ideal, he is 
himself realizing that ideal in his own person."^ Liberal 
studies are eulogized because they set the mind free from 
all narrowness and prejudice.* "Leave in traditional 
preeminence," said Lowell, "those arts that were rightly 
called liberal ; those studies that kindle the imagination, 
and through it irradiate the reason ; those studies that 
manumitted the modern mind."^ Education thus con- 
ceived approaches the classical Greek formula of the true, 
the beautiful, and the good — a formula into which the 
race has been reading a deeper, fuller meaning. 

In these five ways, then, from the social standpoint may 

1 This does not involve a faculty psychology which discriminates arbitrarily be- 
tween intellectual and emotional phenomena. The mind as a whole grows by es- 
tablishing connections between old experiences and new. These connections may 
be predominantly intellectual, i. e., a fact may be related to other facts in time and 
space, or it may also be connected with emotional experiences of the self. Edu- 
cation should consciously seek to establish a symmetrical system of associations 
by which knowledge may be completely not partially incorporated in personality. 

B " Man is activity of relating the ideal and the real ; education in general is 
the development of man's powers to frame a noble ideal of life and to realize this 
ideal." — Anna Boynton Thompson : Educational Review, April, 1895, p. 359. 

3 Joseph LeConte: "The Effect of the Theory of Evolution on Education," 
Educational Review, September, 1895. 

4 G. T. Ladd : " Essentials of a Modern Liberal Education," Educational Re- 
view, October, 1895. 

6 Harvard Anniversary Address. 



122 The Social Mind and Education. 

education be regarded. Obviously methods will vary 
with the particular element which is emphasized. Yet a 
moment's consideration will show that these are but 
different aspects of the same thing, different functions of 
the same process. The unity of consciousness may be 
analyzed for convenience but the reality remains indi- 
visible. True, one function may be exercised at the 
expense of others but not in isolation or independence. 
Mental discipline is gained only through the process of 
acquiring knowledge. Peculiar aptitudes cannot be culti- 
vated without the exercise of intellectual power. Knowl- 
edge and skill once communicated or developed will be 
modified or enriched by individuality, be it in never so 
slight a way. The emotional and ethical life will depend 
upon the materials and organization of knowledge and in 
turn will react upon all the other functions. The problem 
of education therefore lies in an attempt to keep these 
various factors in relations of mutual cooperation and 
reinforcement. 

Again these five elements are not to be thought of as 
coordinate but rather as assuming various positions of 
subordination to the last, which is regarded as the final 
end or purpose of education. Discipline, knowledge, 
specialization, contribution all become subordinate aims, 
each important in itself, but getting its full meaning only 
in relation to the others and to the ultimate end, i. e., 
moral and social self-consciousness. 

Once more, knowledge has a fundamental place among 
these various activities. Discipline, as we have seen, 
requires knowledge as a means to its development, 
specialization and contribution are also conditioned by 
knowledge, while sentiments and ideals are inseparably 
associated with it. It is evident, therefore, that upon the 
kind of knowledge which finds a place in the curriculum 



The Integration of Studies. 123 

will depend the successful achievement of both the subor- 
dinate aims and of the ultimate end. 

In knowledge two things are implied — materials and 
organization. While in close analysis even the simplest 
notion or concept is an organization of sensations it is 
legitimate enough to speak of these primary products as 
materials which are constructed by classification and 
generalization into larger systems. 

First of all, it is obvious that in the higher curriculum 
there must be a conscious isolation of studies, of the parts 
which have been analyzed out of accumulated experiences 
by the reflective thinking of the race. There is some 
danger that in higher education, as in elementary and 
secondary, the plea for unity may be misinterpreted into a 
demand for a vague, ill-defined mingling of all kinds of 
knowledge. Manifestly such a tendency would be retro- 
gression rather than progress, disorganization instead of 
genuine unity. The integration of studies demands that 
these pursuits be definitely set off and unified within them- 
selves in order that they may be further articulated into a 
larger whole. The Committee of Fifteen has admirably 
expressed this essential principle : 

"There should be rigid isolation of the elements of each 
branch for the purpose of getting a clear conception of what is 
individual and peculiar in a special province of learning. Other- 
wise one will not gain from each its special contribution to the 
whole. "1 

An examination of studies discloses wide differences in 
the degrees to which they may be successfully isolated. 
Comte's division into abstract and concrete and Spencer's 
classification into abstract, abstract-concrete, and concrete 
are expressions of these variations. Here, too, the 
hierarchical order, which is of little value in the lower, 

1 Report of the sub-committee 'on " The Correlation of Studies," Ed. annotated 
by G. P. Brown, p. 58. 



124 The Social Mind and Education. 

unconscious stages of education, begins to have a mean- 
ing. Experience is now being reorganized on a reflective 
basis and studies must assume certain relations in a logical 
scheme. Hence mathematics and language, as instru- 
ments or tools of thought, and physics and chemistry as 
dealing with the general principles of force and matter, 
are capable of pretty definite isolation. They furnish sub- 
ject matter for discipline of the mind, they make at least a 
preliminary test for special abilities, and they modify 
somewhat the student's general conception of the world. 

Yet large fields of experience remain virtually un- 
explored in a systematic way. We have seen that the 
collective tradition has gradually been analyzed into phe- 
nomena of matter, life, mind, and society. In the old 
classification of studies the first two would be included in 
the natural sciences, the second two in the humanities. 
Since these elements have been analyzed out of human 
life it follows that they all are necessary to a complete 
view of reality. There is a substantial consensus of 
opinion that the higher education should have all the 
great departments represented in some measure in every 
curriculum. 

Dr. Thomas Hill proposed before 1850 a hierarchy of 
the sciences as follows : (^d) studies dealing with space 
and time — mathematics ; {b^ sciences of matter — physics, 
chemistry, biology, etc.; (^) historical studies — law, 
language, arts, trades ; (^) psychological studies — ethics, 
aesthetics, mental philosophy ; (^e) religious studies — 
theology and natural religion.' At each stage in the 
curriculum, he declared, these five elements should always 
be represented.^ Dr. Harris has long advocated what he 
describes as ' ' keeping the five windows of the soul open 

1 The True Order of Studies , p. 22. 
2 /bid., pp. 159-163. 



The hitegration of Studies. 125 

to the world," This theory was outlined in 1872 and has 
been restated in many articles. It is to be traced very 
clearly in the Report of the Committee of Fifteen. The 
division adopted is primarily into nature, and man or spirit. 
Nature is subdivided into : i. Inorganic — mathematics, 
physics, and chemistry ; 2. Organic — physical geography, 
astronomy, botany, etc. , and man into : 3. Theoretical or 
thinking power — logic, philosophy, philology ; 4. Practi- 
cal or will power — civil history, social and political sci- 
ences ; 5. Esthetic or art power — literature and art.' 
At all times, from the elementary school through the 
college, these five windows must be open. 

Prof. George T. Ladd reduces the number of essential 
groups to three : i. Language and literature ; 2. Mathe- 
matics and natural sciences ; 3. The soul of man, in- 
cluding the products of his reflective thinking.^ This 
division is a little disappointing in its vagueness and yet it 
clearly includes the inorganic and organic spheres, the 
phenomena of mind, and in some measure the products of 
social life, i. e., language, literature, philosophy. Even 
more general are the essentials announced by Butcher : 
' ' Literature, Art, and Science — these are the three chief 
disciplines by which man seeks to attain truth or strives 
after beauty ; and these departments are so inherently 
connected together as to form an ideal unity." It re- 
quires some ingenuity to read into literature, art, and 
science all the studies of the curriculum, yet the ideal of 
certain great departments as presenting necessary aspects 
of truth as a whole is clearly maintained. 

It seems necessary to discriminate mathematics and 
language regarded as prerequisites of all mental prog- 

1 Nineteenth Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the St. Louis Public 
Schools, 1872-73, p. 75. 

2 " The Essentials of a Modern Liberal Education," Educational Review, Octo- 
ber, 1895. 



126 The Social Mind and Education. 

ress from studies which deal with concrete phenomena. 
Physics and chemistry, as we have seen, fall between. 
The latter, however, are to be grouped with the inorganic 
sciences rather than separately classified. We thus have 
five great divisions : I. The Formal Studies — mathematics 
and language (grammar and logic) ; II. Inorganic sciences ; 
III. Organic sciences ; IV. Sciences of mind — psychology, 
ethics, literary art, philosophy ; V. Social sciences — liter- 
ature, ' history, economics, political science, sociology. 

But this primary grouping according to the objective 
nature of the phenomena has certain pedagogical dis- 
advantages. It carries subdivision too far in the earlier 
groups and leaves the last too large. There is need for 
unification into subordinate divisions on the one hand and 
into minor sections on the other. Just as each science 
has its own philosophy, so groups of sciences have their 
unifying conceptions. Thus divisions II. and III. above 
may be combined into a philosophy of nature, division IV. 
becomes the philosophy of mind, and division V. the 
philosophy of society including ( i ) social products, litera- 
ture, language (philology), law ; (2) the social process, 
economic, political, and social forces working in historical 
development. 

1 The disposition of literature in this scheme presents a problem. Wundt in 
his Methoden Lehre (Div. IV., Chapter I.) asserts that while philology is plainly a 
social science, literature is, like painting and sculpture, a much more individual 
creation and is therefore more closely related to psychology than to sociology. 
Literature may, however, be regarded from two points of view, i. e., it may be 
studied as to form or as to content. Thus Tennyson's poems or Shakespeare's 
plays may be looked at as creations of peculiar personalities ; or a Churton 
Collins and countless commentators may seek in the past the materials which 
have been gathered from many sources and recombined in new forms or they 
may study the contemporary forces which have* influenced the authors. In the 
first case the study is chiefly psychological, in the other predominantly social. It 
seems best therefore to place literature as form or art under the sciences of 
mind, and literature as content or as an historical growth under sciences of 
society. It is, of course, obvious that this, like almost all classifications, abstracts 
and separates parts of a unity. 



The Integration of Studies. 127 

It will be noticed at the first glance that these divisions 
arrange themselves in a certain logical order which, how- 
ever, is not to be confused with the chronological order 
of instruction. The study of literature, for example, is 
not to be postponed until knowledge of nature and mind 
has been systematized. Nor is the study of history to 
await a mastery of all which precedes in the schedule. 
On the contrary, all these divisions should be represented, 
some of them simultaneously in the curriculum, and only 
gradually and naturally should the philosophic scheme 
into which the various pursuits fall be presented to the 
growing self-consciousness of the student. The final aim 
of higher instruction should be to aid the student to unify 
his knowledge. The integration of studies implies the 
definite formation and isolation of pursuits and the com- 
bination of them, first into subordinate systems which are 
afterward further combined into larger wholes, and these 
again into a higher final unity. 

The student, therefore, should be required to pursue 
courses in each one of these great divisions for a suf- 
ficient time to enable him to understand the materials, 
methods, and aims, both of a particular study and of the 
group to which it is immediately related. That is, whether 
a student devote his time to physics, or to geology, or to 
botany, his attention should be consciously and system- 
atically called to the philosophy of nature as a whole of 
intimately related parts. Or if he turn to psychology, he 
must not only enter into the spirit and methods of 
analyzing consciousness but he must be shown how on the 
one hand consciousness is related to nature through 
body and brain, and how on the other its activities are the 
sources of language, reasoning, ideals, literature, social 
institutions, etc. In a like manner the student of litera- 
ture must see in the works of great authors not only the 



128 The Social Mind and Education. 

creations of individual genius but the products of nature 
and mind in society working in interaction and giving 
expression to the thoughts and aspirations of the race. 
Language itself should be displayed as a social growth 
to be accounted for by physiological and psychical and 
social causes. History is no longer in our colleges a col- 
lection of dates and names and events, but is unified by the 
idea of uninterrupted sequence of cause and effect — in a 
development which includes concrete physical, mental, 
and social factors. Once more, social philosophy seeks 
to display the collective life as a process in which all 
elements of human knowledge find their coordination — 
in which the individual gets his meaning from the whole, 
receiving the heritage of the past and finding his highest 
happiness in transmitting it purified, enriched, and ele- 
vated to posterity. Finally this synthesis of studies should 
be related to the great cosmic ideal of a universe in which 
our natural and social system is only a subordinate part. 

It remains to show how this ideal may be realized, in 
some measure at least, in the organization of the college 
curriculum. At the outset it will be well to indicate 
certain guiding principles, some of which have been im- 
plied in what has gone before. 

1. The college course must be regarded as primarily 
designed to af?ord the student means for gaining a 
coherent view and high ideals of life. However important 
individuality and independence may be to university 
departments, in the college the students' best interests 
should be the supreme end and each department should 
cooperate with the rest in an intelligent, unified plan. 

2. Continuous work in some one subject or small 
group of subjects is in perfect harmony with the first 
proposition and permits that development of special apti- 
tudes which has been shown to be one of the demands 



The Integration of Studies. 129 

both of social progress and of individual self-realization. 

3. Requirement in studies should be reduced to the 
minimum so far as coiitiyiuance of a study is concerned, but 
should be employed chiefly to secure representation of the 
great departments and to insure attendance upon unifying 
courses on the philosophy of the natural sciences, social 
philosophy, literature, social ethics, and general philoso- 
phy. That is, the largest latitude in the choice of par- 
ticular studies should be combined with a rigid insistence 
upon a conscious and systematic effort to display those 
studies in their wider relations. ' 

Much has been said in this chapter about synthesis, 
unification of knowledge, and the like. It remains to 
give a more definite meaning to these formal phrases. 
One might almost fancy that by some psychical loom the 
various threads of the special sciences and arts were to be 
woven into one great fabric, or, to change the figure, that 
these studies by a tour de force were to be held simulta- 
neously before the mind's eye as if graphically displayed 
upon some mental chart. Mechanical analogy fails us and 
even biological conceptions are far from adequate. 

The idea of growth, as we have seen, involves stages of 
development. What are the stages of mental growth 
which fall within the college period and what methods are 
appropriate to them ? It is true that the whole period is 
one of self-consciousness on the student's part, yet there 
are various degrees of self-consciousness which must be 

1 This thought has been admirably expressed by George S. Morris : " . . . 
in whatever department the special subject of his studies may lie, whether his- 
tory, language, literature, or the physical and natural sciences, he [the student] 
should be expected to accompany his study of and research for particular truths 
and orders of truths, . . with the study of and the search for the truth, the 
universal truth to which all special orders of truths or ' sciences ' and orders of 
'science ' are organically related ; in which as in an universal organism they are 
all concretely one, ' members one of another,' and in the light of which alone 
each becomes complete." — Methods of Teaching and Studying History (a collec- 
tion of essays by various authors), p. 152. 



130 The Social Mind and Education. 

regarded. It is all very well to assure the college fresh- 
man that all knowledge is a great unified organism, but 
does that mean anything to him ? We may assure him 
that the world is an orderly whole, but as it is presented 
to his senses, is it such ? James states the case clearly : 

"The real world as it is given at this moment is the sum total 
of all beings and events now. But can we think of such a sum ? 
Can we realize for an instant what a cross-section of all existence 
at a definite point of time would be ? While I talk and the flies 
buzz, a sea gull catches a fish at the mouth of the Amazon, a tree 
falls in the Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes in Germany, a 
horse dies in Tartary, and twins are born in France. What does 
that mean ? Does the contemporaneity of these events with 
each other and with a million more as disjointed as they form a 
rational bond between them, and unite them into anything that 
means for us a world? Yet just such a collateral contemporaneity, 
and nothing else, is the real order of the world. It is an order 
with which we have nothing to do but to get away from it as fast 
as possible. As I said, we break it ; we break it into histories, 
we break it into arts, and we break it into sciences, and then we 
begin to feel at home. "^ 

This process of breaking up the world has been in 
considerable measure accomplished by the college fresh- 
man and he is familiar with the idea of unification in the 
subsuming of many particulars under a general principle. 
So, too, he is able to follow the process by which subordi- 
nate principles are unified by a still more general law. 
The idea of the unity of nature is thus easily within his 
mental grasp early in his academic career. The exact 
sciences and those in which relatively precise general laws 
are discoverable lend themselves readily to organization. 

As phenomena increase in complexity, however, general 
explanation becomes more difficult, the tax upon con- 
scious attention is greatly increased, and the interest of the 
student cannot so surely be counted upon. Particular 

1 Psychology, Vol. II., p. 635 (foot-note). 



The Integration of Studies. 131 

concrete events or problems attract notice and demand 
explanation. The idea of unity is gained from the dis- 
covery that on every phenomenon of daily life the var- 
ious studies may be focussed to give luminous interpre- 
tation. 

This synthetic habit of looking at problems is the 
very key to wisdom. Life may be described as the 
solution of a continuous series of problems. Success 
varies with the degree of ability with which these demands 
for interpretation and action are met. No skill of analysis 
alone will avail ; there must be recombination into a con- 
crete judgment. On the other hand, the decision which 
neglects important elements of analysis will fall short of 
real insight. Analysis and synthesis are organic parts of 
one process ; each alone is an abstraction. Yet one may 
be developed at the expense of the other. In each 
science or study both are insisted upon, but in higher 
education, in the relations of studies to each other and 
to life conscious, systematic heed has been given to 
analysis while synthesis has been left for the njost part to 
' ' natural maturity of judgment, " " the gradual accumula- 
tion of experience," and more to the same purpose. 
There is here implied a confusion between a method of 
thought and the products of thinking. It is certainly true 
that other things being equal the concrete judgment of a 
youth will not be as wise as that of a mature man, but it 
may be that the former's method of reasoning is actually 
better. He lacks data, however, and his conclusion is 
faulty. The higher education is concerned not so much 
with getting formulated wisdom into consciousness as in 
developing the reasoning methods and mental attitude 
which will gradually achieve wisdom in response to the 
actual needs of life. Sage precepts may be mere unre- 
lated information which has no real meaning for the self. 



132 The Social Mind and Education. 

Maxims, like facts, may fill the mind with useless lumber. 

The superior flexibility of an analytical alphabet as con- 
trasted with a system of synthetic characters — represented 
in material form by movable types and the early wooden 
printing blocks respectively — is typical of all intellectual 
progress. Empirical and practical education sought to 
enforce by precept and discipline a fixed physical, intel- 
lectual, and moral character, to fit human beings to meet 
certain situations, to solve certain definite problems of 
industrial and social life. The experiences of the race in 
various concrete combinations were stereotyped as it were 
in human beings. Sciences were bodies of transmitted 
dogma, arts were customary ways of doing particular 
things, ethics was a mass of concrete maxims and rules. 

Now all is being changed. Elements of analysis are 
prized because they involve possibilities of countless com- 
binations for special unforeseen needs. With the increase 
of social complexity the tools of human thought must 
become more and more refined and adjustable. As social 
arrangements lose their rigidity and are rapidly modified, 
the individual, to resume the figure, must be a case of type 
rather than a stereotyped plate if he is to adapt himself to 
the changing demands of his environment. Each study 
isolated and mastered is an element of potential strength, 
but it becomes actually a power only in contributing to 
some concrete synthetic judgment which otherwise would 
lack completeness. The accumulation of many studies 
or much learning by a mind which is deficient in the habit 
of seeing things together is like a font of type in the hands 
of a bungling compositor. 

The preHminary notions of unity in the more highly 
special facts of life therefore are to be gained from the 
interpretation of particular concrete phenomena which 
are seen to be parts of a vast plexus of events in orderly 



The Integration of Studies. 133 

relations of coexistence or sequence. Historical studies 
in combination with the natural sciences afford these con- 
ceptions of continuity and interdependence carried up 
into the complex facts of human life. Contemporary 
social problems challenge attention, emphasize the intri- 
cacy of society, and create a demand for some coherent 
view of human association. 

Again, with a more exact knowledge of the laws of 
mind the student is prepared to reexamine the concrete 
materials of history. Social facts are seen to group them- 
selves into certain grand divisions and yet to be parts of a 
great unifying conception, that of a developing social 
life. In the light of this hypothesis much unrelated infor- 
mation accumulated during childhood and youth begins 
to assume organization. A preliminary order succeeds the 
chaos of mere haphazard experience. A way of looking 
at life, crude doubtless, yet coherent, thus begins con- 
sciously to take form in the student's mind. Valuable as 
this synthesis will prove to his mental development, it will 
be merely a stage of transition. Drawing its conceptions 
largely from the physical and biological sciences, it may 
give a false sense of definiteness and finality. The young 
mind is often attracted by such theories as those of Buckle 
with their explanations in terms of food supply and climate 
and aspect of nature. These hypotheses gratify the demand 
for unity and many times are welcomed. Or there may 
be a vague, instinctive resistance to these doctrines — a 
demand for a larger science and a rational sanction for an 
emotional repugnance. 

Necessary perhaps as a stage of growth, a predominantly 
naturalistic way of looking at the world must be con- 
sciously broken up to admit more complex facts — facts of 
mind, ' ' idea forces. ' ' The ideal element in social life finds 
its expression largely in literature which at the same time 



134 "^^^ Social Mind and Education. 

reflects nature and man in mutual reaction. The presenta- 
tion of great literary masterpieces as displaying the forces 
of mind at work in society has the double advantage of 
affording concrete material of inherent interest, and of set- 
ting up those emotional associations which are essential to 
the development of personality. 

The provisional survey of society or social philosophy, 
thus broadened and enriched both by literary studies and 
collateral pursuits of one or more of the special social 
sciences, may next be more thoroughly organized ; gen- 
eral principles may be developed out of the concrete facts 
of experience, historical reading, and the laws of eco- 
nomic and political theory. At last phenomena may be 
arranged in their logical order. The sciences fall into their 
rational sequence ; studies are seen to be related in a great 
unified system of mental conceptions which, put behind the 
apparently unconnected daily experiences, sets them in 
order and gives a deeper, clearer meaning to both indi- 
vidual and collective life. Thus an original chaos of per- 
ceptions becomes finally, through many stages of growth, 
a cosmos of ideas. 

But it is not enough that the predominantly intellectual 
aspect of consciousness only be set in order ; there must 
also be a systematic attempt to aid in the unification of the 
emotional and volitional life. Conduct as well as thought 
must be organized. The old curriculum, which suddenly 
in senior year introduced a moral philosophy that had little 
or no relation to the other studies of the course, is passing 
away. There is need of a social ethics which shall grow 
naturally out of the pursuits which precede it, which shall 
base principles of conduct on the essential nature of man 
living in association with his fellows, which out of unified 
knowledge shall guide the unification of personality for the 
achievement of ideal ends. 



The Integration of Studies. 135 

All this leads to a systematic synthesis of studies and 
experience into a philosophy, a conscious view of the 
world, an ideal scheme within which events take their 
places in orderly relations. Such a philosophy must in the 
nature of things be provisional. It must grow with growth 
in knowledge and experience, but it is nevertheless a pur- 
poseful putting of things together — a habit which once 
formed becomes a vital necessity of the mind. 

It is not, then, Utopian to believe that the time will come 
when many of the ablest minds will be specially trained and 
devoted to the service of helping college students to organ- 
ize and integrate their studies into a philosophy of social 
life and a way of looking at the universe. For this is a 
task which cannot longer be neglected. If the experience 
of the race counts for anything, the view of the whole is 
quite as important as the knowledge of details. This view 
of the whole should not be left to happy accident. A 
purposeful "short-cut" must be directed by the higher 
education. "Knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers." 
Much has been done to hasten the advent of knowledge. 
It remains to accelerate in some measure at least the tardy 
pace of that unified knowledge which is wisdom. 



CHAPTER VI. 

A TENTATIVE CURRICULUM. 

Arnold Toynbee once asserted that changes can be 
accomplished only by two things : first, an ideal whicli 
arouses interest and kindles the imagination, and second, 
a definite, intelligent plan for carrying that ideal out 
into practice. ' If the ideal which has been outlined in the 
foregoing chapters is to have any value it must be shown to 
be capable of introduction, in provisional form at least, 
into present educational arrangements. 

The following scheme is presented as a basis for discus- 
sion and as a suggestion for definite machinery of instruc- 
tion. Inevitably the writer exposes himself to the charge 
of being a doctrinaire. He would emphatically disavow 
any thought of dogmatism concerning so complex a 
problem, and above all would have it distinctly under- 
stood that no mechanism can be a substitute for motive 
power, no arrangement of courses, however philosophi- 
cally sound or pedagogically wise, can in itself insure that 
spirit of instruction which alone will give the structure life. 
This plan is designed to show how an earnest purpose to 
integrate the college curriculum might work itself out by 
means of certain definite courses. In the absence of such 
a vivifying purpose this scheme would be merely dry 
bones. 

Again this essay definitely disclaims any attempt to 
offer conclusions on three points : ( i ) as to the precise 

1 Quoted by Professor Herbert B. Adams in a lecture on " Arnold Toynbee," 
reported in The Chautauqua Assembly Herald, August 4, 1888. 

136 



A Tentative Curriculum. 137 

details of the requirement of different studies, (2) as to the 
wisdom of having one academic degree or more, (3) as to 
a definite group system by which election of one subject 
shall ipso facto determine in general the use of the other 
electives. 

The positive aim will be ( i ) to indicate a required cur- 
riculum which does accomplish the general representation of 
subjects although others might conceivably render equally 
good service in this regard ; (2) to show how a series of 
synthetic courses might be introduced in this or another 
curriculum to guide systematically the development of the 
student's mind out of isolated studies into a unified way of 
looking at life and conduct. The emphasis is to be laid 
upon the second aim and the first is important only in rela- 
tion to it. 

Certain existing conditions must at the outset be accepted 
as limits beyond which changes cannot at present be car- 
ried. Thus the period of the higher education must 
include on the average four scholastic years of approx- 
imately nine months, and each year must be further sub- 
divided into three terms of about equal length. Again, 
the number of exercises per week cannot ordinarily exceed 
an average of fifteen. Once more, five great divisions of 
study at least must be represented at some period in the 
required courses of the curriculum, and at the same time 
a sufficient number of free electives must be provided to 
permit continuity of work in any one study or group of 
studies. 

An outline of the proposed requirements in the curric- 
ulum is as follows : 

Freshman Year. (Twelve required units of four hours 
per week for one term, grouped into four general 
courses. No electives.) 

I. Formal Studies. Mathematics (3 units), Classical 



138 The Social Mind and Education. 

Languages (3 units), Modern European Languages (3 
units), English Language (2 units). 

IL Sciences of Nature. (Referred to incidentally in 
mathematical courses. ) 

in. Psychological. (Involved to some extent in lan- 
guage and literary courses. ) 

IV. (i) Social Products. (Represented in language 
courses.) English Literature (i unit). 

(2) Social Process. (Represented in language 
courses. ) 

Synthetic. — History, literature, geography, applied 
science, art, are all correlated in the language courses 
which, conducted in the modern spirit, can meet all the 
needs of unity for the first year. 

Sophomore Year. (Six units of five hours per week 
for one term. One weekly lecture course. Three 
elective units. ) 

I. Formal. Modern European Languages (2 units). 

II. Sciences of Nature. A laboratory science (3 
units). 

IV. (2) Social Process. History (i unit). 

Synthetic, (i) Required lecture covlXs^ (one hour per 
week for two terms) on the Philosophy of Nature, dealing 
with the inorganic and organic sciences as parts of a sys- 
tematic view of natural phenomena. (2) Required lecture 
course (one hour per week for one term) on Physiography 
and History, bringing nature and man into relation. (3) 
Possible use of French and German manuals in science and 
other courses. ' 

Junior Year. (Three units of four hours per week for 
one term. Two lecture courses. Six elective units. ) 

1 This has been tried in several institutions. The plan is advocated because it 
makes a language an actual means to an immediate and necessary end. The use- 
fulness of the language is at once apparent. 



Freskmati Year. 



Sophomore Year. 



Junior Year. 



Great Divisions 
I. Formal. 

Mathematics. 
Language. 
II. Science. 
Inorganic. 
Organic. 

III. Psychological. 
Psychology. 
Logic. 
Ethics. 
Literature (?) 
Philosophy. 

Synthetic 
Courses. 

IV. Social. 

1. Products. 
Literature (?) 
Philology. 

2. Process. 
History. 
Economics. 
Sociology, etc. 



Senior Year. 



Classi 



Mo 



(Referred 



(Involved 
Langu 



(Synthesi 
Litera 



Repres 
Language 



( Repres 
Language 

No ele 



athematic 



cal Lang 



English. 



dern E 



to in Mat 
courses. ) 



to some 
age cour 



s in Lang 
tare cour 



ented in 
courses. 



ented in 
courses. ) 



uages. 



uropean 



hematical 



extent irr 
ses.) 



uage and 
ses.) 



English 
Litera- 
ture. 



Langua 



Use of 
or Ge 
text-b 



V 



Philoso 
Scie 



ges.* 



Science. 



French 
rman 
ooks (?) 



V 



phy of 
nee. 



Physiogra- 
phy and ■ 



History. 



A 



History. 



Th ree elect ives. 



Social 



Problems 



A 



History. 



Psychol- 
ogy- 



\1/ 
Survey of 



Social 
Sciences, 



Literature 



and Life 



( Litera- 
ture rep- 
resented 

above. ) 



Six electives 



Social 


i 
Social 


Philoso- 
phy. 


Ethics. 



General 
Philoso- 
phy. 



Eig ht electiv es. 



SYNOPTIC CHART OF REQUIRED COURSES IN A PROPOSED CURRICULUM. 
Explanation. — Only required courses are indicated. Each horizontal line between any two perpendicular lines represents one unit of four 
or five hours per week for one term. Each dotted horizontal line represents a lecture course of one hour per week for one term. 

• Obviously the required languages might be distributed in several different ways to serve various special ends. 



A Tentative Curriculum. 139 

III. Psychological. Psychology (i unit). 

IV. (2) Social Process. History (i unit). 

Synthetic, (i) Lecture courses (one hour a week for 
first term). Social Problems. The presentation in detail of 
several leading problems in economics, politics, and 
sociology. (2) A survey of the Social Sciences, afford- 
ing a preliminary philosophy of society and indicating the 
various studies which deal with its different aspects. (3) 
Course (i unit). Literature and Life. A course on 
Shakespeare or Milton. 

Senior Year. (One unit. Two lecture courses. Eight 
elective units.) 

Synthetic, (i) Lecture course (one hour a week for 
one term). Social Philosophy — presentation of a general 
theory as to the origin and development of society and the 
leading principles of association. (2) Lecture course (one 
hour a week for one term). Social Ethics — criteria and 
ideals of conduct, civic duty, social service, etc. (3) 
Course (i unit). Philosophy — either (<a!) the development 
of modern philosophy or (<^) the presentation of the system 
of one great philosopher. 

It is, perhaps, necessary to indicate still further in detail 
the character of the synthetic courses proposed in this cur- 
riculum. At the outset it must be insisted that the success 
of the whole scheme would be absolutely dependent upon 
a spirit of hearty cooperation in the teaching staff. If 
these courses were regarded simply as so much additional 
work to be gone through with perfunctorily, they would 
prove virtually useless. The students would quickly detect 
the apathy and come to look upon the lectures as largely a 
formality not organically related to the course as a whole. 
Again, the faculty should be socially self-conscious, i. e.^ 



140 The Social Mind and Education. 

each fully informed as to the general purpose and adjusting 
his instruction to this end. 

Moreover, these unifying courses should be prepared 
with the utmost care and skill so that their organizing 
function might be performed with the greatest economy of 
attention and effort. Their aim should be not only to 
convey information but to set in order knowledge already 
acquired. These courses, too, should be accompanied by 
syllabi and brief bibliographies. Regular examinations 
should form a part of the plan. Indeed, every legitimate 
device should be employed to impress upon the students 
the fundamental and essential nature of the mental habits 
for which these lectures and courses would stand. 

During the first year the instructors in language would 
be intrusted with the task of preserving in a general way 
the unity of the course. This they are more and more 
fully able to do, as the new spirit of classical instruction 
makes its way into colleges and universities. Geography, 
history, social science, ethics, and philosophy, as well 
as literature, philology, and logic, are naturally related 
in a study of the language and literary masterpieces which 
have grown out of the social life of a classical people. 
The outcry against the utter barrenness of a course given 
over largely in its first years to language and mathe- 
matics, is a protest against the outworn, dry, scholastic 
methods which happily are being replaced by new theory 
and practice. 

In the second year an attempt to put natural phenomena 
into a rational system may well be made. The student's 
preparation in the nature group, and his pursuit of some 
one laboratory science in the first terms of the sophomore 
year, enable him to comprehend a course of lectures on the 
general classification of natural phenomena, the chief laws 
by which each group is unified, and the more inclusive 



A Tentative C^crriculum. 141 

hypotheses, such as that of the conservation of energy, the 
equivalence of forces, the law of gravitation, and the like. 
Finally, a theory of cosmic development may be presented, 
and the mind may be carried through the various stages by 
which the natural world is conceived as gaining its present 
form and aspect. Thus, physics, chemistry, astronomy, 
geology, and biology are all displayed as bodies of knowl- 
edge which organized into a whole give a complete picture 
of one great division of man's experience.' 

It is next necessary to bring the nature group into rela- 
tions with the social. At this point a suggestion comes 
from the lower schools. Why may not geography play a 
part quite as important in the college curriculum as in the 
elementary and secondary schools? Physiography has 
been recently made a college study and gives great prom- 
ise of service. It correlates the natural sciences on the one 
hand and on the other offers a point of contact with the 
social sciences represented especially in history. A course 
of lectures, therefore, on .physiography and history would 
provide the necessary step in building up a conception of 
society as both dependent upon its natural basis and as 
reacting upon it. Here various facts as to the influence 
of natural conditions, contour, resources, water supply, 
climate, etc. , upon race and national development could be 
introduced and discussed with comparative thoroughness 
instead of being left as now to more or less casual allusion 
in history courses. Enough material is now available to 
enrich such a course with ample illustrations, and to pre- 
pare the student for an intelligent comprehension of a most 
important aspect of social growth. The Edinburgh summer 
school, mentioned above, has done important work in this 
direction by developing a method of studying the region 

1 A course of this kind has been given by President Jordon at the Leland 
Stanford, Jr., University with marked success. 



142 The Social Mind and Education. 

about Edinburgh from the double standpoint of geology 
and histor\\ ' 

It is to be noted further that the schedule requires stu- 
dents to pursue a course in history at the same time with 
this synthetic course so that there would be frequent oppor- 
tunity* for cross reference and illustration. 

Logically the next step would be the presentation of a 
unified way of looking at society, but. as has been pointed 
out, the student is first attracted to concrete, definite 
problems rather than to general theories. In race devel- 
opment theories grow out of the solving of problems. It 
would be better, therefore, to present during the first term 
of junior year certain t^'pical social problems — definite, con- 
crete situations which demand careful analysis and wise 
solution. The habit of looking at such problems from 
many standpoints can best be encouraged by describing in 
detail the facts concerning them, pointing out ditficulties 
and outlining critically some of the proposed solutions. In 
this way the value of detailed study on the one hand and 
the absolute need of synthetic judgment on the other would 
be \'ividly impressed upon the student.' 

The consideration of these vexed questions of contem- 
porary' life would be likely, it is true, to produce the efiect 
of hopeless disagreement upon the student's mind. Each 
problem might seem more or less isolated from every 
other, and society might appear fragmentary-, a thing of 
many details. Yet if these problems were wisely presented 
there would grow out of them a con\-iction that some coher- 
ent way of concei^-ing social relations is a fundamental 

1 Such a course as this should not deal with vague theories but should present 
concrete practical problems such as those discussed by Professor N. S. Shaler in 
" Nature and Man in America," Professor James Br\-ce in his chapter on "The 
Home of the Nation," and Professor F. J. Turner in his monograph on "The 
Frontier in American History." 

2 This method has been employed successfully at The University of Pennsyl- 
vania and other institutions. 



A Tentative Curricuhctn. 143 

condition of rational solution. Thus a demand for a pro- 
visional social philosophy would develop naturally out of 
the attempt to judge particular situations and difficulties. 
A unilied way of looking at the relation of the individual 
to societ\-, the activities of associated life, and social insti- 
tutions would form the subject matter of another lecture 
course during the second term of junior year. In other 
words, a preliminary and superficial survey of society as a 
whole, and the discrimination of certain general classes of 
phenomena, should precede the detailed study of such 
groups. It is most important that the student should gain 
that conspectus of societ)' which will enable him to correlate 
what knowledge of social phenomena he may already 
possess ; and to perceive the principles upon which they 
are distributed among the special social sciences. Political 
economy, political science, anthropolog}', sociolog}', are 
thus shown to be parts of a vast cooperative attempt to 
explore and interpret the associated life of men. Such a 
general view afiords a certain synthesis, but after all it must 
be consciously recognized as only a provisional unification. 
Premature generalizations and conceptions are to be 
avoided. The ' ' circle of thought " — to use the Herbartian 
phrase — should be frequently completed for a time, but 
never finally closed. 

A course of lessons and lectures on some great literary 
masterpiece — a Shakespearean play for example — might 
admirably ser\-e a tn-ofold purpose. It would furnish a tan- 
gible and concrete subject matter to be studied in the light 
of nature, psychology', and societ}% and it would pro\dde 
material for aesthetic and emotional development, which is 
too likely to be slighted unless it be consciously fostered in 
some such way. The more or less arid generalizations of 
social science, if they are to be of real service, need all the 
while to be brought back to the special and concrete. 



144 The Social Mind and Education. 

With the preparation involved in what precedes, the 
college senior would be able to comprehend intelligently a 
course of lectures on social evolution or social philosophy 
which would attempt to trace the origin and growth of 
society and to interpret the process in terms of physical, 
vital, and psychical forces. The sciences could be dis- 
played in their logical arrangement crowned by a science 
or philosophy of society in which all take their places and 
get their true meaning. Here consciously studies would 
be integrated, i. e. , not merely correlated, but unified into 
an organism of knowledge. 

The presentation of social philosophy would naturally be 
followed by a course of lectures on social ethics based — so 
far as content goes — upon the conception which, regarding 
the individual and society as each an abstraction, in reality 
sees both in organic relations, the individual realizing 
himself in serving society. A truer conception of civic 
duty could be developed from this view of life and the 
highest ideals could be brought into natural relations with 
a unified knowledge of the nature and progress of society. 

The final step would consist in relating social philosophy 
to a way of looking at the cosmos. Here two plans are 
possible. Either a history of modern philosophy might be 
presented in such a way as to trace the gradual develop- 
ment of certain philosophical ideas or the system of one of 
the great philosophers such as Kant or Hegel might be 
studied in detail. The criticism usually made upon the 
average course in the history of philosophy is that it dis- 
tracts rather than unifies the student's mind. He passes 
from one system to another so rapidly that all seems chaos 
and confusion. The fault is one of teaching method rather 
than inherent in the subject matter which may be presented 
from the developmental standpoint so as to show the 
growth of a unified way of regarding the universe. That 



A Tentative Curriculum. 145 

is, the emphasis is laid on the common characters of suc- 
cessive philosophies rather than upon various differing- 
details. For a short course, however, much is to be said 
in favor of studying a single system — one great man's way 
of conceiving things as a unity/ It is not even desirable 
that this become a permanent creed, but it should serve as 
a first structure to be renewed and remade, but never as a 
whole to be abandoned — as a form permanent, however, 
the content may change. 

If the question be asked : who is to give these syn- 
thetic courses ? it may be replied that at first a number of 
men must contribute — perhaps one for the sciences, 
another for physiography and history, still another for the 
social sciences, a fourth for the literature, and a fifth for the 
courses of senior year. In the present state of specializa- 
tion few men would be prepared to venture far beyond the 
limits of their particular fields. Yet if these lecturers by 
conference and discussion would work out in detail a coher- 
ent articulated scheme and then each would do his part in 
harmony with this common plan, much might- be accom- 
plished at once. 

It seems not unreasonable to hope, however, that in 
time this synthetic service will itself become a special 
function to which a man will devote his whole time and 
energy. It is usual to deride such a suggestion as im- 
plying that one person can master the whole of human 
knowledge — a manifest impossibility if by mastery is meant 
an acquaintance with all the details of all departments. 
But obviously scientific knowledg^e has been organized out 
of details and the general principles include vast areas of 
particulars. To deny that one man can gain a general 
grasp of these principles and conceive them in still wider 

1 Vide letter of advice to a young student of philosophy from Taine : Pour et 

contre f enseignement philosophiqiie, pp. 162, 163. 



146 The Social Mind and Education. 

relations of unity, is by implication to assert that men have 
piled up more knowledge than they can organize, that 
specialization instead of enriching and strengthening the 
social tradition is ever loading it with indigestible facts. 

Such in barest outline is a plan for giving greater unity 
and clearer purpose to our higher education. Like all 
plans it is in itself impotent. It is presented, however, 
with the hope not that it will prove adequate in all its 
details, but that it may at least suggest a general end 
toward which the work of our undergraduate curriculum 
ought more consciously and definitely to be directed. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
I. SOCIOLOGICAL. 

BOOKS. 

Bluntschli, Johann : The Theory of the State (Eng. trans.). 

Chamberlain, A. F. : The Child and Childhood in Folk Thought. 

Comte, Auguste : Cours de philosophie positive (6 vols.). 

De Greef, Guillaume : Introduction h la sociologie (2 vols.); 
V evolution des croyances et des doctrines politiques ; Le trans- 
formisme social. 

Durkheim, E. : Les regies de la mithode sociologique ; De la di- 
vision du travail social. 

Flint, Robert : Vico ; The History of the Philosophy of History 
(France). 

Fouill^e, Alfred : Le mouvement positivisle et la conception socio- 
logique du ntond; La science sociale contemporaine . 

Hobbes : Leviathan (Molesworth Ed.). 

Giddings, Franklin H.: The Principles of Sociology. ' 

Izoulet, Jean : La cit^ moderne. 

Le Bon, Gustave : Psychologie desfoules. 

Lilienfeld, Paul : Gedanken ilber die social Wissenschaft der Zu- 
kunft (5 vols.). 

Locke : Political Treatise. 

Machiavelli : The Prince (Morley's Lib.). 

Mackenzie, James S. : An Introduction to Social Philosophy. 

Montesquieu : U esprit les lots (tr. by Nugent). 

Paul, H. : Principles of the History of Language (tr. by Strong). 

Perrier, Ed. : Les colonies animales. 

Rousseau, Jean Jacques : Discours sur Vorigine et les fondements 
de rinigalitS parmi les hommes. 

Schaffle, A. E. Fr. : Bau und Leben des socialen K'drpers{^ vols.). 

Tarde, G : La logique sociale. 

Turgot : CEuvres (Ed. Daire). 

Ward, Lester F. : The Psychic Factors of Civilization ; Dynamic 
Sociology (2 vols.). 

147 



148 Bibliography. 



MAGAZINE AND REVIEW ARTICLES. 

Bern^s, M. : '■^ Sur la mithode de la sociologie," Revue philo- 
sophique, Tome XXIX.; "La Sociologie," Revue de mSta- 
physique et de morale, Tome III. 

Bosanquet, Bernard : ' ' The Relation of Sociology to Philoso- 
phy," Mind, January, 1897. 

Hall, G. Stanley : " The Story of a Sand-Pile," Scribner's Maga- 
zine, Vol. III., p. 690. 

Johnson, J. H. : "Rudimentary Society Among Boys," J. H. U. 
Studies, November, 1884. 

Tufts, J. H.: "Recent Sociological Tendencies in France," 
American Journal of Sociology, January, 1896. 

Ward, Lester F. : "The Data of Sociology," American Journal oj 
Sociology, May, 1896 ; "Sociology in its Relation to the Social 
Sciences," Ainerican Journal of Sociology, July, 1895 ; "Soci- 
ology and Biology," American Journal of Sociology, Novem- 
ber, 1895. 

II. PHILOSOPHICAL. 



Aristotle : Metaphysics (tr. by McMahon). 

Arnott, Neil : Elements of Physics. 

Bacon, Francis : Novum. Organum, (tr. by Dewey) ; Instauratio 
Magna (tr. by Dewey). Bohn's Lib. 

Ball, W. W. R.: A Short Account of the History of Mathematics. 

Blum, E. : La philosophic des sciences. 

Butcher, L. H.: Some Aspects of the Greek Genius. 

De Candolle : Histoire des sciences et des savants (2d ed. ). 

De la Grasserie, R. : De la classification, objective et subjective, 
des arts, de la littirature et des sciences. 

Descartes : Les prittcipes (Ed. Liard). 

Falckenberg, R. : History of Modern Philosophy (tr. by Arm- 
strong). 

Fiske, John : Outlines of Cos^nic Philosophy (2 vols.). 

Haeckel, Ernst H.: Gesannnte Populdre Vortrdge. 

Hegel : The Philosophy of History (tr. by Sibree) ; Encyclopddie 
der phi losophisch en Wissensch aften. 

Herbart : ^sthetische Darstellimg der Welt (tr. by Felkin). 

Herder : Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind. 



Bibliography. 149 



Lalande, A. : Sur la philosophie des sciences. 

Le Conte, Joseph : Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thought. 

Leibnitz : Nouveaux Essais (Ed. von Gerhardt). 

Mach, E. : Popular Scientific Lectures (tr. by McCormack). 

Mill, John Stuart : Dissertations and Discussions. 

La Mettrie : E hotnme tnaclmie (Ed. Ass6zat). 

Oncken, August : Adam Smith und Immanuel Kant. 

Pestalozzi : Meine Nachforschungen iiber den Gang der Natur 

in der Entwickelung der Menschengeschlechts. 
Royce, Josiah : The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. 
Shields, C. W. : The Order of the Sciences. 
Spencer, Herbert : First Principles (2d ed.) ; Essays : Scientific, 

Political, and Speculative (3 vols.). 
Whewell, William : Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences ; History 

of the hiductive Sciences. 
Wolff: Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica. 
Wundt, W. : Methoden Lehre (Div. IV., Chap. L). 

MAGAZINE AND REVIEW ARTICLES. 

Andler, Charles : Review of Lalande's Lectures sur la philosophie 
des sciences, La revue philosophique, Tome XXIX., p. 329. 

Armstrong, A. C. : " Philosophy in American Colleges," Educa- 
tional Review, January, 1897. 

Bourdon, B. : Review of R. de la Grasserie, De la classification, 
objective et subjective, des arts, de la litterature et des sciences. 
Revue philosophique. Tome XXIX., p. 106. 

Flint, Robert: "The Classification of the Sciences," Presby- 
terian Review, July, 1885, and July, 1886 ; " Philosophy as a 
Scientia Scientiarum," Princeton Review, November, 1878. 

Hodgson, S. H.: " Philosophy and Science," Mind, January, 1876. 

Huxley, T. H.: "Evolution," Encyclopcsdia Britannica (9th 
ed.). Vol. VIII. 

Ladd, George T. : Proceedings of American Psychological Asso- 
ciation reported in The Psychological Review, May, 1896. 

De Nemours, Dupont : Article in Physiocrates (Ed. Daire). 

Seth, A.: "Philosophy," Encyclopcedia Britannica (9th ed.). 
Vol. XVIIL, p. 792. 

Wundt, W.: "Uberdie Entstehung der Wissenschaften," 
Philosophische Studien, Bd. V. 

Review in Mind of Berthelot's Science and Philosophy, July, 1886. 



1 50 Bibliography. 



III. PSYCHOLOGICAL. 

BOOKS. 

Baldwin, J. Mark : Mental Evolution in the Child and the Race. 

Dewey, John : Psychology. 

Fouill^e, Alfred : Psychologic des ideSs-forces (2 vols.). 

Hofding, H. : Outlines of Psychology (tr. by Lowndes). 

James, William : Psychology (2 vols.). 

Kant : Kritik der Reinen Veritunft (Ed. von Hartenstein). 

Lazarus and Steinthal : Zeitschrift fur Volkerpsychologie, Bd. I. 

Lewes, G. H. : Problems of Life and Mind: The Study of 

Psychology. 
Locke : Human Understanding (Ed. by Frazer). 
Preyer, W. : Infant Mind {tr. by Brown). 
Romanes, George H.: Mental Evolution in Man. 
Sully, James : Studies of Childhood. 
Ward, James : "Psychology," Encyclopcsdia Britannica (9th ed. ), 

Vol. XX. 

REVIEW ARTICLE. 

Fostor, H. M.: "Organic Evolution and Mental Elaboration," 
Mind, October, 1895. 

IV. PEDAGOGICAL. 



Blow, Susan E. : Symbolic Educatioti. 

Compayr^, Gabriel: History of Pedagogy (tr. by Payne). 

De Garmo, Charles : Herbart and the Herbartians. 

De Greef, Guillaume : E enseignetnent intigral et la philosophic 
positive. An address delivered at the opening of the New 
University of Brussels. 

Fouill^e, Alfred : E enseignement au point de vue national. 

Guyau, J. M. : Education and Heredity (tr. by Greenstreet). 

Harris, W. T. : Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1892-93, 
Vol. II. 

Herbart : Allgemeine Pddagogik ; Pddagogischen Schriften. 

Hill, Thomas : The True Order of Studies. 

Kant : Pddagogik (Ed. von Hartenstein), Bd. VIII. 

Parker, F. W. : Talks on Pedagogics. 

Pestalozzi : How Gertrude Teaches Her Children (tr. by Hol- 
land and Turner). 



Bibliography. 151 



Rein, W. : Outlines of Pedagogics (tr. by C. C. and I. J. Van 

Liew). 
Rein, Pickel, and Scheller : Das Erste Schuljahr. 
Rousseau, Jean Jacques : Entile (tr. by Payne). 
Spencer, Herbert : Education. 
Thomas, Felix : La suggestion : son rdle dans P Education. 

MAGAZINE AND REVIEW ARTICLES. 

Dewey, John : "The Culture Epoch Theory," Second Year Book 
of the Herbart Society. 

Eliot, Charles: "The Unity of Educational Reform," Educa- 
tional Review, October, 1894. 

Geddes, Patrick : " Prospectus of the Fifth Session of a Summer 
School of Arts and Science." Reports of lectures in The 
Interpreter. 

Hailman, W. N. : "Organic Relations of Studies in Human 
Development." Reprint from Proceedings of Jacksonville 
Conference. 

Harris, W. T.: Nineteenth Annual Report of the Board of 
Directors of the St. Louis Public Schools (1872-73). 

Hinsdale, B. A.: "The Dogma of Formal Culture," Educa- 
tional Review, September, 1894. 

Jackman, W. S. : "Correlation of Science and History," Educa- 
tional Review, May, 1896. 

Ladd, George T. : " Essentials of a Liberal Education," Educa- 
tional Review, October, 1895. 

Le Conte, Joseph : "The Effect of the Theory of Evolution on 
Education," Educational Review, September, 1895. 

Lowell, James Russell : Harvard Anniversary Address. 

Lukens, H. T. : "The Correlation of Studies," Educational 
Review, November, 1895. 

McMurray, C. A.: "The Culture Epochs," Second Year Book 
of the Herbart Society. 

McMurray, F. A.: " The Concentration of Studies," First 
Year Book of the Herbart Society. 

Morris, George S. : "The Philosophy of the State and of His- 
tory, ' ' Methods of Teaching and Studying History. 

Rein, W. : "Pestalozzi and Herbart," Forum, May, 1896. 

Taine, H. : Letter quoted in Pour et contre P enseignement phi- 
losophiqiie, pp. 162-163. 



5 Bibliography. 

Thompson Anna Boynton: "The EducI^I^^^IT^J^^i^T^T^ 
^oryr Educatio7tal Review, K^rW 189s 

"'"^aTitf"^ "^'^ "^"""^ ^P°'^^ ^^-^ '" ^-^^-W 
Report of the Committee of Fifteen on "Ti,. ^ , •• 

Studies" (Annotated by G.P Brown). ^""""°" °' 



INDEX. 



Agassiz, L., 73. 
Analysis, 26, 36, 54. 
Andler, Charles, 25. 
Anthropomorphism, 27, 50, 83, 84. 
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 53. 
Aristotle, 30, 31, 35, 40, 42, 52, 58. 
Arnott, Neil, 46. 
Arts, 40. 
Augustine, 52. 
Autocracies, 20. 

Bacon, Francis, 30, 43, 53, 54. 

Bacon, Roger, 42. 

Bain, Alexander, 33, 48. 

Baldwin, J. M., 76, 78, 85, 94, 95, 99. 

Bernes, M., 66, 69. 

Berthelot, M., 32. 

Beyer, 72. 

Bibliographies, 22. 

Bichat, 57. 

Biology, 57, 60, 61, 73. 

Blow, S. E., 26. 

Blum, E., 49. 

Bluntschli, J., 67. 

Bonnet, 25. 

Bourdon, B., 32. 

Buckle, 64. 

Burdin, 46. 

Butcher, S. H., 115. 

Chamberlain, A. F., 78. 

Childhood of the race, 69. 

Children's thinking, 72-84. 

Child study, 76. 

Christianity, 52. 

Classification of the sciences, 28,29-31, 

40-49. 
Clement of Alexandria, 70. 
Committee of Fifteen, Report of, no, 

114, 123. 
Communication, 17, 53. 
Compayre, G., 41. 
Compulsion, social, 14. 



Comte, Auguste, 23, 26-30, 35, 37, 46, 49, 
51. 53. 56, 57, 60. 70, 71, 78, 79> 123- 

Concentration of studies, 106. 

Consciousness, social, general defi- 
nition, 13, 16, 68 ; relation to social 
self-consciousness, 19, 20 ; growth of 
purpose, 23, 24 ; contrast with social 
unconsciousness, 27-29. 

Contract, 80. 

Coordination of studies, 106. 

Correlation of studies, 106. 

Crowds, 17. 

Culture Epoch theory, 72, 81, 93, 96, 98, 
99. 

Curricula, 116, 118, 130-135, 137-146. 

Custom, 12, 81. 

Cuvier, 57. 

Dante, 41. 

Darwin, Charles, 35, 60, 73. 

De Candolle, 25. 

De Garmo, Charles, 72, 109. 

De Greef, G., 15, 16, 19, 22, 42, 53, 56, 57, 

58, 61, 62, 64, 66, 79, 80, 115. 
Democracies, 20. 
Descartes, 44, 53. 
Dewey, J., 94, 100, 103, 106. 
Discipline, mental, 118, 119, 122, 123. 
Discovery, 16. 
Division of mental labor, 15, 17, 25, 26, 

51. 77- 
Dollinger, 73. 
Dumas, 73. 
Durkheim, E., 14, 23, 25, 62, 74, 81. 

Edinburgh Summer School, 115, 141. 

Education, as a social function, 91, 116- 
118; aim of, 92, 96, 97, 121 ; both social 
and individual, 92; recapitulation the- 
ory, 100; diff"erentiation of studies, 85, 
103 ; need of unity in higher, 114 sg. ; 
higher, 120 sq. 

Ego, development of, 86. 



154 



Index. 



Eliot, Charles, 117. 
Embryology, social, 77. 
Environment, 74, 95, 99, 112. 
Espinas, 67. 
Ethics, social, 134, 144. 
Evolution, mental, 75; social, 24, 51, 
58; universal, 50. 

Faculties, college, 139. 

Falckenberg, R., 13, 17, 26. 

Fechner, 61. 

Fiske, John, 27, 37, 47, 60. 

Flint, Robert, 25, 26, 29, 31, 33, 34, 38, 40, 

43,48,51.53, 54,59- 
Folk-psychology, 67. 
Foster, H. M., 37. 

Fouillee, Alfred, 12, 46, 48, 62, 67, 91, 115. 
Froebel, 26. 

Galileo, 53. 

Geddes, P., 115. 

Giddings, F. H., 12, 19, 57, 62. 

Goethe, 60, 70. 

Government, 20, 21. 

Grasserie, R. de la, 35. 

Guyau, J. M., 93, 99. 

Haeckel, E., 73, 74, 75. 

Hailman, W. N., 102. 

Hall, G. S., 77. 

Haller, 25. 

Happiness, 89. 

Harris, W. T., 93, 114, 117, 124. 

Hartmann, 72, 76. 

Hegel, 33, 45, 46, 64, 70. 

Herbart, 56, 61, 70-72, 107. 

Herder, 70. 

Heredity, 82. 

Hill, T., 124. 

Hinsdale, B. A., 118. 

Hobbes, 44, 58. 

Hodgson, S. H., 32. 

Hofding, H., 76, 77, 86. 

Huxley, T. H., 73. 

Imitation, 15. 

Induction and deduction, 100. 

Interest, 104. 

Izoulet, J., 20. 

Jackman, W. S., in. 

James, W., ii, 13, 16, 24, 82, 86, 130. 



Johnson, G. H., 77. 
Jordan, D. S., 141. 

Kant, 45, 70. 

Knowledge, social, 21, 24, 39, 66. 

Laboratory method, 120. 
Ladd, G. T., 51, 121, 125. 
Lalande, A., 25, 40, 41, 49. 
Lamarck, 57, 60, 73. 
La Mettrie, 56. 
Language, 12, 98, no. 
Laplace, 56. 
Lazarus, 67. 
Le Bon, G., 17, 67. 
Le Conte, J., 74, 121. 
Legislatures, 21. 
Leibnitz, 25, 45, 56. 
Lewes, G. H., 13, 14, 16, 18. 
Liberal arts, 42. 
Lilienfeld, P., 61, 62, 78. 
Locke, 44, 58. 
Lotze, 61. 
Lowell, J. R., 121. 
Lukens, H. T., 105, 107. 

Machiavelli, 58. 

Mach, E., 93. 

Mackenzie, J. S., 34, 57, 63, 88-90, 92, 93. 

McMurray, C. A., 82. 

McMurray, F. A., 108, in. 

Memory, social, 15, 18, 21, 22, 25, 29. 

Meyer, 35. 

Mill, J. S., 47, 59. 

Mind, social, general definition, 11, 67 ; 
dynamic or static, 15 ; differentiated, 
16, 18 ; organized, 17, 25 ; distinguished 
from individual, 18, 19, gi ; struggle for 
unity, 23, 30, 83 ; development of, 28, 29, 
35, 73, 79, 90 ; purpose in, 23, 24, 34, 68, 
69, 79, 91 ; philosophy a synthesis of, 
38, 73 ; individuals as organs of, 52, 68. 

Montesquieu, 58. 

Morris, G. S., 129. 

Natural selection, 94. 
Newton, 25. 

Oncken, August, 59. 
Organic concept, 57, 60, 62. 

Parallelism in individual and race de- 
velopment, 67-71, 80, 90, 96. 



Index. 



155 



Parker, F. W., in. 

Paul, 68, 98, 108. 

Payne, W. H., 12. 

Pedagogy, 93. 

Perrier, E., 49. 

Personality, S7-90. 

Personality, social, 67, 68, 69, 89. 

Pestalozzi, 71, 99, 106. 

Philosophy, synthetic nature, 30-36,40; 
a science of the sciences, 38 ; classi- 
fying function, 40-49; theology, 52, 

53- 
Physiocrates, 58. 
Physiography, 141. 
Plato, 31, 52. 
Pleasure, 89. 
Preyer, 76. 

Primitive thought, 22, 82, 83. 
Printing, 17. 
Psychogenesis, 75, 76. 
Psychology, 56, 61. 

Quadrivium, 41. 
Quesnay, 58. 

Race development, 69, 70, 71, 77, 78. 
Recapitulation theory, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 

74. 77, 78, 96. 
Rein, W., 71, 72, 107. 
Research, 120. 
Romanes, 75, 76, 86. 
Rousseau, 71, loi. 
Royce, Josiah, 32, 35, 37, 56. 

Schaffle, A. E. Fr., 12, 21,61,62,78, 79. 

Scholasticism, 53. 

Sciences, nature of, 25 ; growth of, 26, 

54, 56 ; order of development, 28-29 ; 

organism of, 33-35, 37, 45, 134 ; differ 

from philosophy, 35 ; unification of, 

39, 50 ; origin of, 40, 83 ; abstract and 

concrete, 47, 48. 
Self, idea of, 88-90. 
Self-consciousness, social, 19, 20, 23, 24, 

25, 34. 36, 37. 55. 59. 68. 
Seth, A., 38. 
Shields, C. W.,35, 48. 
Short-cuts in evolution, 78, 94, 95, 97, 98, 

100, loi, 105, 135. 
Small, A. W., 62. 
Smith, A., 59. 



Social philosophy, 39, 52-65, 134. 

Social problems, 142-143. 

Spencer, Herbert, 24, 27, 29, 30, 35, 37, 
40, 47, 48, 60, 61, 73, 74, 75, 78, 98, 99, 
loi. 

Spinoza, 58. 

Stanley, 48. 

Steinthal, 67. 

St. Simon, 46. 

Studies, 85, 102 ; differentiation of, 104, 
105; correlation of, 106-112; liberal, 
121 ; isolation of, 123; classification of, 
124 sq.; requirements of, 128; unity 
of, 130-134. 

Suggestion, 98, 99. 

Sully,J.,76, 83, 84, 85, 98, 103. 

Syllogism, social, loi. 

Synthesis, 26, 31, 36, 54. 

Synthetic instruction, 137-146. 

Taine, H., 145. 

Tarde, G., 12, 14, 19, 20, 26, 35,62, 81,101, 

118. 
Theology, 52, 55. 
Thomas, F., 99. 
Thompson, A. B., 121. 
Threshold of consciousness, 86. 
Toynbee, A., 136. 
Tradition, 15, 18, 22, 25, 30, 36, 37, 49, 84, 

91.94- 
Treviranus, 60, 73. 
Trivium, 41. 
Tufts, J. H., 68, 89, 92. 
Turgot, 59. 

Unconsciousness, social, 27, 28, 80. 
Unity of knowledge, 114 sq. 

Van Liew, C. C, 81. 

Vico, 57, 58. 

Vogt, 72, 73. 

Von Baer, 35, 57, 60, 73. 

Ward, J., 82, 89. 

Ward, L. F., 16, 19, 20, 31, 34, 38, 48, 62, 

102, 119. 
Whewell, William, 39, 42, 50. 
Wolff, 25,45, 73- 
Wundt, 35, 61, 68, 126. 

Ziller, 70, 72, 81, 107. 



ERRATUM. 
On page 93, note 2, " Mack " should read " Mach." 



rOUNDrO BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 



THE SOCIAL MIND 



AND 



EDUCATION 



A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTIES OF THE GRAD- 
UATE SCHOOLS OF ARTS, LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE, 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 



DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 



BY 

GEOR(?E EDQAR VINCENT 



CHICAGO 

tbe mnivetsiti? ot (Tbtca^o press 

London : LUZAC & CO., 46 Great Russell St., W. C. 



LBJL'04 



«^ #i 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



029 487 352 1 






:«,'>,.';^","i:.T,' 
■:':ft;.'4,'r-^.:::-,.,. 
,".>■.;,■ •■:>^:; ■4' 
■'-;,c;";,-v::,j>J 
■„"j:^:-%v,:'r4-"i 
.' ;,-ji;:.:i:'j.-;,'?t.a 

"r.':i;;'"u-c'.>r!ii; 






:;.^-.<«oM<i.*: 




•:•-.. .;^--.l !••;(( ;'.«,, .,„,,- 

'. ^., . 1,1. -.I'- r.'%ttf}L. 
■ ■ ■[ 1 ]\*ii 

,i '•• '■;> ::^ '- vv"-^=»f.^' 



„ . ;,.. :.f.., .•.•^'..(■-lej w;. -ji™ "'*-" 
;.:',».•,'■;: :i'. Si 



JiJCs. 















